[{"id":37254,"date":"2026-09-18T20:08:54","date_gmt":"2026-09-19T00:08:54","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/?p=37254"},"modified":"2026-09-18T20:08:54","modified_gmt":"2026-09-19T00:08:54","slug":"teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-ii-divisions-designers-and-doctrines","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/18\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-ii-divisions-designers-and-doctrines\/","title":{"rendered":"Teaching Paradox: Hearts of Iron IV, Part II: Divisions, Designers and Doctrines"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is the second part (<a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"37063\">I<\/a>) of our long-delayed series looking at <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em>, Paradox Interactive&#8217;s World War II grand strategy game and also one of the most popular strategy games currently on the market.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Last week, we looked at how <em>HoI4<\/em> simulates combat, particularly its focus on <em><strong>operations<\/strong><\/em> (rather than tactics or, as we&#8217;ll see in later weeks, strategy).  Much of <em>Hearts of Iron<\/em>&#8216;s success is due to its effectiveness as an operational simulator and its operational model is <em><strong>by far<\/strong><\/em> the most developed part of the game.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This week we&#8217;re turning to the question of how <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> handles what is going on below the operational level that the player operates at.  Because the player does not themselves handle &#8211; or even really <em>see<\/em> &#8211; how their armies function below that division-level operational simulator, the granularity here comes from <strong>how <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> understands &#8216;doctrine<\/strong>,&#8217; which is to say the practices, guidelines and expectations that militaries use to guide their function in the field.  The player is thus notionally given some ability, by choosing doctrines and determining the composition of their divisions, to shape how their units fight in the small scale (or at least how those fights are abstractly simulated).  In practice, however, as we&#8217;ll see, <em>HoI4<\/em>&#8216;s approach to doctrine is less developed than its approach to operations and never quite succeeds in really capturing the different ways that armies in this period understood themselves and functioned.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><br>But first, if you like what you are reading here, please share it, as I rely on word of mouth to replenish my manpower pool after poorly considered post topics. If you really like it, you can support me, my academic work and my public writing, including this project on <a href=\"https:\/\/www.patreon.com\/user?u=20122096\">Patreon<\/a>! I can\u2019t promise to use your support to buy a division worth of tanks, but I also will not promise not to do that. If you want updates whenever a new post appears or want to hear my more bite-sized musings on history, security affairs and current events, you can follow me on Bluesky (@bretdevereaux.bsky.social). I am also active on Threads (bretdevereaux) and maintain a <em>de minimis<\/em> presence on Twitter (@bretdevereaux).<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"jetpack_subscription_widget\"><h2 class=\"widgettitle\"><\/h2>\n\t\t\t<div class=\"wp-block-jetpack-subscriptions__container\">\n\t\t\t<form action=\"#\" method=\"post\" accept-charset=\"utf-8\" id=\"subscribe-blog-1\"\n\t\t\t\tdata-blog=\"161773962\"\n\t\t\t\tdata-post_access_level=\"everybody\" >\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p id=\"subscribe-email\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<label id=\"jetpack-subscribe-label\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tclass=\"screen-reader-text\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfor=\"subscribe-field-1\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tEmail Address\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/label>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"email\" name=\"email\" autocomplete=\"email\" required=\"required\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tvalue=\"\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tid=\"subscribe-field-1\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tplaceholder=\"Email Address\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n\n\t\t\t\t\t<p id=\"subscribe-submit\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"action\" value=\"subscribe\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"source\" value=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/?after=2026-08-06T00%3A00%3A00&#038;page=1&#038;rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fposts\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"sub-type\" value=\"widget\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"redirect_fragment\" value=\"subscribe-blog-1\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" id=\"_wpnonce\" name=\"_wpnonce\" value=\"fd76a9d5bb\" \/><input type=\"hidden\" name=\"_wp_http_referer\" value=\"\/?after=2026-08-06T00%3A00%3A00&#038;page=1&#038;rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fposts\" \/>\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type=\"submit\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tclass=\"wp-block-button__link\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tstyle=\"margin: 0; margin-left: 0px;\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tname=\"jetpack_subscriptions_widget\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tSubscribe!\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/form>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" data-attachment-id=\"37369\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/18\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-ii-divisions-designers-and-doctrines\/394360_1730\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1730.jpg?fit=1920%2C1080&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,1080\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"394360_1730\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1730.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1730.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37369\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1730.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1730.jpg?resize=300%2C169&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1730.jpg?resize=768%2C432&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1730.jpg?resize=1536%2C864&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1730.jpg?resize=1100%2C619&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1730.jpg?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">As noted last time, in addition to aiming to win the war in Europe before the USSR can join the war, one of our goals here is <strong>Maximum Britain<\/strong> which means following the focus tree to merge the United Kingdom, the Dominions and also India into a global superstate.<br>This is, to be clear, historically speaking, a fairly absurd idea in practice, but the game makes it possible.  Pursuing it early on is a significant handicap as it is necessary to bank around 500 political power before taking the major decision to hold the Imperial Conference (you need a few hundred for the decisions themselves, but also several hundred to run &#8216;improve opinion&#8217; diplomatic efforts to get all of the relevant countries to agree).<br>I was finally in a position to fire the conference in January of 1941, while my armies continued to hold the line in the Low Countries.<br>Also, Iraq decided to go fascist at this point in the run and it went very badly for them, as you may be able to see in the background.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">What is Doctrine?<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now military <strong>doctrine<\/strong> is a concept we have been meaning to get to here on the blog for quite a while and &#8211; at last &#8211; we have a good opportunity!  Military doctrine, as a concept is one of those famously tricky to define concepts, but also absolutely essential for understanding how a military in any period &#8211; but perhaps especially in the Second World War &#8211; operates in practice.  Parshall and Tully<span id='easy-footnote-1-37254' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/18\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-ii-divisions-designers-and-doctrines\/#easy-footnote-bottom-1-37254' title='Jonathan Parshall and Anthony Tully, &lt;a href=&quot;https:\/\/amzn.to\/3soz7ab&quot;&gt;&lt;em&gt;Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway&lt;\/em&gt;&lt;\/a&gt; (2005), 83.'><sup>1<\/sup><\/a><\/span> offer what I think is one of the most accessible and useful definitions of doctrine, &#8220;At its simplest, doctrine is the body of formal knowledge that tells a fighting force how it is expected to fight&#8230;doctrine is bigger than tactic in that doctrine encompasses not only the means for actually handling forces in battle, but also augments it with command structure and communications procedures.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Doctrine is thus the term for the &#8216;standard operating procedures,&#8217; as it were, of an army or indeed of an entire military.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The reason doctrine is essential is because, as Clausewitz says, <strong>everything is very simple in war, but the simplest thing is difficult<\/strong> (drink!).  The <em>concept<\/em> of a coordinated attack on an enemy position is very simple.  The <em>execution<\/em> of a coordinated attack on an enemy position is very hard.  After all, a real army does not actually consist of a few dozen units that, as in a video game, respond more or less instantly to the precise, clear and unambiguous commands of a single leader.  Instead, a real army consists of many thousands (or hundreds of thousands or even millions) of human beings, each of whom is in their own experiential little universe &#8211; unable to read their minds and often unaware of the positions of their fellows.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If you want a large group of people to execute even the simplest of commands effectively, they need to <em>already<\/em> have some common conception of what the orders mean and how they carry them out.  If you want two <em>units<\/em>, with different commanders, to coordinate effectively &#8211; often when they cannot be in direct communication &#8211; those commanders (and their soldiers) need to share some common conception of the normal or correct way to attack or defend.  If I am commanding, say, a division&#8217;s artillery support (probably split into half a dozen or more batteries) and I am supposed to support a brigade&#8217;s attack in the morning, I need to have the same <em>conception<\/em> of what an attack means as the brigade commander.  <strong>On the battlefield, armies cannot &#8216;make it up as they go along,&#8217; they need to function according to standard procedures, a shared understanding of what an attack looks like, what a defensive line looks like, how to call out information on a radio, what orders mean and so on<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That <em>shared conception<\/em> is at the core of the concept of doctrine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">By the Second World War, this sort of doctrine had been largely formalized in nearly all of the militaries of the major participants.  That body of <em>formal<\/em> knowledge consisted of training materials and best practices often laid out in an extensive catalog of field manuals, complete with their own bespoke jargon.  As the war progressed, changes to doctrine could be promulgated the same way, with After Action Reports and &#8216;Lesson&#8217;s Learned&#8217; summaries flowing ideally up the chain of command and new doctrine publications, updated field manuals and such flowing down the chain of command.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That said, as a pre-modernist, I have to note that while <em>formal<\/em> military doctrine &#8211; written out in field manuals &#8211; is a relatively modern invention, <em>informal<\/em> military doctrine is as old as warfare itself.  Pre-modern armies <em><strong>also<\/strong><\/em> had &#8216;standard operating procedures,&#8217; &#8211; often every bit as rigid as modern doctrine &#8211; which were learned informally, with older soldiers teaching newer ones (and young officers practically &#8216;apprenticing&#8217; to more senior ones).  <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In short <strong>doctrine is <em>necessary<\/em> for armies (and navies, and air forces) to function<\/strong>.  While it <em>can<\/em> be constraining, a &#8216;straitjacket&#8217; that imposes standard approaches (sometimes to non-standard problems) there is simply no other way of coordination battles that might involve tens or hundreds of thousands of individuals who <em>need<\/em> to act in concert in order to be successful.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In terms of what doctrine <em>includes<\/em>, we run the real risk that because almost <em>everything<\/em> a military does (or has) interacts with doctrine, there&#8217;s a sense in which <em>everything<\/em> is doctrine and so <em>nothing<\/em> seems like doctrine in a kind of &#8216;the fish doesn&#8217;t know it is wet&#8217; situation.  Instead, while it is the case that doctrine tends to be evolutionary (smaller changes, iteration on iteration) rather than being designed &#8216;from scratch&#8217; from first principles, it is helpful to think about building a doctrine <em>from first principles<\/em> to get a sense of what it entails.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Beginning at the operational level (we&#8217;ll put strategy aside for now), doctrine begins with a <em><strong>theory of victory<\/strong><\/em>, a sense of how an army defeats an opposing force.  That theory of victory could be, for instance, attritional in nature (&#8220;we win by inflicting more casualties on the enemy until their force collapses&#8221;) or it could be based in maneuver (&#8220;we win by breaking through enemy lines and then maneuvering to cut off enemy forces or disrupt their logistics.&#8221;)  Heck, in the case of some kinds of militaries waging <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2022\/03\/03\/collections-how-the-weak-can-win-a-primer-on-protracted-war\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"11757\">protected war <\/a>(or <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/02\/13\/collections-against-the-state-a-primer-on-terrorism-insurgency-and-protest\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"33562\">engaged in non-violence or terrorism<\/a>), the theory of victory may be entirely abstract, focused on public opinion or popular will.  <strong>Naturally armies with different theories of victory are going to construct very different doctrines for achieving those goals<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">For instance, an army that has a theory of victory based on maneuver is going to need to concentrate a lot of force and coordinate it to create that breakthrough at a specific <em>spot<\/em> in the enemy line and then the ability to <em>go fast<\/em> once that breach is made, which is going to demand different command structures and procedures than an army that is focused on simply inflicting attrition.  In particular, the maneuver army might want to push a lot of command authority <em>down<\/em> to lower ranks so that they can <em>go fast<\/em> in situations where communications with high command are difficult and conditions on the ground are rapidly changing.  But a different army might want to pull command authority <em>up<\/em> to enable very large, well-coordinated, intricately planned &#8216;set piece&#8217; battles, perhaps in order to try to shift the attritional balance in their favor (or achieve a very choreographed advance).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That theory of victory in turn is going to shape the <em>conduct<\/em> of a battle.  To take our &#8216;maneuver&#8217; theory of victory army, the next question becomes &#8220;what is the force structure of the sharp forward edge of your breakthrough force?&#8221;  Do you want your tanks distributed widely or concentrated into a handful of units?  What is the role of infantry in this attack?  If the infantry and the tanks are expected to coordinate closely, they probably need to be placed together into the same divisions so that they can train together and be commanded together.  What about the artillery?  Do you want each small unit to have a little bit of artillery of its own, or a really big &#8216;grand battery&#8217; at the disposal of the division commander, which can be unleashed in a coordinated manner, perhaps focused on a single objective in a larger battle?  <strong>Doctrine is going to play into the <em>structure<\/em> of your army: what capabilities, equipment and troops does a given division <\/strong>(or corps or brigade or army group) <strong>have?<\/strong>  <strong>What is its command structure?  Which elements are subordinate?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Those concerns then flow downward into the fighting procedures for individual smaller units.  When the divisional commander orders his armored brigade to &#8216;take that hill&#8217; &#8211; what does that look like?  Do the tanks have a formation to advance in?  Does the infantry expect to <em>go first<\/em> in front of the tanks or to follow in their wake (or is the infantry not in the same command chain as the tanks at all and so will just struggle to mutually support each other &#8211; a persistent problem for the British Army for much of WWII).  How does air power and artillery factor in here?  What level of &#8216;fires&#8217; support does the company commander advancing his company expect to get &#8211; and how does he expect to get it?  Doctrine gets all the way down to &#8220;how does the company commander&#8217;s signal officer call for an artillery strike?&#8221; because in the chaos of battle you need standard ways to indicate a specific location and call a specific strike (grid squares, usually).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And again, the &#8216;best approach&#8217; here may differ if the theory of victory is different!  We might ask for instance, during a large offensive, what is the best use of your close air support aircraft?  Are they best employed to focus their attacks on the point of breakthrough, contributing to the massed firepower at the decisive point?  Or perhaps it is a better idea to have them striking deeper along an enemy&#8217;s operational depth, hitting reserves, reinforcements on the move, supply depots and rear echelon units that might be softer targets?  The balance between those missions (with implications for what the guys on the ground expect from their aircraft) is going to depend on what you are trying to achieve (that theory of victory) but also <em>how you are trying to achieve it<\/em>.<span id='easy-footnote-2-37254' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/18\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-ii-divisions-designers-and-doctrines\/#easy-footnote-bottom-2-37254' title='In the event, to grossly oversimplify the complex, the German preference in the war was to focus that air support on the decisive point (the &lt;em&gt;Schwerpunkt&lt;\/em&gt;), while Soviet doctrine focused on using air assets to strike the enemy&amp;#8217;s &amp;#8216;operational depth&amp;#8217; (while their front line was hopefully being plastered by the assault itself).  At least by 1944, the American approach was in some ways just &lt;em&gt;more&lt;\/em&gt;, using heavier air frames (up to and including massive strategic bombers) to plaster enemy rear areas, while artillery buried the enemy front line and fighter-bombers made it impossible for the enemy to move anything by daylight for fear of being bombed.  In some cases, such as the demolition of the Panzer Lehr division as part of the Operation Cobra breakout, US commanders assigned more bombers to hit an enemy position than the enemy had &lt;em&gt;men&lt;\/em&gt; (the 2,200 remaining Germans in Panzer Lehr got hit with about 3,000 aircraft in a single day).  But of course that doctrinal choice has strategic implications in terms of production and how much manpower is going to the front versus going to the factories!'><sup>2<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">(As you can see, doctrine for land troops, navies and air forces are going to interact here too: these elements often need to be mutually supporting, so they need doctrines that link up effectively.  Shore bombardment support gets a lot more effective if the troops ashore have a way to signal rapidly to the ships where they need the big guns.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Mixed in with these choices are also just a <em>ton<\/em> of &#8216;best practices.&#8217;  Often the &#8216;best&#8217; way to do something is not obvious or cannot be reasoned out easily from first principles but emerges slowly with experience.  Something like, for instance, the &#8216;<a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Combat_box\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Combat_box\">combat box<\/a>&#8216; bomber formations, which enabled greater coverage and fields of fire from heavy bombers&#8217; defensive guns (thus limiting &#8211; though by no means removing &#8211; the damage enemy fighters could do) had to be developed and refined based on experience from the field.  Already mentioned but shore bombardment doctrine in the United States Navy evolved a lot during the war, particularly the somewhat counter-intuitive realization that often cruisers and destroyers provided the most effective shore support because their lighter (though still massive by land-warfare standards) guns could be quick, accurate and responsive, whereas the Big Guns on battleships were harder to fire &#8216;danger close&#8217; and slower to get effectively on the target.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But what I want to stress is just how <em><strong>expansive<\/strong><\/em> doctrine ends up being.  It isn&#8217;t just a simple tactical field manual &#8211; for one, by World War II, tactics are so complex that the &#8216;simple tactical field manual&#8217; for a combined arms division with motorized, mechanized and armor elements supported by artillery and anti-aircraft along with maintenance and logistics elements would be enormous (in practice that&#8217;s dozens and dozens of field manuals).  But equally <strong>command structures, communications practices, unit structures<\/strong> (what elements go in what division at what level), <strong>operational concepts<\/strong> <strong>and training procedures<\/strong> <em>all<\/em> fit into doctrine too.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And all of that matters because it gets to how <strong>two armies with broadly similar equipment can fight very differently<\/strong>, because they understand <em>what they&#8217;re doing<\/em> with that equipment differently, because they have different practices for its employment and different training to set up those practices.  So doctrine is really important.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" data-attachment-id=\"37376\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/18\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-ii-divisions-designers-and-doctrines\/394360_1737\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1737.jpg?fit=1920%2C1080&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,1080\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"394360_1737\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1737.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1737.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37376\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1737.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1737.jpg?resize=300%2C169&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1737.jpg?resize=768%2C432&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1737.jpg?resize=1536%2C864&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1737.jpg?resize=1100%2C619&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1737.jpg?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">The first half of 1941 ended up being more heavily focused on naval and overseas affairs.  My infantry-centric army could hold the Low Countries, but wouldn&#8217;t be able to push outward without unacceptable losses.  Getting those 50-odd divisions to France for 1939, however, required cutting lots of corners, with the result that the armored and motorized divisions required for offensive operations wouldn&#8217;t be available in quantity until late 1941 and I wouldn&#8217;t have enough of them to break out until summer 1942.<br>In the meantime, I focused on locking down North Africa and dealing with the Italian Navy, the Regia Marina.  I had split my navy into two main battlegroups, a home fleet (organized around my more modern, deadly fast carrier group) and the Mediterranean fleet, organized around eight of my big ol&#8217; battlewagons.  The French navy was a lot less helpful than expected, so my fight with the Regia Marina ended up being somewhat attritional: the Mediterranean fleet won a series of battles basically trading screens favorably with the Regia Marina.  Under normal circumstances, the way naval battles work in <em>HoI4<\/em> is that damage accrues first to the smaller screening ships, so for the most part you have to &#8216;burn off&#8217; an enemy&#8217;s supply of destroyers and cruisers before getting to put away their capital ships.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Doctrine Tree<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Sussing out how <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> handles formal doctrine is actually really easy: it is a specific, discrete game mechanic called &#8216;doctrine,&#8217; which is then split between land doctrine, air doctrine and naval doctrine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That said, I think it is fairly clear <strong>that this is a set of mechanics the <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> team has never been fully satisfied with<\/strong>.  You can tell because the doctrine system has undergone more changes than most core <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> systems, getting two major overhauls and a ton of minor tweaks.  <em>On release<\/em>, doctrine was part of the research system and so doctrines were basically technologies which thus competed for research slots with every other kind of technology.  However with the 1.11 patch (in 2021), doctrine was moved out of the research tree into its own space and used &#8216;army\/air\/navy experience&#8217; as its currency instead of research time.  Then with the 1.17 patch (in 2025) the system was massively overhauled <em>again<\/em> to drop much of the &#8216;tree&#8217; structure entirely.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I want to talk about both the system as it existed post 1.11 and post 1.17, because I think both doctrine systems help understand what the developers are <em>trying<\/em> to do and also expose some weaknesses with the end result.  We&#8217;re going to focus here in particular on <strong>Land Doctrine<\/strong>, but in each case the Air and Naval trees work basically the same way.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Let&#8217;s start with the &#8216;old&#8217; doctrine tree:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"720\" data-attachment-id=\"37293\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/18\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-ii-divisions-designers-and-doctrines\/image-203\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-2.png?fit=1926%2C1354&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1926,1354\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-2.png?fit=1024%2C720&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-2.png?resize=1024%2C720&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37293\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-2.png?resize=1024%2C720&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-2.png?resize=300%2C211&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-2.png?resize=768%2C540&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-2.png?resize=1536%2C1080&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-2.png?resize=1100%2C773&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-2.png?w=1926&amp;ssl=1 1926w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">I pulled a <a href=\"https:\/\/forum.paradoxplaza.com\/forum\/threads\/hearts-of-iron-iv-development-diary-4-land-doctrines.769073\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/forum.paradoxplaza.com\/forum\/threads\/hearts-of-iron-iv-development-diary-4-land-doctrines.769073\/\">screencap from a Developer Diary <\/a>for this because this version of the doctrine tree isn&#8217;t in the game anymore and I couldn&#8217;t find a good screencap of what it looked like in 1.16, but this is <strong>reasonably<\/strong> close to the final form it took.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Basically the structure here was a series of doctrine paths.  Players first had to choose a tree (you could only develop one of the four doctrine categories) and then spent army experience (or air experience or navy experience for those trees) to &#8216;buy&#8217; each progressive notch on the tree (originally this was research using technology).  At a couple of points in each tree, it branched and the player chose one of the two branches (losing access to the other branch).  Each stop on the tree confers a set of statistical benefits, making your divisions (or air wings, or ships) slightly better in a given way.  The currency for this is that army\/air\/navy experience, which can be gained in peacetime slowly through having theorists in your high command or by doing military exercises, but is gained rapidly during a war simply by fighting, representing the battlefield&#8217;s role as a harsh teacher.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And you can see what this system is <em><strong>trying<\/strong><\/em> to do.  Each of the four major &#8216;trees&#8217; is meant to represent the military doctrine of one or more of the major powers.  The Mobile Warfare Doctrine tree is meant to reflect German doctrine through the war (generally called by its German name, <em>bewegungskrieg<\/em>, &#8216;maneuver warfare&#8217;), with split branches favoring offense or defense meant to reflect the potential for Germany to get in over its head and have to shift to a more defensive approach to warfare (as it did, historically).  The Superior Firepower Doctrine tree is meant to reflect the American approach to the war, with split branches that honestly don&#8217;t make a whole lot of sense and mostly gesture towards late- or post- Cold War doctrinal revisions (AirLand Battle was a 1980s US military doctrine and a significant depature from what came before while the phrase &#8216;Shock and Awe&#8217; is most often associated with the 2003 Invasion of Iraq).  The Grand Battleplan doctrine is meant to reflect countries that stuck closer to WWI tactical approaches (France, Britain, Japan), with one line for increasingly artillery and armor heavy British doctrine and another for Japanese infantry infiltration tactics.  The formal doctrine it most clearly evokes is French Methodical Battle (<em>La Bataille Conduite<\/em>).  Finally, the &#8216;Mass Assault&#8217; doctrine was supposed to encompass <em>both<\/em> Chinese <em>and<\/em> Soviet approaches and that&#8217;s just&#8230;a real problem for reasons we&#8217;ll get into in a moment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The update changes this system, recognizing that it was way to rigid.  So the new post-1.17 system <strong>replaced the single doctrine tree the player must choose with a &#8216;grand doctrine&#8217; and then supporting modular doctrines for each combat &#8216;arm<\/strong>.&#8217;  Thus a country&#8217;s army doctrine becomes the sum of its &#8216;grand doctrine&#8217; (representing overall operational concept), plus a choice of one of several infantry, support, armor and operations sub-doctrines.  That said the main four &#8216;grand doctrines&#8217; retain the names and framing of the doctrine trees.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" data-attachment-id=\"37372\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/18\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-ii-divisions-designers-and-doctrines\/394360_2639\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2639.jpg?fit=1920%2C1080&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,1080\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"394360_2639\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2639.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2639.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37372\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2639.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2639.jpg?resize=300%2C169&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2639.jpg?resize=768%2C432&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2639.jpg?resize=1536%2C864&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2639.jpg?resize=1100%2C619&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2639.jpg?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">The new doctrine tree, following my doctrine selection for my current United Kingdom run.  I opted to stick with Grand Battleplan here, because it is actually quite strong in the current build of the game, despite the fact that generally historians view the doctrines that it is meant to represent (French Methodical Battle, the British focus on set piece engagements and for some inexplicable reason Japanese Army doctrine) as some of the least effective land battle doctrines in the war.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A country picks a doctrine for each of these categories (spending army experience as before) and then as that unit-type (or any unit from the grand doctrine) fights, they accumulate &#8216;mastery&#8217; which unlocks progressive tiers of bonuses.  The idea is that you spend army experience to pick the <em><strong>kind<\/strong><\/em> of warfare you want to do and then get better at it over time as the approach is practiced and refined.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There&#8217;s clearly a second intention to this system <strong>which is to enable players to try to recreate historical doctrinal systems<\/strong>.  That is very evidence in the original &#8216;four trees&#8217; system, where each tree (or branch) is clearly themed after the doctrine of a specific combatant.  But it remains true in the post-1.17 modular system.  Players are going to quickly pick up on, for instance, in the &#8216;armor&#8217; subdoctrine, that &#8216;Armored Spearhead&#8217; shows an American tank (a Sherman), while &#8216;Armored Infantry Support&#8217; shows a German tank (a Tiger) and &#8216;Streamlined Deployment&#8217; shows three Soviet tanks (T-34s, I think, though so small and in profile they could also be IS-2s).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And on the one hand, I think this is a noble attempt to actually model something fairly complex and on the other hand I think quite a few problems remain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first problem, somewhat reduced but not removed by the new system is simply that the &#8216;grand doctrines&#8217; don&#8217;t necessarily map on well to what major powers were doing or at least <em>thought<\/em> they were doing.  Both the United States and the Soviet Union understood themselves to be attempting to do a kind of maneuver warfare, the USA attempting to reverse-engineer German maneuver warfare doctrine, whereas the USSR came into the war with its own maneuver warfare doctrine (Deep Operations), which it needed to refine but also actually train and implement because Stalin had purged most of the officers who knew and developed it.  It is certainly the case that the United States pursued a firepower-based solution to generating maneuver, enabled by the USA&#8217;s much larger industrial base, but the goal was still breakthroughs and maneuver, not merely blowing things up for blowing things&#8217; up sake.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Meanwhile, placing the USSR under &#8216;Mass Assault&#8217; is honestly borderline insulting given that the USSR would finish WWII with what is generally now regarded as the most sophisticated maneuver warfare doctrine around. While Soviet armies often took huge casualties and Soviet commanders &#8211; especially early in the war &#8211; often didn&#8217;t seem to understand their own doctrine and engaged in under-prepared, under-resourced infantry attacks (not infrequently because Stalin demanded counter-offensives before they were ready), <strong>the USSR was not doing &#8216;human wave&#8217; attacks a la <em>Enemy at the Gates<\/em> <\/strong>(2001) and indeed by the time we are at Operation Bagration in 1944, it is very easy to argue that the Soviets are <em>better<\/em> at maneuver warfare than the Germans (indeed one could potentially try to make that argument as early as Operation Uranus in late 1942).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Likewise, &#8216;Grand Battleplan&#8217; as the umbrella for France, Britain and Japan is equally odd. The British Army struggled a fair bit with infantry-and-armor coordination through the war and generally preferred carefully planned &#8216;set piece&#8217; battles, with a pretty clear legacy reaching back to the lessons of the First World War (alongside the French Methodical Battle approach),<strong> but the Imperial Japanese Army was devoted to the cult of the offensive and favored quick marches, surprise and tenacity in offense<\/strong>, rather than a slow operational tempo characterized by intensive planning.  If I were to place the IJA anywhere on the doctrine tree, it would be as a kind of alternate branch of the Mobile Warfare tree: Japan was trying to do speed, infiltration and maneuver, just with <em>infantry<\/em> (for the most part) rather than with armor (for the most part).  The limitations of a &#8216;light and fast&#8217; approach become pretty shockingly clear as one gets into the back half of 1942 and the IJA starts tangling with well-supplied Americans and Australians who have a lot of firepower at their disposal.  In short, the Imperial Japanese <em>Navy<\/em> may have favored baroque, overly complex and choreographed battleplans, but the IJA was very much a &#8216;cult of the offensive&#8217; organization that prioritized speed and surprise &#8211; albeit with a lot less trucks and tanks than what European armies were using.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So in the notional layout, these doctrines are often a weak match for the historical countries they are supposed to represent.  <strong>The bonuses also often do not line up clearly either<\/strong>.  Admittedly, the new doctrine system is significantly better in this regard.  One of the classic balancing goof-ups of the old system was the &#8216;Mass Mobilization&#8217; branch the Mass Assault Doctrine, which offered bonuses to manpower and reduced frontage for infantry brigades (enabling a country to get more infantry in the fight on a given section of front), which was meant to represent Nationalist China and (to an extent) the USSR reaching deep to mobilize enormous amounts of manpower &#8211; a &#8216;muscle not metal&#8217; approach &#8211; but <em><strong>actually<\/strong><\/em> was basically useless for those countries (they have plenty of manpower anyway) and <em><strong>extremely useful<\/strong><\/em> for small highly industrialized countries which desperately needed the huge boost to recruitable manpower.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The new tree avoids these kinds of errors, but in playing I have generally found the connections between doctrine choices and actual operational concept to be fairly weak.  Part of the problem is that doctrines are presented as a confusing collection of tiered bonuses to a bewildering array of things.  Which is better for building armored divisions arming for decisive breakthroughs: +5% breakthrough, +10% soft attack and a flat +5 organization for medium and heavy tanks or +10% breakthrough, +2 organization and +0.05 recovery rate?  I have <em>six hundred hours<\/em> in this game and I would <em><strong>still<\/strong><\/em> have to consult a guide to figure out which was the better option for that specific concept.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Meanwhile, balance remains a problem.  Ideally, this would be a case where different countries would find that different doctrines supported their own mix of industry, terrain and strategic needs.  In <em>practice<\/em>,<a href=\"https:\/\/www.reddit.com\/r\/hoi4\/comments\/1qd70n6\/doctrine_tier_list_in_singleplayer\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/www.reddit.com\/r\/hoi4\/comments\/1qd70n6\/doctrine_tier_list_in_singleplayer\/\"> each balancing patch tends to just alter the array of &#8216;meta&#8217; choices with entire grand doctrines almost invariably assigned to the scrap heap of &#8216;never pick.<\/a>&#8216;  This is a problem that, as we&#8217;ll see, is intensified <em><strong>greatly<\/strong><\/em> by the division-designer.  From my perspective, this system could actually do to be a lot <em>simpler<\/em>, with the player being tasked to think about their intended operational concept and then guided into choices that fit that concept, rather than having to confront a bewildering array of stat bonuses which often don&#8217;t <em>do<\/em> what they are supposed to historically model in any event (and do almost nothing to really tell the player what they are <em>supposed<\/em> to do).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The final issue here <strong>is very strong <em>path dependence<\/em> in doctrine choices<\/strong>.  Historically, armies frequently tried things, realized they didn&#8217;t work and then <em>tried new things<\/em>.  American amphibious operations doctrine &#8211; which by 1944 was an absolute <em>marvel<\/em> of efficiency in managing enormous and extremely complex operations &#8211; largely emerged by getting it <em>wrong<\/em> a whole bunch.  The marine landings at Gaudalcanal in August of 1942, for instance, failed to load supplies so that they would be unloaded in the order of the most essential to the least, leaving the marines in the lurch when Japan contested the waters around the island, stopping unloading prematurely.  That problem was fixed for the Operation Torch landings in North Africa in November of 1942, but the major takeaway of allied commanders from the Torch landings is that if they had been facing truly fierce, determined resistance, they probably would have failed.  In short, no one set out in 1939 to plan D-Day: the doctrine for Operationa Overlord emerged out of a process of trial and error.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And while the current doctrine system allows for lessons learned and experience gaining through the &#8216;mastery&#8217; system (which &#8216;levels up&#8217; existing doctrines to unlock new bonuses), it <em><strong>heavily<\/strong><\/em> penalizes <em>shifting doctrine<\/em> in response to changing conditions.  A player that goes in with an &#8216;Armored Spearhead&#8217; oops-all-tanks armored division concept only to have to realize they need to back up to a more combined arms &#8216;Armored Infantry Support&#8217; doctrine &#8211; which is exactly the experience Britain and the United States had with their armored doctrine! &#8211; is basically forced to reset to zero as if they hadn&#8217;t learned anything at all.<span id='easy-footnote-3-37254' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/18\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-ii-divisions-designers-and-doctrines\/#easy-footnote-bottom-3-37254' title='There is an irony that, as of right now, the Armored Spearhead doctrine is actually a fair bit stronger than Armored Infantry Support, so far as I can tell.'><sup>3<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  The player is aggressively <em>penalized<\/em> for trying an operational concept, realizing it doesn&#8217;t work and trying to shift tracks (because it resets their bonuses and costs more currency), but this is exactly what the most successful armies in World War II <em><strong>did<\/strong><\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However none of these issues are, in my view, the biggest issue for <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em>&#8216;s concept of doctrine.  The biggest issue for <em>HoI4<\/em>&#8216;s doctrine <strong>is that the most important &#8211; for the game itself, at least &#8211; parts of doctrine <em>do not take place in the doctrine system<\/em><\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" data-attachment-id=\"37380\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/18\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-ii-divisions-designers-and-doctrines\/394360_1744\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1744.jpg?fit=1920%2C1080&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,1080\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"394360_1744\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1744.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1744.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37380\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1744.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1744.jpg?resize=300%2C169&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1744.jpg?resize=768%2C432&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1744.jpg?resize=1536%2C864&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1744.jpg?resize=1100%2C619&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1744.jpg?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">By June 1941, I had done a fair bit of damage to the Regia Marina, but the Mediterranean Fleet was pretty badly worn down.  Normally, Britain has so many ships that I could have just kept pressing until the RM ran out of screens, but being Britain, I also had to run anti-submarine duty, which absorbs quite a lot of destroyers, forcing me to be more careful with my most modern, frontline screening ships (I do generally have separate templates for escort destroyers (focused on ASW) vs. fleet destroyers (focused on torpedoes and surface detection)).<br>  However, the near total destruction of the German surface fleet the previous year gave me the &#8216;trump card&#8217; which I now played, moving the Mediterranean fleet into repair, while shifting my fast attack fleet into the Mediterranean to keep the pressure on the Regia Marina.<br>The result was suitably lopsided: by the end of June, 1941, the Regia Marina had largely ceased to exist except for a smattering of submarines and a handful of surface ships that would be badly outmatched by my repaired Mediterranean fleet.  That was important as it bought me the opportunity to now transfer my fast battle group East.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The All-Powerful Division Designer<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As noted in the first part of this series, the basic unit of <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em>&#8216;s combat is the division.  Now, as we&#8217;ll see, divisions can vary a lot in size &#8211; indeed, divisions can be as small as a single brigade or practically as large as an entire corps.  But the game treats all of these units as divisions, which cannot either be split or merged.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is actually a significant change from previous entries in the series.  In <em>Hearts of Iron III<\/em>, countries actually produced brigades (<a href=\"https:\/\/hoi3.paradoxwikis.com\/Land_units\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/hoi3.paradoxwikis.com\/Land_units\">each of a single type<\/a>) which were then combined into a division (which could have 2-5 brigades in it).  A player could thus pull a brigade out of a division and attach it to another, or cobble together a division from available spare brigades, or produce new brigades and attach them to existing divisions and so on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">By contrast <strong>divisions in <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> are produced to <em>templates<\/em><\/strong>.  Each division has a template which determines what its components will be and it will automatically attempt to pull the necessary manpower and equipment to bring those components to full strength.  In essence, the actual &#8216;brigades&#8217; in the division structure are really mostly notional: a division is actually a container for battalions (the sub-units of brigades in the division-designer).  In addition to the core &#8216;line&#8217; battalions (which determine a division&#8217;s combat width &#8211; the amount of frontage it takes up), a division also can have support battalions, which boost its capability (and raise its equipment and manpower cost) without adding frontage, but it is limited to five of them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" data-attachment-id=\"37383\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/18\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-ii-divisions-designers-and-doctrines\/394360_2638\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2638.jpg?fit=1920%2C1080&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,1080\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"394360_2638\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2638.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2638.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37383\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2638.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2638.jpg?resize=300%2C169&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2638.jpg?resize=768%2C432&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2638.jpg?resize=1536%2C864&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2638.jpg?resize=1100%2C619&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2638.jpg?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">A break from naval affairs, this is my Infantry Division template.  I took these screenshots in 1944, but this template was complete in this form in 1939 and didn&#8217;t change subsequently.  In fan terminology, this is a &#8216;9-1&#8217; (9 infantry, 1 artillery) division.  I am not sure if that is still a &#8216;meta&#8217; composition, but in single-player, it works just fine.<br>As divisions go, this configuration makes for an effective defensive unit, with high enough piercing to stop light and even medium tanks and enough soft attack to mulch infantry, however its low breakthrough means it should not be used to attack much (or you will eat manpower losses).<br>Because the United Kingdom is very much &#8216;long&#8217; on industry but &#8216;short&#8217; on manpower, I&#8217;ve opted for a template that emphasizes metal over men, thus the full raft of regimental and divisional support (including a field hospital to limit manpower losses).  That equipment makes this a fairly expensive template, but Britain can pay for it.  I&#8217;m sure a player could punch these divisions around, but the AI <strong>really<\/strong> struggles to make offensive headway against 3 or 4 of these divisions on good terrain.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Divisions go into training as whole units (the entire division is trained together before deployment), but <strong>once deployed, they remain &#8216;attached&#8217; to their template<\/strong>.  If the player <em>changes<\/em> a division&#8217;s template, that <em>instantly<\/em> changes the expected composition of every division using that template.  All of those divisions will <em>immediately<\/em> request or return the necessary equipment and manpower from (or to) the national stockpile to reinforce up to their new expected components.  In practice, because being under-strength for a given composition can impose pretty significant penalties, it is a wiser idea to <em>copy<\/em> an existing template, upgrade it, and then swap divisions over to the new template when they&#8217;re out of combat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now this needn&#8217;t necessarily be a problem if you could have infinite division templates, but you generally can&#8217;t.  <strong>Modifying a division template requires army experience<\/strong>, the same currency used to buy doctrines (and also to modify vehicle templates &#8211; so designing a new tank or creating an upgraded version of an old one burns this currency too).  In practice, of the three &#8216;experience&#8217; currencies, army experience remains precious the longest in the game, because it is used for the most things.  That means that <strong>unnecessary division template changes burn a real and limited resource<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" data-attachment-id=\"37387\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/18\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-ii-divisions-designers-and-doctrines\/394360_2641\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2641.jpg?fit=1920%2C1080&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,1080\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"394360_2641\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2641.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2641.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37387\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2641.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2641.jpg?resize=300%2C169&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2641.jpg?resize=768%2C432&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2641.jpg?resize=1536%2C864&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2641.jpg?resize=1100%2C619&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2641.jpg?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">This is my mechanized infantry division (initially it was all motorized, I shift it to mechanized as the mechanized equipment becomes available), intended to back up the offensive punch of the armored divisions and to defend the territory they take.  It&#8217;s a 9-2 structure (a bit punchier than my 9-1 defensive divisions) and with the greater armor and hardness offered by mechanized infantry and self-propelled guns (instead of towed artillery) it can actually attack reasonably well.  It is however, more than <em><strong>three times<\/strong><\/em> as expensive as a regular infantry division, which ought to neatly explain why early on I focus on infantry divisions and only develop my mobile forces later, once the front line is stable.<br>Again, I make no claims to this being an ideal division template &#8211; like all of my division templates, it&#8217;s a design I got stuck on quite a few versions ago and it works well enough in single-player not to be worth changing.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That will matter to a different degree to different countries.  France and Britain, in particular, tend to be &#8216;starved&#8217; for army experience prior to the start of the war where they then suddenly have to face Germany.  You can see the resulting incentives play out in the UK run I have been showing in the screenshots: my army experience was <em>very<\/em> carefully &#8216;budgeted&#8217; until well into 1942.  I needed enough army experience to have two effective infantry division templates (one for UK infantry, one for units recruited from India) ready in 1939, plus enough to create templates for one armored and one motorized division, to design the tanks and self-propelled artillery to go in those divisions and finally to buy all of my sub-doctrines.  That leaves functionally no space for specialized division templates.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now what the AI does is it &#8216;versions&#8217; its division templates (because it costs nothing to <em>copy<\/em> an existing template you already have), causing the AI to end up with a dozen or more templates, which are all incremental changes on each other.  <strong>But my sense is most players do what I do: they maintain a handful of division templates which they work hard to get to a &#8216;final form&#8217; before deployment and then subsequently make on minimal changes to<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" data-attachment-id=\"37391\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/18\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-ii-divisions-designers-and-doctrines\/394360_2640\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2640.jpg?fit=1920%2C1080&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,1080\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"394360_2640\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2640.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2640.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37391\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2640.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2640.jpg?resize=300%2C169&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2640.jpg?resize=768%2C432&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2640.jpg?resize=1536%2C864&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2640.jpg?resize=1100%2C619&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_2640.jpg?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Finally, my armored division layout for this playthrough.  The major oddity here is the single self-propelled artillery battalion, which was a product of me accidentally overproducing self-propelled artillery and figuring I might as well get some firepower out of them.<br>Otherwise, this is a 4-4-1 on 26 width; the meta is for larger divisions, but honestly this division is <strong>already<\/strong> unusually big compared to historical armored divisions (300 tanks!).  Whereas the leg infantry division has ~100 breakthrough and the mechanized infantry division ~200, this division has 745 breakthrough, enabling it to attack while taking relatively little damage, while its high attack value ensures that the defenders will <em><strong>absolutely<\/strong><\/em> take heavy damage.<br>Note that I am exclusively using medium armor &#8211; no light armor or heavy armor &#8211; for both my tanks and self-propelled.  This is to save on research.  Britain has good research ability, but is pulled in many directions, needing to maintain top of the line ships, aircraft and land warfare, so any simplification (like being able to ignore heavy and light tanks) is welcome.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The result are, frankly, &#8216;cookie-cutter armies.&#8217;   In that UK run, by the summer of 1944, my army consisted of 305 divisions (roughly 3 million men) using just <em>seven<\/em> templates (two of which are actually identical &#8216;colonial&#8217; templates to pull manpower from India and Malaya; they stay unique even after those countries are absorbed, so it is really <em>five<\/em> templates).  My main force in Europe thus consists of 130 <em>exactly identical<\/em> infantry divisions, backed by 13 <em>exactly identical<\/em> mechanized infantry divisions and 13 <em>exactly identical<\/em> armored divisions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is, to put it lightly, not how actual divisions generally worked.  Of course divisions might be of different sizes and strengths due to combat losses (something <em>HoI4<\/em> considers), but while most countries did have a standard &#8216;template&#8217; sense of what an infantry division or an armored division <em>should look like<\/em>, that was no guarantee at all that every such division <em>did<\/em> look like that.<span id='easy-footnote-4-37254' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/18\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-ii-divisions-designers-and-doctrines\/#easy-footnote-bottom-4-37254' title='Players of other WWII strategy titles, like Eugen Systems&amp;#8217; &lt;em&gt;Steel Division&lt;\/em&gt; series, where the player has access to the components &lt;strong&gt;of one specific division at a time&lt;\/strong&gt;, will be immediately and quite strongly aware that divisions, even divisions notionally of the &amp;#8216;same type&amp;#8217; did not always actually have the same components!  16th Panzer, 116th Panzer and Panzer-Lehr (130th Panzer) were all notionally Panzer divisions but in June of 1944, they had wildly different unit and equipment complements, which &lt;em&gt;Steel Division&lt;\/em&gt; represents fairly well.'><sup>4<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  The division template, for instance, treats light, medium and heavy tanks as no-substitution battalion types, but actual Panzer Divisions varied quite widely in how many light, medium or heavy tanks they had.  Pretty much everyone threw divisions forward that were effectively missing elements, either because those elements hadn&#8217;t been stood up yet or were still in transit or had been detached for some other job.  <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> has no way to represent that: you either have all of a division or you have nothing.  A division can be <em>damaged<\/em>, but it cannot be <em>incomplete<\/em> and it can never be &#8216;non-standard.&#8217;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The larger problem is the degree to which the division designer <\/strong>&#8211; the screen where you decide what battalions go into your division templates &#8211; <strong>largely usurps the role of doctrine<\/strong>.  In the Second World War, having the right doctrine and training to get tanks and infantry to cooperate together effectively what substantially more important than the simple question of deciding to have armor divisions &#8211; command structures, communications, tactics all mattered.  But the lion&#8217;s share of the work in <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> is simply accomplished by placing motorized infantry and armor in the correct quantities into the division designer in a single division.  The job of learning how to coordinate armor and infantry is now mostly complete; having the right doctrine provides a noticeable but decidedly smaller bonus to that &#8216;correct&#8217; division template&#8217;s performance.  But in fact, as was <em>repeatedly demonstrated<\/em> in World War II, having the &#8216;right&#8217; division structure was not enough to produce victory, not without soldiers and officers who understood how to <em>use<\/em> that structure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The importance of the division designer is, of course, most visible when it &#8216;breaks.&#8217;  For the first few years after release, for instance, due to the way frontage was calculated, divisions at <em>exactly<\/em> 10, 20 and 40 width functioned <em>much<\/em> better than any other configuration.  That has long since been patched, but the example (especially in single-player) that remains is what the community refers to as &#8216;space marines:&#8217; a leg infantry division with a <em>single<\/em> armored battalion in it (typically heavy armor, because who cares if it goes fast).  Because <em>battalions<\/em> do not have stats, <em>divisions<\/em> do, the one battalion of armor has its armor value <em>averaged<\/em> across the entire division, which can push it <em>just<\/em> enough enough to get over the armor-piercing break-points for regular infantry or infantry with just support anti-tank, which triggers a massive reduction in the damage that division takes.  Thus the label &#8216;space marines&#8217; because the division fights as if its <em>infantry<\/em> were wearing powered armor.  &#8216;Space marines&#8217; can thus easily outmatch basically any division the AI will produce, although in multiplayer, players are well aware of this trick and can counter it.<span id='easy-footnote-5-37254' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/18\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-ii-divisions-designers-and-doctrines\/#easy-footnote-bottom-5-37254' title='Before anyone asks, no, I do not use space marine division templates in single-player.  You can see my infantry template up above.'><sup>5<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The irony is, of course, that this idea &#8211; distributing heavier tanks across the entire infantry force more or less evenly &#8211; <em>was tried<\/em> in World War II, but it was <em><strong>famously ineffective<\/strong><\/em>.  This was the French and British approach to armor, the &#8216;Infantry Tank&#8217; and the actual observed effect was that there were never enough tanks at the critical point when they were &#8216;sprinkled&#8217; like this.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As a game design element, the division designer gives the player <em>so many<\/em> buttons and knobs to twist and turn that it is almost inevitable that players are going to min-max divisions out of the system that grossly outperform the more-or-less historical division templates the AI has to work with.  On the flipside, the division designer has some trouble really representing historical differences in unit composition.  If you want an &#8216;artillery heavy&#8217; army, for instance, you have to add &#8216;line artillery&#8217; (artillery used as a main &#8216;line&#8217; battalion rather than a support company) as a co-equal element with the infantry brigades &#8211; you cannot just <em>expand<\/em> the &#8216;support artillery,&#8217; but in practice American and British divisions remained &#8216;triangular&#8217; (three infantry brigades) in structure, with division artillery (&#8216;div arty&#8217;) simply <em><strong>expanded<\/strong><\/em> to include more batteries.  The line\/support distinction in the division designer doesn&#8217;t seem to have a real world parallel (unless there is one in the Red Army?  I am admittedly less knowledgeable about the Soviet military).<span id='easy-footnote-6-37254' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/18\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-ii-divisions-designers-and-doctrines\/#easy-footnote-bottom-6-37254' title='The irony is that &lt;em&gt;Hearts of Iron III&lt;\/em&gt; &lt;em&gt;&lt;strong&gt;did&lt;\/strong&gt;&lt;\/em&gt; have a real parallel: you researched &amp;#8216;superior firepower&amp;#8217; which added one more brigade slot in the division and then added a &lt;em&gt;&lt;strong&gt;second&lt;\/strong&gt;&lt;\/em&gt; artillery support regiment to create something like the artillery-heavy British infantry division structure.  For what it is worth, I feel like an obvious change here would be for a &amp;#8216;superior firepower&amp;#8217; doctrine to work not by giving bonuses to &amp;#8216;line artillery&amp;#8217; but instead to double or triple the size of support artillery components (thus also requiring you to have more artillery to supply them with), with a matching increase in firepower (but not frontage), to reflect what the United States and Britain were doing late in the war, which was massing a lot more materiel on a significantly smaller frontage.'><sup>6<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Meanwhile <strong>the system is <em>again<\/em> incapable of representing Soviet practice well<\/strong>.  While Soviet divisions might <em>notionally<\/em> be close to the same size as German, British or American divisions, in practice they tended to be substantially smaller.  Importantly, a lot of the heavier supporting elements (like artillery) were concentrated not at the division level but at the corps level, with the result that a Soviet corps almost functioned like a jumbo-sized western division.  You <em>can<\/em> sort-of-kind-of simulate this in <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> by using relatively large division templates for the USSR and simply pretending they represent corps instead of divisions, but <em>HoI4<\/em> simply does not have a level of organization for a corps.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And while division-size may seem relatively minor &#8211; what is the difference between two twenty-width divisions vs. one forty-width division &#8211; the way that <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> calculates damage reduction via defense (when defending) or breakthrough (when attacking) has typically meant that oversized divisions are better, particularly for attacking.  So whereas in the war itself, the Germany, Britain the USA and the USSR all settled on a similar size for an armored division (or for the Soviets, a tank corps), with around 200 tanks and 8,000-10,000 personnel, the current <em>HoI4<\/em> ideal tank division is a monster with nearly 20,000 personnel and around 450 tanks.  There&#8217;s a reason no one in the actual war made their divisions regularly that large.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The end result is that <strong>a lot of what in the real world we would term doctrine is expressed through the division designer<\/strong>, but that frankly the division designer feels like one of the &#8216;gamiest&#8217; elements of <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> that doesn&#8217;t do a great job of expressing differences in doctrinal approaches between countries (&#8216;meta&#8217; division templates are often used quite regardless of the country or the doctrine) or in modeling the divisions that, by war&#8217;s end, most of the combatants had settled on as ideal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" data-attachment-id=\"37395\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/18\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-ii-divisions-designers-and-doctrines\/394360_1748\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1748.jpg?fit=1920%2C1080&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,1080\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"394360_1748\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1748.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1748.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37395\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1748.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1748.jpg?resize=300%2C169&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1748.jpg?resize=768%2C432&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1748.jpg?resize=1536%2C864&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1748.jpg?resize=1100%2C619&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1748.jpg?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">My first attempt at an offensive breakout in Europe came in September and it did not go.  If you look closely you can see two offensive battles in the Netherlands and basically the moment the top circle turned yellow, I knew I did not yet have enough combat power to proceed and called the whole thing off; I might have been able to grind forward but at this point I cannot afford the manpower and equipment losses of a grind.  That is, of course <strong>a level of information no battlefield commander (much less national leader) is going to have that quickly<\/strong>.<br>The key problem was actually airpower: the Luftwaffe still had the attritional edge int he air over the front lines.  Fortunately, I was developing a strong industrial lead, so I would spend the next six months or so not only building up my armored forces but also increasing my rate of fighter production so that I could run Germany out of planes.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">No Obligation to Follow Doctrine<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A serious problem in planning against American doctrine is that the Americans do not read their manuals, nor do they feel any obligation to follow their doctrine<\/p>\n<cite>(An apocryphal quote generally attributed to an unnamed Soviet observer during the Cold War)<\/cite><\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>On the one hand, <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> makes a real effort to try to model the way different countries approached doctrine<\/strong>.  I&#8217;ve focused here on land warfare doctrine, which really at the time mostly meant maneuver warfare doctrine, as for the major combatants in Europe the defining question was <em>how ought the tank be used<\/em> &#8211; but there is a matching set of questions for air and naval doctrine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On the other hand, <strong>I don&#8217;t think this model succeeds particularly well<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">By the war&#8217;s end, the maneuver warfare doctrines apparent in Europe really were visibly different.  German maneuver warfare doctrine emphasized devolving command authority downward to create rapid moving, agile forces (a concept that regularly goes by its German name, <em>Auftragstaktik<\/em>, &#8220;mission-tactics&#8221;), which aimed to achieve breakthrough by focusing all of its firepower on a key <em>point<\/em> in the enemy front line.  Soviet maneuver warfare doctrine (Deep Operations), instead pulled command authority up, focusing support materiel up at the corps and even army level.  It <em>also<\/em> aimed to produce mobile breakthrough, but by engaging the enemy across their operational depth, using infantry, armor and air power to simultaneously hit front lines, reserves and rear areas to induce a broader frontal collapse.  American doctrine was, in some ways less developed, but &#8211; motivated by the limits of how many divisions the United States could realistically deploy in Europe &#8211; focused on packing as much firepower as possible into the smallest frontage and divisions possible, often using absolutely <em>smothering<\/em> quantities of airpower and artillery.<span id='easy-footnote-7-37254' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/18\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-ii-divisions-designers-and-doctrines\/#easy-footnote-bottom-7-37254' title='Though &lt;em&gt;everyone&lt;\/em&gt; used a lot of artillery, to be clear.'><sup>7<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> doesn&#8217;t really draw that out.  Infantry divisions with line artillery isn&#8217;t a cute trick for just Superior Firepower doctrine armies to pack a ton of firepower into a small unit, but a fairly standard template choice you&#8217;ll find used by players running a lot of countries.  Deep Operations doctrine doesn&#8217;t actually provide a way for players to strike across the operational depth of an enemy: damage accrues to enemy divisions reinforced into the front lines regardless and there isn&#8217;t any simulation of collapsing rear areas.  Even the basic question of &#8216;should the infantry or the tanks go first in an assault&#8217; (&#8216;armored spearhead&#8217; (USA, Germany) vs. &#8216;armor as exploitation force&#8217; (USSR)) isn&#8217;t really modeled in terms of which divisions take damage.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Meanwhile at the level most visible to the player &#8211; at the operational level &#8211; the player is under no obligation to follow their own doctrine<\/strong>.  Playing as the United Kingdom on the Grand Battleplan doctrine which <em>should<\/em> mean a strong preference for exhaustively planned set-piece battles, I find often launch far quicker, less planned operations which ought to be something out of the Mobile Warfare doctrine tree.  Sure, the bonuses from Grand Battleplan make my planning cap <em>somewhat<\/em> higher, but the difference isn&#8217;t large enough to offset other momentary advantages.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The result here is a valiant attempt to model the way doctrine shapes how militaries conduct themselves in war that feels like it falls short, in part because it is too afraid of actually constraining the player, to force them to actually follow their doctrine.  In particular, the game is afraid of ever having units simply function <em><strong>badly<\/strong><\/em> because their doctrine is poor or because they&#8217;re being used in a way not suited to it, but of course that absolutely was the experience of various countries which tried to use armor without the necessary coordination and communications doctrines.  As a result, the doctrine trees end up mostly as a set of bonuses which may or may not be optimal rather than something more closely approaching <em>playstyles<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" data-attachment-id=\"37400\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/18\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-ii-divisions-designers-and-doctrines\/394360_1750\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1750.jpg?fit=1920%2C1080&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,1080\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"394360_1750\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1750.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1750.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37400\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1750.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1750.jpg?resize=300%2C169&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1750.jpg?resize=768%2C432&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1750.jpg?resize=1536%2C864&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1750.jpg?resize=1100%2C619&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/394360_1750.jpg?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Japan then opened its war in the Pacific in October of 1941 in my game.  Historically, of course, Britain &#8211; already overstretched dealing with Germany and Italy &#8211; was almost wholly unprepared for the Japanese onslaught in late 1941 and early 1942 and suffered a series of humiliating setbacks that really mortally wounded the British Empire as a global empire.<br>I am, at this point, however, in a rather stronger position.  Victory in Ethiopia and North Africa has meant that I could move a potent field army East, meaning that Singapore is <strong>actually<\/strong> unassailable by land (indeed, I&#8217;ll be invading into Siam instead) rather than only notionally being so.  Meanwhile the neutralization of most of the Regia Marina means that my fast battlegroup could move east, basing out of Singapore and aiming to hold the Straits of Malacca.  Essentially my goal is to keep the IJN &#8216;trapped&#8217; in the Pacific Thunderdome with the United States Navy (as Japan has attacked the Philippines and thus brought the USA into the war), where attrition will swiftly destroy them.<br>Operating close to your bases is a significant advantage in HoI4 naval warfare and so my squadron &#8211; with four fleet carriers &#8211; is more than strong enough to keep control over the waters around Malaya and Indonesia and deals some stinging defeats to the IJN in the process, hastening the failure of Japanese naval power in the face of the inevitable American naval grinder.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This is the second part (I) of our long-delayed series looking at Hearts of Iron IV, Paradox Interactive&#8217;s World War II grand strategy game and also one of the most popular strategy games currently on the market. Last week, we looked at how HoI4 simulates combat, particularly its focus on operations (rather than tactics or, &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/18\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-ii-divisions-designers-and-doctrines\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Teaching Paradox: Hearts of Iron IV, Part II: Divisions, Designers and Doctrines<\/span> <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":156979701,"featured_media":37362,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"advanced_seo_description":"","jetpack_seo_html_title":"","jetpack_seo_noindex":false,"jetpack_seo_schema_type":"","_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_wpcom_ai_launchpad_first_post":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"{title}\n\n{excerpt}\n\n{url}","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"_wpas_customize_per_network":false,"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[12763,48286509],"tags":[716949914,716950594,716950593,63205,716950588,716950084,716950595,716950112,716950592,716950236],"class_list":["post-37254","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-collections","category-teaching-paradox","tag-bewegungskrieg","tag-deep-battle","tag-deep-operations","tag-doctrine","tag-hearts-of-iron","tag-maneuver-warfare","tag-methodical-battle","tag-paradox-development-studio","tag-teaching-paradox","tag-world-war-ii"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/paWMNs-9GS","jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/wp4001641.png?fit=1920%2C1440&ssl=1","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37254","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/156979701"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=37254"}],"version-history":[{"count":100,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37254\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":37406,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37254\/revisions\/37406"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/37362"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=37254"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=37254"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=37254"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}},{"id":37063,"date":"2026-09-11T17:58:35","date_gmt":"2026-09-11T21:58:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/?p=37063"},"modified":"2026-09-11T17:58:35","modified_gmt":"2026-09-11T21:58:35","slug":"teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/","title":{"rendered":"Teaching Paradox: Hearts of Iron IV, Part I: Operational Art"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This week, at long last, we begin our long-delayed but always expected something that we blog for: <strong>the <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> <em>Teaching Paradox<\/em> series!<\/strong><span id='easy-footnote-8-37063' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/#easy-footnote-bottom-8-37063' title='You know, initially when I wrote this, I included the Tennessee Williams reference because I like the phrasing and was going to put in a footnote saying that it didn&amp;#8217;t really have any historical content here, but I am checking and &lt;em&gt;The Glass Menagerie&lt;\/em&gt; premiered in 1944, so it is actually historically on point.  Neat!'><sup>8<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  This has been a long requested series that I put off for a long time because I wasn&#8217;t entirely sure how I wanted to tackle it.  But my thoughts here have at least congealed somewhat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So we are going to cover Paradox Interactive&#8217;s most popular strategy title: <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em>.   And make no mistake: <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> is <em><strong>popular<\/strong><\/em>, more so than any other Paradox game by some distance.<span id='easy-footnote-9-37063' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/#easy-footnote-bottom-9-37063' title='While &lt;em&gt;Crusader Kings III&lt;\/em&gt; and &lt;em&gt;Stellaris&lt;\/em&gt; have posted similar &amp;#8216;peak&amp;#8217; numbers (typically early after release or a major update) to &lt;em&gt;HoI4&lt;\/em&gt;, on any given day there are usually as many people playing &lt;em&gt;HoI4&lt;\/em&gt; as there are playing &lt;em&gt;CK3&lt;\/em&gt;, &lt;em&gt;Stellaris&lt;\/em&gt;, and &lt;em&gt;Victoria III&lt;\/em&gt; &lt;em&gt;&lt;strong&gt;combined&lt;\/strong&gt;&lt;\/em&gt;.  As I write this sentence, there are (according to SteamDB) about 50,000 people playing &lt;em&gt;HoI4&lt;\/em&gt; on Steam, compared to 22k for &lt;em&gt;CKIII&lt;\/em&gt;, 12k for &lt;em&gt;Stellaris&lt;\/em&gt;, 11k and 9k for &lt;em&gt;EU4 &lt;\/em&gt;and &lt;em&gt;EU5&lt;\/em&gt; respectively and roughly 8k playing &lt;em&gt;Victoria III&lt;\/em&gt;.  This is despite the fact that &lt;em&gt;HoI4&lt;\/em&gt; has not had a recent update in the past few months.'><sup>9<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  These days, <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> generally has more concurrent players on Steam than even strategy stalwarts like<em> Sid Meier&#8217;s Civilization<\/em> (VI, because apparently no one likes VII), <em>Age of Empires IV<\/em>, <em>Mount &amp; Blade Bannerlord<\/em>, etc.  <strong><em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> isn&#8217;t just the most popular <em>Paradox<\/em> game, it is the most popular <em>strategy game<\/em> &#8211; the whole genre &#8211; right now<\/strong>.<span id='easy-footnote-10-37063' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/#easy-footnote-bottom-10-37063' title='I am going by Steam stats but the strategy genre remains so PC-dominated that &amp;#8211; unlike many other genres &amp;#8211; I think this is basically a fair way to estimate total player counts.  I think it is plausible that non-steam player numbers bring &lt;em&gt;Sid Meier&amp;#8217;s Civilization VI&lt;\/em&gt; roughly to parity with &lt;em&gt;Hearts of Iron IV&lt;\/em&gt;, but that is the only real competition here.'><sup>10<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And that makes its historical assumptions well worth talking about.  This week we&#8217;re going to look at how <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> simulates military operations, something that in practice makes up probably three-quarters of the player&#8217;s experience in the game.  Then in the following weeks we&#8217;ll look at the strategic &#8216;shell&#8217; around that operational core, with how the game understands industry, information, strategy and politics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As with other entries in this series (<em><a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2021\/04\/30\/collections-teaching-paradox-europa-univeralis-iv-part-i-state-of-play\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2021\/04\/30\/collections-teaching-paradox-europa-univeralis-iv-part-i-state-of-play\/\">Europa Universalis IV,<\/a> <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2021\/08\/13\/collections-teaching-paradox-victoria-ii-part-i-mechanics-and-gears\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2021\/08\/13\/collections-teaching-paradox-victoria-ii-part-i-mechanics-and-gears\/\">Victoria II<\/a><\/em>, <em><a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2022\/09\/16\/collections-teaching-paradox-crusader-kings-iii-part-i-making-it-personal\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2022\/09\/16\/collections-teaching-paradox-crusader-kings-iii-part-i-making-it-personal\/\">Crusader Kings III<\/a><\/em> and <em><a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2024\/07\/19\/collections-teaching-paradox-imperator-part-i-divisa-in-partes-tres\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2024\/07\/19\/collections-teaching-paradox-imperator-part-i-divisa-in-partes-tres\/\">Imperator<\/a><\/em>) the goal here isn&#8217;t a review of the game or a guide to it, but instead an effort to <strong>outline what the <em>historical assumptions<\/em> of a given game are, what its &#8216;theory of history&#8217; is<\/strong>, and to try &#8211; to a degree &#8211; to assess that theory of history against what we actually know of the history.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Especially in this particular section, focused on how <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> handles land combat, I found I struggled quite a bit to describe how the game simulates operations without getting pulled into how a player might design <em>good<\/em> operations.  As a result, for <em>HoI4<\/em> players, this first post may end up feeling a bit surface-level in its description of the game, but this is unavoidable: I want these posts to be intelligible to someone who has never played the game, after all.  But whereas with other Paradox games I can often leave the &#8216;grand tactics&#8217; of maneuvering armies out without losing too much of the core of the game, <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> is <em><strong>almost all maneuvering armies<\/strong><\/em>.  It thus cannot be left out, but at the same time, this is not the place for the minutiae of how to conduct an armored breakthrough.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Finally, I should note at the outset that while I bought my own copy of <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> (ages ago) and have spent <em>far too much<\/em> money on its DLCs, Paradox did kindly provide me with copies of some of the expansion packs that were missing from my collection (mostly things in the second &#8216;Expansion pass&#8217;).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But first, if you like what you are reading here, please share it, as I rely on word of mouth to replenish my manpower pool after poorly considered post topics.  If you really like it, you can support me, my academic work and my public writing, including this project on <a href=\"https:\/\/www.patreon.com\/user?u=20122096\">Patreon<\/a>!  I can&#8217;t promise to use your support to buy a division worth of tanks, but I also will not promise not to do that.   If you want updates whenever a new post appears or want to hear my more bite-sized musings on history, security affairs and current events, you can follow me on Bluesky (@bretdevereaux.bsky.social). I am also active on Threads (bretdevereaux) and maintain a <em>de minimis<\/em> presence on Twitter (@bretdevereaux).<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"jetpack_subscription_widget\"><h2 class=\"widgettitle\"><\/h2>\n\t\t\t<div class=\"wp-block-jetpack-subscriptions__container\">\n\t\t\t<form action=\"#\" method=\"post\" accept-charset=\"utf-8\" id=\"subscribe-blog-2\"\n\t\t\t\tdata-blog=\"161773962\"\n\t\t\t\tdata-post_access_level=\"everybody\" >\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p id=\"subscribe-email\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<label id=\"jetpack-subscribe-label\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tclass=\"screen-reader-text\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfor=\"subscribe-field-2\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tEmail Address\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/label>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"email\" name=\"email\" autocomplete=\"email\" required=\"required\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tvalue=\"\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tid=\"subscribe-field-2\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tplaceholder=\"Email Address\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n\n\t\t\t\t\t<p id=\"subscribe-submit\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"action\" value=\"subscribe\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"source\" value=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/?after=2026-08-06T00%3A00%3A00&#038;page=1&#038;rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fposts\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"sub-type\" value=\"widget\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"redirect_fragment\" value=\"subscribe-blog-2\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" id=\"_wpnonce\" name=\"_wpnonce\" value=\"fd76a9d5bb\" \/><input type=\"hidden\" name=\"_wp_http_referer\" value=\"\/?after=2026-08-06T00%3A00%3A00&#038;page=1&#038;rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fposts\" \/>\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type=\"submit\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tclass=\"wp-block-button__link\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tstyle=\"margin: 0; margin-left: 0px;\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tname=\"jetpack_subscriptions_widget\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tSubscribe!\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/form>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"768\" data-attachment-id=\"37204\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/hoi4-dday-screen\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/HoI4-Dday-screen.png?fit=1920%2C1440&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,1440\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"HoI4 Dday screen\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/HoI4-Dday-screen.png?fit=1024%2C768&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/HoI4-Dday-screen.png?resize=1024%2C768&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37204\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/HoI4-Dday-screen.png?resize=1024%2C768&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/HoI4-Dday-screen.png?resize=300%2C225&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/HoI4-Dday-screen.png?resize=768%2C576&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/HoI4-Dday-screen.png?resize=1536%2C1152&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/HoI4-Dday-screen.png?resize=1100%2C825&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/HoI4-Dday-screen.png?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">On of <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em>&#8216;s loading screens, showing an artistic rendering<a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Operation_Overlord#\/media\/File:NormandySupply_edit.jpg\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Operation_Overlord#\/media\/File:NormandySupply_edit.jpg\"> of a famous photo<\/a> of American troops unloading on Omaha Beach during D-Day.  The <em>Hearts of Iron<\/em> series has been in a habit for some time of basing at least some of its key artwork directly off of famous WWII photos, another way the game builds verisimilitude and attempts to communicate to its audience that it is trying to present a historically grounded vision of the Second World War.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Operations<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In past series on Paradox grand strategy titles, we&#8217;ve talked about how it is often possible to summarize these games (especially the way they are different from each other) in terms of what each game is &#8216;about&#8217; &#8211; its core focus.  <em>Europa Universalis IV<\/em><a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2021\/04\/30\/collections-teaching-paradox-europa-univeralis-iv-part-i-state-of-play\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"6992\"> is a game <em><strong>about states<\/strong><\/em><\/a>,<span id='easy-footnote-11-37063' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/#easy-footnote-bottom-11-37063' title='Interesting, I&amp;#8217;d argue more so than its successor, &lt;em&gt;EUV&lt;\/em&gt;'><sup>11<\/sup><\/a><\/span> while<a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2022\/09\/16\/collections-teaching-paradox-crusader-kings-iii-part-i-making-it-personal\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"14001\"> <em>Crusader Kings III<\/em><\/a> is a game about personalistic rule and thus the personal relationships that define it and <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2021\/08\/13\/collections-teaching-paradox-victoria-ii-part-i-mechanics-and-gears\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"8567\"><em>Victoria II<\/em> is a game about pops<\/a> (while <em>Victoria III<\/em> lives at the intersection of pops, economics and politics).  That isn&#8217;t to say these games don&#8217;t include other things of course, but there is a clear central concept, an idea the game wants to explore most.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Hearts of Iron IV is a game about<\/strong> <strong>what in military theory we call <em>operations<\/em><\/strong>. Indeed it is substantially <em>more focused<\/em> on operations than its predecessors (<em>Hearts of Iron II <\/em>and <em>III<\/em>; I never played the original <em>Hearts of Iron<\/em> and so won&#8217;t comment on it here) in that it streamlines everything <em><strong>but<\/strong><\/em> operations (e.g. research, industry, politics, espionage) in order to more clearly focus on the game&#8217;s major focus (though it then allows you to <em>automate<\/em> a fair chunk of the operations to try to control the complexity).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" data-attachment-id=\"37207\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/203aa01\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/203AA01.jpg?fit=1920%2C1080&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,1080\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"203AA0~1\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/203AA01.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/203AA01.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37207\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/203AA01.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/203AA01.jpg?resize=300%2C169&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/203AA01.jpg?resize=768%2C432&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/203AA01.jpg?resize=1536%2C864&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/203AA01.jpg?resize=1100%2C619&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/203AA01.jpg?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">And as usual we are going to be running a campaign roughly in parallel with the series.  I opted for a run as the United Kingdom because it offers a very &#8216;fully featured&#8217; run that interacts with basically all of the games systems.  Now I should note that I did not do this run on Ironman because I needed to be able to drop saves at regular intervals to pull screenshots.  However, for the sake of establishing my United Kingdom Ironman Cred, I present the following screenshot of my achievements list:<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"816\" height=\"86\" data-attachment-id=\"37210\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/image-202\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-1.png?fit=816%2C86&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"816,86\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-1.png?fit=816%2C86&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-1.png?resize=816%2C86&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37210\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-1.png?w=816&amp;ssl=1 816w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-1.png?resize=300%2C32&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image-1.png?resize=768%2C81&amp;ssl=1 768w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 816px) 100vw, 816px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Yes, including India.  We&#8217;re actually going to repeat this focus in this run as well, mostly because it exemplifies how deeply silly Hearts of Iron IV&#8217;s &#8216;meme politics&#8217; can get, but I have done it, on Ironman, quite a while ago.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now talking about this a bit tricky, because I want to say that <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> is fundamentally about what we might call the operational level of military analysis or even the operational level of war. But the idea that there is a distinct operational &#8216;level,&#8217; despite being part of United States military doctrine, is disputed by some current military theorists (if you want to read perhaps the clearest such dispute, see B.A. Friedman, <em><a href=\"https:\/\/amzn.to\/4qXMApr\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/amzn.to\/4qXMApr\">On Operations: Operational Art and Military Disciplines<\/a><\/em> (2021), which I find very persuasive on most of its point). But I don&#8217;t want to bog us down unpacking those arguments, which have to do with the nature of operations, the degree to which operational planning is actually a kind of &#8216;grand tactics,&#8217; or the history of the idea (or lack of it) in Soviet &#8216;<a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Deep_operation\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Deep_operation\">Deep Operation<\/a>&#8216; doctrine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And I don&#8217;t think I have to, because there may or may not really <em>be<\/em> an &#8216;operational level&#8217; of war between tactics and strategy, but &#8216;operational art&#8217; as commonly understood in the West <strong>is the focus of <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em><\/strong>, so the term is useful for us regardless of its applicability to real war. Though, of course, the fact that it remains common in modern military doctrine should suggest that it is, to some degree, applicable.<span id='easy-footnote-12-37063' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/#easy-footnote-bottom-12-37063' title='For what it is worth, I find the idea of &amp;#8216;operations&amp;#8217; as a third category between tactics and strategy is just a fantastically valuable teaching tool for students just beginning to grapple with the nature of war that it is very hard to ever fully abandon the &amp;#8216;operational level&amp;#8217; as a classroom idea, even if it is perhaps something that a mature practitioner is going to &amp;#8216;complicated out of existence.&amp;#8217;'><sup>12<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So what do we mean when we say &#8216;operations,&#8217; &#8216;operational art&#8217; or even an &#8216;operational level of war?&#8217;  We have discussed the <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2022\/03\/25\/miscellanea-a-very-short-glossary-of-military-terminology\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2022\/03\/25\/miscellanea-a-very-short-glossary-of-military-terminology\/\">three levels of military analysis<\/a> a few times on the blog, but it has been a while and so is worth reviewing.  The three levels are tactics (<em>how<\/em> you fight), operations (<em>where<\/em> you fight) and strategy (<em>why<\/em> you fight).  To expand on those shorthand definitions, tactics (the lowest layer of analysis) concerns the method used to win battles (broadly defined): maneuver, positioning, stratagems, and so on.  Strategy (the uppermost layer) considers the overall objectives a state, polity or organization has, the ways those objectives can be achieved (including the decision <em>not to have a war<\/em>) and the resources required to achieve those objectives, a set of components short-handed in US military doctrine as &#8216;Ends, Ways and Means.&#8217;  <em>Grand<\/em> strategy is sometimes treated as its own layer, which broadens the analysis to include political, diplomatic and economic tools and concerns, though I would tend to argue that all strategy is grand strategy: states do not have ends, ways or means that are ever wholly divorced from political, diplomatic and economic tools.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" data-attachment-id=\"37214\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/20912d1\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20912D1.jpg?fit=1920%2C1080&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,1080\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"20912D~1\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20912D1.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20912D1.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37214\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20912D1.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20912D1.jpg?resize=300%2C169&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20912D1.jpg?resize=768%2C432&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20912D1.jpg?resize=1536%2C864&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20912D1.jpg?resize=1100%2C619&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20912D1.jpg?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Now we&#8217;re going to cover the &#8216;strategic layer&#8217; of Hearts of Iron IV in later posts, so I am mostly going to &#8216;fast forward&#8217; here from the 1936 start date to the beginning of the war proper in 1939, but I want to lay out my self-imposed &#8216;rules&#8217; for a United Kingdom run, as well as my early approach.<br>The rules are: historical focuses (making countries more or less act historically) are on; as the United Kingdom, I follow &#8216;historical&#8217; decision-making until the outbreak of war in 1939 (no early war by rejecting the Munich Agreement, etc), no new division recruitment until the Anschluss of Austria and no meaningful military rearmament until the militarization of the Rhineland.  Finally, no nuclear weapons, no cheesy division templates (&#8216;space marines&#8217;), and no paratroopers (which are highly exploitable against the AI).<br>The aims are to keep France in the war (by winning the Battle of France) and then to win the war against the Axis without the USSR entering the war if possible and then &#8211; assuming I can find an opportunity given the limits to diplomacy and war declaration &#8211; to recover <strong>all<\/strong> of Poland, including the chunk seized by the USSR (which will require war with the USSR as there&#8217;s no option to negotiate on this point).<br>In addition, the aim is to also leave the United Kingdom in a &#8216;great power&#8217; position at war&#8217;s end, rather than broke or ailing, which means completing the Imperial Federation focus we&#8217;ll discuss later.  Ideally, we want &#8216;maximum Britain&#8217; which means an Imperial Federation achieved <em><strong>with<\/strong><\/em> India.<br>That&#8217;s the goal.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In this schema, <strong>operations is the layer that knits strategy<\/strong> <strong>together with tactics<\/strong>.  Ideally the decision-making process begins with strategy, where it is determined that the best (or perhaps only) way to achieve to achieve a strategic end-state is through warfare.  <strong>Operations is thus occupied with the question of how to reach that strategic end-state, whatever it might be, through the use of military force<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In practice, that generally means that operations takes the strategic end-state (&#8216;compel the surrender of Germany&#8217;) and then designs military campaigns to achieve that objective, which of course means first asking, &#8216;what would cause Germany to surrender?&#8217;  Often this means making decisions about what theaters to prioritize (&#8216;should I fight in France or in North Africa or in Italy?&#8217;), which all of the follow-on considerations of logistics, transport and movement in space and time.  The maneuver component of this &#8211; planning the movement of often very large armies over vast spaces &#8211; strongly resembles a sort of &#8216;super-sized tactics&#8217; and indeed the idea is often termed &#8216;grand tactics&#8217; which in some contexts has a similar meaning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Perhaps the best way to exemplify this is with a reasonably direct example, so let us posit Napoleon&#8217;s Ulm Campaign (1805).  Napoleon had decided that he needed to knock Austria out of the war (&#8216;ends&#8217;) and that the best way to do this was the destruction of Austria and Russia&#8217;s armies, with Austria coming first, (&#8216;ways&#8217;) using Napoleon&#8217;s army (&#8216;means&#8217;) &#8211; all strategic level concerns.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now comes the <em><strong>operational art<\/strong><\/em>: how to best employ his army (the means) to those ends.  Napoleon opts for a campaign of rapid maneuver so that he could concentrate a much larger French army against a smaller and isolated Austrian army before Russian (or other Austrian) help could arrive.  To do <em>that<\/em>, he would have to march each piece of his army (his army corps, of which he had six in motion for the campaign) along separate routes (to make <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2019\/10\/06\/new-acquisitions-how-fast-do-armies-move\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"1396\">maximum use of roads<\/a> and <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2022\/07\/15\/collections-logistics-how-did-they-do-it-part-i-the-problem\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"13968\">supplies<\/a>), while carefully managing their movement (&#8216;space and time&#8217;) to make sure they all arrived where the Austrians were at the same time (to avoid being picked off one by one).  At the same time, managing the dispersed movement of several large armies meant managing the logistics of these forces, as the campaign would last almost a month (and could have lasted longer) in hostile territory.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"789\" data-attachment-id=\"37079\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/image-201\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image.png?fit=3767%2C2904&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"3767,2904\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image.png?fit=1024%2C789&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image.png?resize=1024%2C789&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37079\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image.png?resize=1024%2C789&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image.png?resize=300%2C231&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image.png?resize=768%2C592&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image.png?resize=1536%2C1184&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image.png?resize=2048%2C1579&amp;ssl=1 2048w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image.png?resize=1100%2C848&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image.png?w=2200&amp;ssl=1 2200w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/image.png?w=3300&amp;ssl=1 3300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Via <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Ulm_campaign#\/media\/File:Ulm_campaign_-_French_strategic_envelopment,_26_September-9_October_1805.jpg\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Ulm_campaign#\/media\/File:Ulm_campaign_-_French_strategic_envelopment,_26_September-9_October_1805.jpg\">Wikipedia<\/a>, a map of the Ulm Campaign, showing the maneuvers of Napoleon&#8217;s corps.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Finally, the question of how to actually <em><strong>beat<\/strong><\/em> the Austrians once Napoleon&#8217;s forces arrived would be a question of tactics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Operations<\/strong> is thus often concerned with the use of maneuver (both the &#8216;where&#8217; and the &#8216;how fast&#8217;), logistics and terrain to create favorable conditions where battles can both be won and also be decisive or at least <em>contribute<\/em> to strategic ends.  Now as a &#8216;level of war&#8217; coequal with strategy and tactics, operations can and indeed must be <em>more<\/em> than just that, because it would have to consider uses of force beyond simply maneuvering against enemy armies in the field for the purpose of battles, but that frame will serve us pretty well here because it is the frame <em>Hearts of Iron<\/em> adopts across the entire series.  Which is not a critique: this is a game about World War II, which was very substantially a war concerned with large conventional armies maneuvering in the field.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is thus perhaps both ironic and telling that <em>Hearts of Iron<\/em>, arguably <em><strong>the<\/strong><\/em> modern military strategy game,<strong> is fundamentally a game about operations, not strategy<\/strong> (though the latter is present).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" data-attachment-id=\"37218\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/20c3a91\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20C3A91.jpg?fit=1920%2C1080&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,1080\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"20C3A9~1\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20C3A91.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20C3A91.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37218\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20C3A91.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20C3A91.jpg?resize=300%2C169&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20C3A91.jpg?resize=768%2C432&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20C3A91.jpg?resize=1536%2C864&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20C3A91.jpg?resize=1100%2C619&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20C3A91.jpg?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Now we fast forward to the start of the war in Europe in 1939.  Historically, the British Expeditionary Force in France was 13 divisions.  I have 55 divisions here in France ready to go at the start of the war.  That&#8217;s necessary because France in Hearts of Iron IV <strong>is much, much weaker than it was historically<\/strong>.  German success in the Battle of France was, in a sense, an unlikely outcome, but the developers clearly feel like they need to <strong>make it likely<\/strong> and they do that by making France (and to a lesser extent Britain) much weaker than they were.<br>The &#8216;trick&#8217; for offsetting this is more preparation but also more intentional use of manpower from Britain&#8217;s Empire.  In order to allow me to deploy almost all of my available manpower onto the continent, I actually guard Britain&#8217;s coastline with divisions recruited in British Malaya, using a compact, relatively cheap division template that is just good enough to avoid anything truly silly (this approach was more necessary back when naval invasions didn&#8217;t require establishing sea control first).<br>That lets me move basically all of my recruitable manpower into France, where it is supplemented by a number of divisions recruited in India.  It is necessary to be careful here: Indian divisions fighting in Europe will push India towards greater autonomy, so I don&#8217;t want too many of them, but they make great second-row divisions and they also let me stretch a thin curtain over the Maginot Line in case the French AI does something dumb (as it used to do somewhat regularly).<br><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Divisions and Lines<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Perhaps the most immediately striking and overwhelming element of <em>HoI4<\/em>&#8216;s visual presentation is how it simulates and represents armies in order to facilitate a game about operations.  Whereas in other Paradox titles, armies generally exist as a single &#8216;stack&#8217; that occupies one point on the map (a province, for instance), in <em>HoI4<\/em> (and the earlier <em>HoI<\/em> titles) armies are broken out into divisions, which, rather than being concentrated at a single point on the map, are instead spread out, typically in clear front lines, often along borders.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There are a few mechanics that push players towards this different way of organizing armies.  First, whereas other Paradox games feature &#8216;armies&#8217; as &#8216;stacks&#8217; (groups that operate as one) of units, <em>HoI4<\/em> treats the division as an almost &#8216;atomic&#8217; unit.  While divisions are (in ways we&#8217;ll get to) composed of smaller units, they cannot be merged or split apart and while they can be put in the same province they cannot be &#8216;stacked.&#8217;  A division which is defeated in a combat will not wait for the other divisions in the same combat to be defeated, but will retreat all on its own.  In practice, the division functions as a UI element the same way an entire army &#8216;stack&#8217; in Paradox&#8217;s other games does.<strong>  The player is thus strongly encouraged to think about divisions as the &#8216;base unit&#8217; of their operational approach<\/strong> (with implications in both nature and scale we&#8217;ll get to).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Moreover, the game gives players a lot of reasons not to group their divisions up.  Battles, when they occur, have limited frontage and inflict penalties (both frontage penalties and stacking penalties) if there are too many divisions involved in the combat; at the very least excess divisions cannot participate (but have their organization, strength recovery and movement frozen), which makes it a bad use to have excess divisions in a single engagement.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" data-attachment-id=\"37221\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/20b9a21-2\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20B9A21-1.jpg?fit=1920%2C1080&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,1080\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"20B9A2~1\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20B9A21-1.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20B9A21-1.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37221\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20B9A21-1.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20B9A21-1.jpg?resize=300%2C169&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20B9A21-1.jpg?resize=768%2C432&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20B9A21-1.jpg?resize=1536%2C864&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20B9A21-1.jpg?resize=1100%2C619&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20B9A21-1.jpg?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">A closer look at what a front line (where France meets Germany) can look like.  Each little box (green for the player, blue for friendly, red for enemy) indicates divisions, with the number in the small box indicating how many of that type and the little green icon indicating the division type (a horse for cavalry, a helmet for infantry, etc).  When Hearts of Iron IV released, a LOT of players complained about the lack of an option to use <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/NATO_Joint_Military_Symbology\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/NATO_Joint_Military_Symbology\">APP-6 NATO military symbols<\/a> for divisions (&#8216;NATO counters&#8217;).  It was a huge, fiery, player-dividing flame-fest.  Now no one cares and this is the most popular strategy game on the market.  Make of that what you will.<br>In terms of these divisions, I&#8217;ll get to my template a bit later, but it is artillery heavy (a 9\/1 with full supports), because the United Kingdom is long on industry but short on manpower.  I have to spend steel instead of blood, especially if I want to have anyone left at the end to potentially fight the USSR.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But perhaps most significantly the <strong>logistics system<\/strong> compels spread out as well: divisions in <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> do not just draw from the supply capacity of the province they&#8217;re in (they&#8217;re already mostly too big!), but rather they pull from a nearby <strong>supply hub<\/strong> (which may be several provinces away) and thus <strong>need a clear, friendly path to that supply hub<\/strong>. Supply hubs, in turn, have a limited capacity to support units. They can &#8211; in a system we&#8217;ll talk about later in the series &#8211; draw supply at greater distance, but that throughput is limited. <strong>Consequently, most states already have armies too large to be supported by a single supply hub<\/strong>. As a result <strong>the AI and the player generally cannot &#8216;doomstack&#8217;<\/strong> (place all or nearly all of their combat units in a single, massive formation, located all together) <strong>as in other strategy titles<\/strong>.  The player is forced to spread their divisions over multiple supply hubs to maintain them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Even more importantly, far more so than in almost any other mainstream strategy game, <em><strong>it is very bad if enemies get behind you<\/strong><\/em> in <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em>.  An enemy division <em>between<\/em> your divisions and your supply hubs blocks their supply, forcing them out of supply, with catastrophic penalties to combat power and steady attrition which depletes their equipment.  Indeed <strong>much of the (grand) tactics of <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> is about finding ways to isolate enemy units from their sources of logistics<\/strong> (which makes sense as this is a core element of operational art).  Consequently <strong>most of the time, the player or AI will want to leave <em>no gaps<\/em> in their lines which might allow enemy units to encircle them<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Finally, that &#8216;no gaps&#8217; approach is facilitated by <em>HoI4<\/em>&#8216;s &#8216;movement is attack&#8217; design, which is shares with no other mainland Paradox series.  In every other Paradox game, for one army to attack another, it must <em>arrive<\/em> in the same province, but in <em>Hearts of Iron<\/em> (the whole series) a division initiates combat the moment it <em>begins<\/em> to enter a province with an enemy division <em><strong>and cannot finish moving into that province until it has won the battle<\/strong><\/em>, displacing the enemy division out of the province (by depleting its organization, forcing its retreat).  <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The result is a <em>very<\/em> different combat system, where wars (or at least theaters in wars) resemble two lines of divisions stretching over many provinces &#8216;shoving&#8217; each other with offensive battles, as opposed to the &#8216;point location&#8217; battles of other Paradox titles or indeed, other strategy games (e.g. the <em>Total War<\/em> series) more generally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" data-attachment-id=\"37225\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/attachment\/204e601\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/204E601.jpg?fit=1920%2C1080&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,1080\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"204E60~1\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/204E601.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/204E601.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37225\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/204E601.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/204E601.jpg?resize=300%2C169&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/204E601.jpg?resize=768%2C432&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/204E601.jpg?resize=1536%2C864&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/204E601.jpg?resize=1100%2C619&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/204E601.jpg?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Jumping ahead to 1940 (1939 on historical provides few options for Britain to go on the attack against Germany as the small front line is very difficult terrain), I&#8217;ve managed what Churchill could not and successfully intercepted the German amphibious attack on Norway.  over the course of two naval battles, I bag most of the Kriegsmarine&#8217;s surface fleet.<br>I&#8217;m not sure how much we&#8217;ll touch on naval warfare in this series, but my approach is to spend the interwar period building (in part) a few more battlecruisers that can make 28 knots as a sort of &#8216;budget fast battleship&#8217; to combine with Britain&#8217;s starting fleet carriers to make a deadly fast attack group: fast enough to dash out from Britain to &#8216;catch&#8217; German fleets spotted off the coast of Denmark.  And with 5 BCs, 6 CAs and 4 CVs, more than enough firepower to rumble with any potential European enemy except perhaps the Regia Marina (and even then, I think I&#8217;d have the edge).<br>You wouldn&#8217;t want to try to solo the Pacific War with it, but I don&#8217;t intend to.  It is &#8216;enough,&#8217; which lets me focus on anti-submarine work with the rest of my dockyards and direct everything else I have towards the war on the continent.<br><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Iron Operations<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The result is that &#8216;battles&#8217; (large-scale engagement consisting of multiple attacks over connected provinces, the way we&#8217;d understand the &#8216;Battle of France&#8217; or the &#8216;Battle of Stalingrad&#8217; given their scale) in <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> are a lot more granular than in other Paradox titles.  In <em>Europa Universalis<\/em>, the player puts together an army, throws it against the enemy army and then hopes for the best: the outcome is heavily shaped by army composition, local terrain and such, but once the player has made the decision to offer battle (or been trapped into it), their active participation is over.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">By contrast, <em>HoI4 <\/em>presents the player with <em><strong>a lot more decisions<\/strong><\/em>.  Not just &#8216;should I have a battle in this theater&#8217; but &#8216;which provinces specifically in this line should I attack first?  Which divisions should I use?  Should my attacks be sequential or coordinated?  How many angles can I attack from?&#8217; and so on.  And that is before considering the impact of air or naval operations on the above.  The result is something quite like tactics: a skilled player can &#8211; by considering attack directions, which divisions to use, local terrain, logistics considerations and so on &#8211; produce far more successful offensives in a way that the player simply doesn&#8217;t have that level of control in other Paradox titles.<span id='easy-footnote-13-37063' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/#easy-footnote-bottom-13-37063' title='To be clear, a skilled player in &lt;em&gt;CKIII&lt;\/em&gt; or &lt;em&gt;EU5&lt;\/em&gt; absolutely &lt;em&gt;&lt;strong&gt;can&lt;\/strong&gt;&lt;\/em&gt; tilt the outcome of battles in their favor through canny maneuvering before contact, but there is a real difference here both in granularity (how many decision-points you get) and level of impact.'><sup>13<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That said, the player isn&#8217;t really doing &#8216;tactics&#8217; in a typical sense either (indeed in the game &#8216;tactics&#8217; are approaches chosen automatically by your simulated generals during an engagement; they&#8217;re an explicit part of the game design simulated <em>beneath<\/em> your (operational) layer).  The typical considerations of tactics &#8211; use of terrain, overlapping fields of fire, formations, fortifications, small-scale maneuver, suppression and so on &#8211; are at most simulated abstractly through various bonuses and penalties we&#8217;ll get to when we discuss the game&#8217;s approach to doctrine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Because <strong>the player&#8217;s basic unit of control is the <em>division<\/em><\/strong> (and indeed, the player cannot control anything smaller!) <strong>and divisions in WWII were <em>really big<\/em><\/strong>, often as large or larger as entire field armies in earlier periods.  Divisions vary substantially in size but range from 10,000 to 25,000 troops.  To give a brief sense of how big a formation that is: most readers are probably familiar with E &#8220;EZ&#8221; Company from <em>Band of Brothers<\/em>; we see them <em>do tactics<\/em> (flanking, encirclement, suppression-and-maneuver).  E Company probably feels to most folks like a big-ish unit, with a lot of people (around 140 at any given time) that we meet.  E Company was, in fact, just one company (of three) in the 2nd battalion (of three) in the 506th Parachute Infantry regiment (of four, plus a host of supporting elements) in the 101st Airborne Division (which at a typical strength of ~8,000, including support elements, was a small division; US airborne divisions tended to be about half the size of regular infantry divisions).  There were, in fact, <em>four<\/em> E Companies in the 101st, along with one E Battery.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In short, <strong>divisions are really big<\/strong> and as a result the concerns for a player whose smallest unit of control is an <em>entire division<\/em> look pretty different from unit tactics for squads, platoons or companies.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" data-attachment-id=\"37228\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/attachment\/20e8841\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20E8841.jpg?fit=1920%2C1080&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,1080\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"20E884~1\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20E8841.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20E8841.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37228\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20E8841.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20E8841.jpg?resize=300%2C169&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20E8841.jpg?resize=768%2C432&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20E8841.jpg?resize=1536%2C864&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20E8841.jpg?resize=1100%2C619&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20E8841.jpg?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Moving ahead, here is the situation in the summer of 1940, as Germany has invaded the Low Countries.  With (it&#8217;s hard to see) almost 15 divisions in the Ardennes, I have a chunky defense there which acts as the pivot around which another 22 divisions swing up into Belgium.<br>The cheeky thing here is my 20-odd divisions slated for the Netherlands.  The sequencing of Germany&#8217;s attack on France and the Low Countries has been much improved, but Germany still tends to declare war on the Netherlands and invade days before it does the same to Belgium, leaving British armies stuck in France watching helplessly as the Netherlands falls, unable to walk across Belgium to stop it.  Historically, while there was a lot of confusion due to a lack of Belgian coordination, Germany invaded all three of the Low Countries on the same day (May 10, 1940).<br>The cheeky thing to do about this is to simply be prepared to <em><strong>ship<\/strong><\/em> British forces to the Netherlands, so I had about 20 divisions read in Calais and Dover, prepared to be shipped into Rotterdam the moment the Germans crossed the Dutch frontier.  As a result, I was able to get to Amsterdam, Breda and the northern edge of the Ijsselmeer first and set up defensive positions.  The 22 divisions slated for Belgium then pivot around Luxembourg to link on a line that runs from Luxembourg to Liege and then follows the Meuse into the Netherlands before turning north to Utrecht.  It&#8217;s a defensive line that offers really good terrain on the whole length which is important: <strong>we&#8217;re going to be here for a while<\/strong>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>This is also shaped by <em>HoI4<\/em>&#8216;s different combat model<\/strong>.  As we&#8217;ve actually discussed before, in most strategy games, battles tend to be extremely decisive, <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2022\/07\/01\/collections-total-generalship-commanding-pre-modern-armies-part-iiic-morale-and-cohesion\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2022\/07\/01\/collections-total-generalship-commanding-pre-modern-armies-part-iiic-morale-and-cohesion\/\">with armies generally taking enormous casualties<\/a> that render the loser immediately combat incapable.  By contrast, in <em>Hearts of Iron<\/em>, each division has two kinds of &#8216;health&#8217;: a <strong>strength <\/strong>rating, which represents the proportion of equipment and manpower the division has available, and an <strong>organization<\/strong> rating, which represents the division&#8217;s combat effectiveness.  Divisions are forced to retreat from combat when their <strong>organization<\/strong> hits zero and most damage accrues to organization rather than to strength.  But organization replenishes quickly on the game&#8217;s time scale (measured in hours).  <strong>The result is that a division, attacked and defeated by an infantry division, will generally have regenerated its organization substantially by the time it has retreated to the next province<\/strong> <strong>and thus be ready to defend <em>again<\/em><\/strong>.<span id='easy-footnote-14-37063' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/#easy-footnote-bottom-14-37063' title='One of the great advantages of faster divisions (cavalry, but really motorized or mechanized infantry and armor) is that they can move quickly enough to attack retreating divisions &lt;em&gt;before&lt;\/em&gt; they reorganize, allowing them to &amp;#8216;keep a beat enemy beat&amp;#8217; as it were (and potentially overrunning them).'><sup>14<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  Meanwhile <em><strong>strength<\/strong><\/em> damage, assuming the manpower and equipment is available in the country&#8217;s stockpile and the logistics route is clear, is replenished very fast compared to the rate at which divisions take strength losses (because most damage accrues to organization), with the result that recently &#8216;pushed&#8217; divisions will also generally be at full strength.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>This produces a &#8216;shoving match&#8217; rather than decisive battles in <em>HoI4<\/em>&#8216;s combat model<\/strong>: you do not (generally) destroy enemy divisions when you defeat them, you merely <em>push<\/em> them.  The only reliable way to destroy an enemy division entirely is to defeat it when it has nowhere else to retreat, generally by encircling it.  <strong>It is, of course, still possible to adopt an attritional strategy<\/strong>, simply aiming to deplete the enemy&#8217;s stockpile of manpower and equipment faster than your own &#8211; and that does sometimes happen &#8211; but what the player is generally <em>trying to do<\/em> is to use operational art to move faster than that, either by accelerating attrition or bypassing it altogether.  But the tool to do that is <strong><em>taking and holding ground<\/em><\/strong> (provinces), which neatly reorients the players attention to the way that decision-makers at the time thought about it: operations to take or hold specific territory (rather than thinking, in the first instance, about destroying a given army).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The player&#8217;s task, then (which the AI mimics) is to ask, &#8220;<strong>how do I both <em>achieve shoving<\/em><\/strong> (how do I get the front moving the way I want in the first place) <strong>and how do I then move the front line in a way that achieves some greater objective?<\/strong>&#8221;  It is that latter part that is such a shift because, recall, in a lot of games of this sort <em>simply destroying the enemy<\/em> is the objective, but in <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em>, the enemy will not be destroyed (probably), merely moved backwards.  So the question becomes not &#8216;how do I destroy the enemy?&#8217; but <strong>&#8216;how do I move them backwards in a way that gets me closer to winning?<\/strong>&#8216;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In short, the player is asking, &#8216;how do I bridge the gap between my tactics (being able to shove the enemy) and my strategy (winning the war in a way that achieves my objectives).&#8217;  Which (said gesturing upwards energetically) <em><strong>is operations<\/strong><\/em>!<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" data-attachment-id=\"37233\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/attachment\/2005701\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/2005701.jpg?fit=1920%2C1080&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,1080\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"200570~1\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/2005701.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/2005701.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37233\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/2005701.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/2005701.jpg?resize=300%2C169&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/2005701.jpg?resize=768%2C432&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/2005701.jpg?resize=1536%2C864&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/2005701.jpg?resize=1100%2C619&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/2005701.jpg?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Of course the war isn&#8217;t only in Europe so here is some of the action in Africa &#8211; in this case the Horn of Africa &#8211; in June of 1940.<br>Note the crenellated red line between my territory and the Green (Italy) &#8211; that is an automated front-line.  The arrow leading out of it is a automated offensive plan.  We&#8217;ll talk about these below.<br>This is also a good example of using <strong>logistics<\/strong> in an operation.  Supply in this part of the world is mostly coming in by port, so instead of engaging the Italians everywhere, I have focused my forces on the coast with just a thin wing on their left to keep them from being encircled.  Instead, the main force punches right up the coast to seize the airbase and Mogadishu, the loss of which leaves all of those Italian divisions to the north cut off from supply and basically helpless.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now I don&#8217;t want to get too deep here into &#8216;how do be good at <em>Hearts of Iron<\/em>&#8216; but there are a number of different mid-term objectives players might aim to &#8216;shove&#8217; for.  Perhaps the nearest term is &#8216;shoving&#8217; for a better vantage to attack a key location.  Cities, mountains, forts, forests and so on can all be really good defensive locations; rivers act as barriers <em>between<\/em> provinces which disadvantage attacks over them.  At the scale <em>HoI4<\/em> exists at, you cannot &#8216;flank&#8217; these positions (you can encircle them, more on that in a second), however attacking one province simultaneously from multiple directions widens the frontage of the battle, allowing the attacker to get more divisions into the fray, which can offset the defender&#8217;s terrain advantage.<span id='easy-footnote-15-37063' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/#easy-footnote-bottom-15-37063' title='My own, somewhat vulgar, pet term for abusing the frontage rules is a &amp;#8216;width screw,&amp;#8217; (since the &lt;em&gt;HoI&lt;\/em&gt; series has used &amp;#8216;frontage&amp;#8217; and &amp;#8216;combat width&amp;#8217; somewhat interchangeably) which comes in two forms: either expanding the combat width &lt;em&gt;way more&lt;\/em&gt; than the defender has divisions (so you have several divisions beating on just one or two) or alternately shrinking the combat width &lt;em&gt;way less&lt;\/em&gt; than the defender has divisions (so that most of his divisions are stuck in reserve, unable to move or regenerate, but not actively fighting).  The former, of course, simulates a force being flanked, the latter is the best way to accomplish a &amp;#8216;spoiling attack.&amp;#8217;'><sup>15<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  So often the first objective of a &#8216;shove&#8217; is to clear &#8216;easier&#8217; provinces (plains, hills, ones not guarded by river-crossings) in order to be able to lever an opponent out of the &#8216;hard&#8217; provinces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">One step up further than that, the player might aim to break out into enemy rear areas and disrupt logistics.  As noted above, units need clear, unobstructed path to a friendly supply hub to fight effectively: seizing that hub or pinching the supply route (say, cutting across a key rail line) can render even very favorable positions untenable.<span id='easy-footnote-16-37063' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/#easy-footnote-bottom-16-37063' title='Though the AI will calmly sit in low supply and attrition rather than abandon a front line that cannot be held.  Players, by contrast, can just evacuate untenable salients.'><sup>16<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  The extreme version of this is <strong>encirclement<\/strong>, where you &#8216;shove&#8217; in a way that cuts off part of the enemy army from <em>any<\/em> route to their capital, which puts them out of supply (with major combat penalties) and creates a pocket.  If the player can then close down that pocket (weakened by attrition and supply penalties as the divisions in it cannot be reinforced), left nowhere to run the divisions stuck in the pocket will be destroyed when they can no longer retreat.  This is the one reliably way to <em>fully destroy<\/em> a division (along with all of its manpower and equipment) and thus the most powerful way to shift the balance of attrition in your favor.<span id='easy-footnote-17-37063' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/#easy-footnote-bottom-17-37063' title='It can also create huge gaps in the enemy line which can be exploited: if their old front line is in the bag, then you have a window of opportunity to rush through the hole created behind them.'><sup>17<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Perhaps most importantly, of course, you can want to &#8216;shove&#8217; in order to get control over the underlying terrain itself.  As we&#8217;ll get to later, factories and raw materials in <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> do not exist abstractly, they live <em>on the map<\/em> in specific places &#8211; seizing a key area denies the factories and resources in that area to your enemy, further accelerating an attritional advantage.  Key urban centers also are &#8216;victory point&#8217; locations: countries are compelled to surrender (capitulate) when a certain majority (typically quite high) of their victory points are taken.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In some cases, a player may expect to defeat an enemy with a single big initial offensive &#8211; a <em>coup de main<\/em> &#8211; in which case the offensive design is about navigating divisions to key victory points and seizing them while maintaining and protecting the logistics lines that effort creates.  But in most cases, it is going to take several &#8216;shoves&#8217; to achieve victory and attrition is going to play a role.  Consequently, the player might instead plan a single large campaign aiming to seize a key resource zone or industrial area (and finish up with a front line anchored on good defensive terrain for the inevitable counter-attack), which in turn is composed of smaller operations levering the enemy out of the area by seizing logistics hubs or through disruption which is in turn composed of smaller battles that get the front moving and set terrain conditions for successfully attacking key enemy strong-points.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In short, the player in <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> lives in the space <em>between <\/em>strategy (&#8216;win the war&#8217; &#8211; as we&#8217;ll see, <em>HoI4<\/em>&#8216;s strategic layer is actually <em><strong>much less<\/strong><\/em> developed than comparable games like <em>Victoria III<\/em> or <em>Europa Universalis IV <\/em>or <em>V<\/em>) and tactics (&#8216;win the battle&#8217;), asking the player to think about how they can win the battles <em>in a way that wins the war<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" data-attachment-id=\"37235\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/204aee1\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/204AEE1.jpg?fit=1920%2C1080&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,1080\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"204AEE~1\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/204AEE1.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/204AEE1.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37235\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/204AEE1.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/204AEE1.jpg?resize=300%2C169&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/204AEE1.jpg?resize=768%2C432&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/204AEE1.jpg?resize=1536%2C864&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/204AEE1.jpg?resize=1100%2C619&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/204AEE1.jpg?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Meanwhile at the northern end of the Horn of Africa area of operations, I&#8217;m also trying to push on key supply centers (while my ships sit off coast making sure there are no reinforcements) and you can see that I&#8217;ve made a tiny encirclement here: the two Italian divisions (one infantry, one light armor) caught along the coast have nowhere to retreat to.  If attacked, they suffer massive effectiveness penalties; if defeated, instead of being &#8216;shoved,&#8217; they are totally destroyed.<br>At the bottom, you can see the green arrow (with &#8217;66&#8217; on it) &#8211; that is an active battle indicator showing the Italian AI is desperately trying to break its two trapped divisions out.  The green color indicates that this effort is failing (green means the player is winning the combat), because they&#8217;re attacking two strong infantry divisions in mountains, which is never going to go well.<br>By using a few of my &#8216;European&#8217; template divisions &#8211; with lots of artillery and other equipment &#8211; in Africa against much weaker Italian divisions, I can often shove them around, though I cannot put these &#8216;good&#8217; divisions everywhere, so I have to focus my efforts.<br>As above, the focus is on picking off key ports (most of which are pretty vulnerable), leaving the rest of the Italian army in this part of Africa to wither on the vine.<br>North Africa will be more challenging, but not massively so.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Modeling Operations in WWII<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">All of this is somewhat difficult to describe but with luck some of the screenshots here have helped demonstrate, for those who haven&#8217;t played the game, how this system works.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There&#8217;s one final set of interacting mechanics here that we need to note which tend to govern the tempo of operations in <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em>: <strong>entrenchment and planning<\/strong>.  Units that stop moving gain &#8216;<strong>entrenchment<\/strong>&#8216; over time in their current location, which provides a percentage boost to the damage they deal (&#8216;attack,&#8217; both &#8216;soft&#8217; and &#8216;hard&#8217; &#8211; we&#8217;ll get into this later) and reduces the damage they take when defending (&#8216;defense&#8217;).  In short, units that sit still in a province get better at defending that province, up to a cap.  Full entrenchment is generally a pretty significant bonus and it can be <em>very hard<\/em> to move a group of well-entrenched infantry divisions off of a province with good defensive terrain (usually terrain with penalizes armor).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>Planning<\/strong> works almost exactly like entrenchment except for attacking rather than defending.  units assigned to an offensive plan (see below) and set up on the front line gain a planning bonus day by day which increases their attack and reduces they damage they take when attacking (&#8216;breakthrough&#8217;).  Whereas entrenchment instantly drops to zero once a unit moves, the planning bonus degrades slowly once a unit begins attacking and advancing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In practice the interaction is this: at the start of an operation, both armies are likely already fully entrenched.  To offset that substantial bonus to the defender (which the attacker cannot use &#8211; you do not get your entrenchment bonus when you attack, indeed attacking at all <em>instantly<\/em> sets a division&#8217;s entrenchment to zero), the attacker needs to build up a planning bonus, which typically might take something like two weeks of in game time (plus or minus various bonuses).  Once that bonus is built up, the attacker strikes, using the planning bonus to overcome the defender&#8217;s entrenchment.  If both sides are pure infantry, this may <em>still<\/em> not be enough, because infantry is much better at defending than attacking (high &#8216;defense&#8217; but terrible &#8216;breakthrough&#8217;) but armor and airpower can tip the scales in favor of the attacker.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That said, once the defender is thrown off of their initial positions <em>he loses his entrenchment bonus<\/em>, while the attacker&#8217;s planning bonus is only slowly wearing off.  The advantage thus swings to the attacker who has created a breakthrough, allowing them to widen gaps and push through to exploit the breakthrough.  That said, soon enough the attacker&#8217;s planning bonus wears off and the constant attacking and advancing wears down the attackers organization (and equipment\/manpower), leading the balance to shift back to the defender, who then re-entrenches, re-calcifying the lines in a new position.  At which point the attacker, if they want to remain on the offensive, has to pick a new spot, set a new plan, resupply and reinforce their divisions, rev up their planning bonus again and then take another &#8216;punch.&#8217;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The result of this system is to create discrete, identifiable operations (the game will even name them for you).  Players (and the AI) plan around these discrete smaller units of warfare with smaller objectives that occur on an observable rhythm.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And as a <strong>model of operations in World War II, <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> broadly succeeds<\/strong>.  There is enough detail in the resource and logistics simulation to model <em>why<\/em> offensives were mounted in the places why were and in the way that they were.  The logistics and resource systems create objectives for operations that broadly match those attempted historically and the logistics system is also detailed enough to create the severe logistics hurdles that limited historical operations as well.  Playing Britain, for instance, one quickly becomes familiar with the logistics problem in western Egypt and eastern Libya where the lack of infrastructure and rail lines means that as each army pushes forward from its supply bases, it becomes dramatically weaker, which can lead to the same kind of see-saw pattern, for the same reasons, as occurred historically.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Likewise, the system tends to push players towards doctrinal approaches that were successful historically, more or less.  We&#8217;ll come back to doctrine in a bit, but players quickly discover that while broad linear offensives (using mostly infantry) can <em>work<\/em>, the more effective approach is finding points on which a lot of very mobile divisions (especially armor) can be focused to create a breakthrough (generally supported by air power), which can enable larger forces to be encircled or have their logistics unmoored.  While the game somewhat struggles (as we&#8217;ll discuss) to really distinguish between the German and Soviet schools of thought as to maneuver warfare, this nevertheless <em>is maneuver warfare<\/em> and the game mechanics push the player towards that historical solution.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Meanwhile, the regular cycle of entrechment, planning, reconstitution and then planning again simulates the logistical and organizational complications that led to the operational tempo during the war.  No one was, after all, attacking everywhere all of the time.  Instead we can identify clear offensive &#8216;pushes&#8217; which required both planning (in that coordinating so many troops and machines required advanced plans) and preparation (in stockpiling the troops, munitions and fuel) which took time.  So, for instance, we can identify key major Soviet offensive operations on the Eastern Front: the winter counter-offensive (Dec 1941-May 1942), the failed Kharkov offensive (May, 1942), operations Uranus (encircling Stalingrad) and Mars (Nov 1942), the Soviet Kursk counter-offensive (July, 1943) and so on.<span id='easy-footnote-18-37063' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/#easy-footnote-bottom-18-37063' title='Indeed, one of the things that Jonathan Parshall notes contributed to early Soviet offensive failures in 1942 was that Stalin did not allow for enough time to plan and prepare, instead insisting on immediate offensive action.  By late 1942, he seems to have recognized the folly of this and Soviet operations become more deliberate and less rushed, leading &amp;#8211; alongside improved equipment, doctrine and a host of other factors &amp;#8211; to more effective operations and eventual Soviet victory.'><sup>18<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Indeed, the <em>Hearts of Iron <\/em>series remains extremely popular <strong>precisely because it so effectively models the operational level of World War II<\/strong>.  This is hardly to say it does so perfectly &#8211; no game is going to fully capture the complexity of such a large war &#8211; but it does so better than any of its competition.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That doesn&#8217;t necessarily make it the &#8216;ultimate operational simulator&#8217; however.  <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> is built to represent large-scale, division-level operations in World War II.  As we&#8217;ll get to in later parts of this series, it really struggles to represent other aspects of operations: occupation, administration, dealing with partisans and other &#8216;unconventional&#8217; warfare and so on.  Notably, those systems are &#8216;split off&#8217; from the core operational system, even more so than in previous <em>Hearts of Iron<\/em> titles.  It was possible, for instance, in <em>Hearts of Iron III<\/em> to &#8216;spawn&#8217; partisan units behind enemy lines during an offensive to represent coordination with resistance forces (as with the D-Day landings, for instance), but not in <em>HoI4<\/em>.  The game has relatively little way of simulating, for instance, the way incessant partisan activity behind German lines made it difficult for reserve forces to move quickly enough to contain the Soviet breakout around Stalingrad during Operation Uranus (Nov. 1942) which resulted in the encirclement of Friedrich Paulus&#8217; 6th army (along with elements of several other German armies) in a pocket around the city of Stalingrad.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It likewise struggles a bit to represent some of the fighting in the Pacific Theater where operations were often smaller than a division.  The Battle of the Tenaru (Aug 21, 1942), for instance, was a significant allied victory that had a meaningful impact on allied (particularly American) morale in the Pacific, but as an engagement between two regiments (the US 1st Marine Regiment and part of the Japanese 28th Infantry Regiment) it lives entirely below the simulation level of <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em>.  A player in <em>HoI4<\/em> cannot send a regiment &#8211; much less a detachment of one &#8211; to Gaudalcanal.  They must send a <em>whole division<\/em> or nothing &#8211; but for much of the early fighting on Gaudalcanal, neither side was at divisional strength.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nevertheless, <em>on the whole<\/em>, the system succeeds.  Of course the challenge it creates from a game design perspective is that <strong>it is very complex<\/strong>.  Compared to a game of <em>Europa Universalis V<\/em>, where even a quite large empire might split most of its army into perhaps at most 6 or 7 &#8216;stacks,&#8217; the number of maneuver units in <em>HoI4<\/em> is overwhelming.  To draw from my screenshots above, in my latest run, my British army in France and the Low Countries in 1939 numbered some 57 divisions and that is, by HoI4 standards, a relatively small army for a major country.  For many players, controlling such a large army might be bewildering or alternately frustrating in its granular detail.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" data-attachment-id=\"37240\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/20cd871\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20CD871.jpg?fit=1920%2C1080&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,1080\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"20CD87~1\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20CD871.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20CD871.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37240\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20CD871.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20CD871.jpg?resize=300%2C169&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20CD871.jpg?resize=768%2C432&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20CD871.jpg?resize=1536%2C864&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20CD871.jpg?resize=1100%2C619&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/20CD871.jpg?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">About a month after the previous image and you can see that the situation for Italy has basically collapsed.  With the loss of all but one key port (and the ports and urban centers are mostly the same), the Italians lacked the supply capacity to maintain their army here, weakening the divisions and allowing me to push basically everywhere.  The entire operation here was wrapped up within a month, with a total loss of Italian forces in the region and the restoration of the Ethiopian government.<br>Historically, Italy had almost 250,000 troops in East Africa when the war started and ended up losing effectively all of them (some 230,000 POWs), while Allied (a mix of British, South African, Ethiopian, Belgian and Free French forces with the British making up the lion&#8217;s share) casualties were very low.<br>So if you thought, &#8220;only a computer could be so stupid as to go to war with the British Empire will having a quarter of a million troops basically stranded in East Africa&#8221; &#8211; no, actually, Mussolini was that stupid too.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Which brings us to:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Fronts, Armies and AI Generals<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Attentive eyes on the screenshots I have been using here (and will keep using) may note that sometimes the map has these wonderful drawn front lines and operational arrows and sometimes it doesn&#8217;t.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That is because one of the innovations of <strong><em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em><\/strong> was the decision to include a system for <em>automating<\/em> the operations we&#8217;ve been describing.  In the past I&#8217;ve talked about &#8216;generations&#8217; of Paradox titles, distinguishing between the very &#8216;on rails&#8217; second generation Paradox titles (<em>HoI3,<\/em> <em>Eu3<\/em>, <em>Victoria II<\/em>) and the more simulationist, free-form third generation titles (<em>EU4, Crusader Kings II<\/em> and <em>III<\/em>, <em>Imperator<\/em>).  I wonder if the trend that won&#8217;t end up defining a &#8216;fourth generation&#8217; of Paradox&#8217; games isn&#8217;t the effort to enable a greater degree of accessibility &#8211; a broader audience &#8211; by allowing players to simply automate entire systems of the game to a greater or lesser degree.  You see a bit of this in <em>Victoria III<\/em> and a <em><strong>lot<\/strong><\/em> of it in <em>Europa Universalis IV<\/em> (where nearly every system can be turned over to AI control), but <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em>, despite falling firmly within the third generation chronologically, shows some of the earliest experimentation with this kind of automation with what I am going to call its &#8216;war plans system&#8217; which has been part of the game since its launch but was absent in its predecessor, <em>HoI3<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The first part of this system is the highly simplified <em>HoI4<\/em> order-of-battle system<\/strong>.  Whereas <em>Hearts of Iron III<\/em> had a fairly complex order of battle system: brigades were grouped into divisions (unlike in <em>HoI4<\/em>, in <em>III<\/em>, brigades could be freely moved between divisions or deployed independently), which were grouped into corps, which were grouped into armies, which were combined into army groups, which were assigned to a theater, which each level having its own commander and a command &#8216;range&#8217; in which their bonuses would apply.  Each level above the division also had an HQ unit, representing where the commander and his staff <em>were<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong><em>HoI4<\/em> radically simplified this<\/strong>: divisions became effectively &#8216;atomic&#8217; units &#8211; unable to be divided into their components &#8211; and they are grouped directly into armies (no corps).  Each army can have around 25 divisions in it and has one commanding officer, who <em>can<\/em> have an HQ on the map, but does not need to.  An Army Group, in turn, can combine up to five armies.  As noted above, these are not &#8216;stacks&#8217; &#8211; the divisions continue to move independently.  While <em>HoI4<\/em> has &#8216;theaters,&#8217; these are mostly player-UI elements, they do not provide command bonuses.  <em>HoI4<\/em> thus compressed <em>HoI3<\/em>&#8216;s six-level org chart into just three: divisions, armies, army-groups.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, <em>HoI4<\/em> added automation to those armies: you can assign an army a stretch of frontline and the AI (representing the army commander) will automatically deploy the army&#8217;s divisions to defend that front line.  The player can then draw an offensive line on the map, indicating where he would like an offensive to <em>end up<\/em> if successful, which creates a war plan at which point divisions begin to accrue their planning bonuses (above).  The player can then, at any time, order the army to execute the plan and it will begin attempting to push to the intended &#8216;finish&#8217; line, taking provinces in sequence (with some attention given to frontage and using easier-to-take provinces to lever enemies off of harder ones) until it gets there or the player orders a halt.  It is also possible, though this system, to order amphibious or airborne operations (and indeed, unlike land-based offensives, they can be conducted no other way).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is thus possible in <em>HoI4<\/em> for the player, rather than micro-managing every division, to instead place their armies on the front line and draw arrows where they want them to go and then for the most part let the AI (again, simulating those army and army group generals) &#8216;figure out&#8217; how to get there, akin to the way that the leader of a country or a high command (like the Soviet <em>Stavka<\/em> or German <em>OKW<\/em>) would determine general objectives and then let generals &#8216;on the ground&#8217; come up with the detailed plans on how to reach them.  AI controlled countries use this system exclusively to conduct their warfare.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And it is easy to see the <em><strong>intent<\/strong><\/em> here and how it aligns with the historical vision of the game.  After all, the player in <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> is not a corps commander, they are directing the <em>entire military<\/em> &#8211; land, air and naval assets, industrial production, doctrine and even policy &#8211; of a country.  You play <em>as the state<\/em> (and continue to do so even if the government of the state changes; we&#8217;ll come back to that), after all.  So instead the idea is that the player merely draws the war plans and determined the composition of the armies that will execute each part of the plan (indicated by its own frontline and offensive lines) and then, when the time is right, triggers the plans and lets the simulation handle the messy details of coordinating attacks.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">However, whereas <em>Victoria III<\/em> (which has a similar &#8216;automated&#8217; war system) forces the player to use it and does not offer the option for manual control, <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> keeps the ability for players to move divisions manually.  My suspicion is that most plays rely on a mix of automation and manual direction, though my impression is that I use rather more manual direction than most, a product of having been playing the series since <em>Hearts of Iron II<\/em> (where no automation option existed).  <strong>It is not possible to build a planning bonus without a war plan<\/strong>, with the result that even when I am planning to <em>entirely<\/em> manually control an offensive (which I usually do), I will begin by drawing an offensive war plan <em>somewhere<\/em> (it does not matter at all if the arrow is pointing where I intend to go) in order to build that planning bonus.  But I&#8217;ll then commence the attack by <em>deleting the war plan<\/em> so the AI doesn&#8217;t shift divisions around without my say so.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There are advantages to manual deployment in this way, which mostly gets down to precision control.  The army AI has gotten a lot better over the years, but on the defensive it still tends to shift divisions around too much and doesn&#8217;t defend in depth effectively.  The latter matters a lot because if you are <em>expecting<\/em> to get pushed from a position, it is a good idea to have divisions already place done province back so that they have their full entrenchment bonus when the enemy tries to breakthrough.  Likewise, shifting divisions around a front removes their entrenchment bonus, which can be disastrous if done at the wrong time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On the offensive, the army AI is reasonable competent but broadly speaking a bit wasteful compared to a player, far more willing to launch attacks that have little chance of succeeding because they&#8217;re &#8216;part of the plan.&#8217;  Consequently when doing large-scale offensives I often leave my leg infantry under AI control on front lines (but without any attack orders) while micro-managing my armored, mechanized and motorized divisions (which are doing most of the attacking): the result is that as I push forward, the front lines automatically adjust, causing my leg infantry divisions to file into and dig in into new positions as the armor advances.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Most of the Game<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What I think is most significant, however, for <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em>&#8216;s view of history <strong>is simply that the operational-level simulation is <em>most of the game<\/em><\/strong>.  Whereas <em>Victoria III<\/em> completely automates its front lines because warfare is <em>less important<\/em> compared to politics and economics in that game, <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> provides automation <em>tools<\/em> because it invests <em><strong>so much player attention<\/strong><\/em> into the operational level of the game that it becomes simply overwhelming.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is difficult to measure just how much <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> is a game about the operational &#8211; rather than strategic &#8211; but the playtime balance in any given &#8216;run&#8217; between pre-war and war is instructive, because the strategic layer (political focuses, industry management, research, espionage) work at the same speed both pre-war and during the war, but the operational element becomes <em>massively<\/em> more complex once the shooting starts.  In my current UK run, I covered the three years from game start in 1936 to the beginning of the war in 1939 in a single play-session that lasted about four hours (including a break for dinner!).  Making it to 1944 (where I am now as I write this) by contrast, took a dozen play sessions over two weeks that took up more than 20 hours.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So while I cannot speak for the &#8216;typical player,&#8217; I would suggest we might place the balance that in a typical run (which usually ends in &#8217;44 or &#8217;45 &#8211; few players push past the end of the war and there is almost no content there to play anyway),<strong> a player might spend something on the order of three-quarters of their time and attention <\/strong><em><strong>entirely<\/strong><\/em><strong> on the operational level<\/strong> (including naval and air warfare), with the remaining <em>one quarter<\/em> split over politics, industry, research, espionage and so on.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And that gets us to perhaps the most important part of <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em>&#8216;s theory of history: <strong>in <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em>, &#8216;history&#8217; is <em>mostly<\/em> a history of warfare fought on the operational level between conventional armies with division-sized elements<\/strong>.  That is, to be clear, not an absurd way to frame a game about World War II.  World War II was a lot of other things too, of course &#8211; it was an enormous and incomprehensibly complex conflict &#8211; but in terms of setting a game&#8217;s focus, it makes sense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>However<\/em>, it is important to note everything that gets <em>neglected<\/em> in that focus.  Small unit actions are left out, partisan activity is barely simulated, war crimes are <em>entirely removed<\/em> (we&#8217;ll get to it), asymmetrical warfare &#8211; often an important part of WWII &#8211; is mostly absent as is <em><strong>the experience of war<\/strong><\/em>.  We&#8217;ll see this even more as we begin to look at other systems but <em><strong>Hearts of Iron IV <\/strong><\/em><strong>has almost <em>nothing<\/em> to say about the <em>experience<\/em> of World War II<\/strong>; the comparison with <em>Crusader Kings<\/em> or <em>Victoria<\/em>, which have a <em>lot<\/em> to say about the experience of the Middle Ages or industrialization is really marked.  The game never asks you to consider the experience of being an individual soldier or worker during these events and it &#8211; for reasons we&#8217;ll get to &#8211; <em><strong>really<\/strong><\/em> never asks you to consider the experience of being a civilian caught in the maelstrom of atrocity and violence.  It doesn&#8217;t even have much to say about the experience of being, say, Sir Claude Auchinleck, sweltering in the heat of North Africa trying to coordinate an offensive and make sense of confusing information while managing (or, in the event, failing to manage) the expectations of Winston Churchill.<span id='easy-footnote-19-37063' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/#easy-footnote-bottom-19-37063' title='I give this sort of example because this is &lt;em&gt;exactly&lt;\/em&gt; the experience that &lt;em&gt;CKIII&lt;\/em&gt; is interested in, &amp;#8220;what is is like to be a leader in this place at this time?&amp;#8221;'><sup>19<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> is the most popular Paradox title, by a country mile.  It is quite possibly the most popular current strategy game on the market.  Its influence is significant enough to be detectable in the patterns of political thinking that show up in both commentary <em>and decision making<\/em>.  <strong>And yet it is, by far, the <em>narrowest<\/em> Paradox game, with the thinnest vision of history<\/strong>.  Again, that is not necessarily a critique &#8211; it is <em>fine<\/em> to make a game <em><strong>about operations<\/strong><\/em>.  But <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em> is fundamentally a <strong>game about operations in WWII<\/strong>, rather than a game about WWII.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Next week, we&#8217;ll start diving into the systems that create the &#8216;shell&#8217; around <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em>&#8216;s impressive operational simulator and I am going to start to have a lot more unkind things to say.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This week, at long last, we begin our long-delayed but always expected something that we blog for: the Hearts of Iron IV Teaching Paradox series! This has been a long requested series that I put off for a long time because I wasn&#8217;t entirely sure how I wanted to tackle it. But my thoughts here &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/11\/teaching-paradox-hearts-of-iron-iv-part-i-operational-art\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Teaching Paradox: Hearts of Iron IV, Part I: Operational Art<\/span> <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":156979701,"featured_media":37201,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"advanced_seo_description":"","jetpack_seo_html_title":"","jetpack_seo_noindex":false,"jetpack_seo_schema_type":"","_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_wpcom_ai_launchpad_first_post":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"{title}\n\n{excerpt}\n\n{url}","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"_wpas_customize_per_network":false,"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[12763,48286509],"tags":[716950591,716950588,716950589,716950216,716950590,28285,19479,716950484,1914,716950236],"class_list":["post-37063","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-collections","category-teaching-paradox","tag-grand-tactics","tag-hearts-of-iron","tag-hoi4","tag-modern-warfare","tag-operational-art","tag-operations","tag-paradox","tag-strategy-games","tag-video-games","tag-world-war-ii"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/paWMNs-9DN","jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/HOI4-Splash.png?fit=929%2C598&ssl=1","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37063","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/156979701"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=37063"}],"version-history":[{"count":100,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37063\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":37247,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37063\/revisions\/37247"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/37201"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=37063"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=37063"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=37063"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}},{"id":37003,"date":"2026-09-04T12:03:11","date_gmt":"2026-09-04T16:03:11","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/?p=37003"},"modified":"2026-09-04T12:03:11","modified_gmt":"2026-09-04T16:03:11","slug":"fireside-friday-september-4-2026","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/04\/fireside-friday-september-4-2026\/","title":{"rendered":"Fireside Friday, September 4, 2026"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Hey folks!  Fireside this week!  Last week&#8217;s post was a monster (over 10,000 words compared to our more typically ~6,000) which left me with some non-blog catching up to do.  Next week, we&#8217;ll be starting our next <em>Teaching Paradox<\/em> series, this time looking at <em>Hearts of Iron IV<\/em>, which has been requested for quite some time.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"696\" data-attachment-id=\"37061\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/04\/fireside-friday-september-4-2026\/pxl_20260822_180618507\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/PXL_20260822_180618507.jpg?fit=4080%2C2775&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"4080,2775\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;1.68&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;Pixel 9&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;1787407578&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;6.9&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;3263&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0.008332&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"PXL_20260822_180618507\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/PXL_20260822_180618507.jpg?fit=1024%2C696&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/PXL_20260822_180618507.jpg?resize=1024%2C696&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-37061\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/PXL_20260822_180618507.jpg?resize=1024%2C696&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/PXL_20260822_180618507.jpg?resize=300%2C204&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/PXL_20260822_180618507.jpg?resize=768%2C522&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/PXL_20260822_180618507.jpg?resize=1536%2C1045&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/PXL_20260822_180618507.jpg?resize=2048%2C1393&amp;ssl=1 2048w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/PXL_20260822_180618507.jpg?resize=1100%2C748&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/PXL_20260822_180618507.jpg?w=2200&amp;ssl=1 2200w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/PXL_20260822_180618507.jpg?w=3300&amp;ssl=1 3300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Percy, resting atop my library, currently in boxes.<br>We had a water issue over the summer &#8211; fortunately, no damage to any of our things, but the basement where my office is has to be refloored.  Which has delayed me setting up the new bookshelves I ordered and instead forced me to go through the long process of boxing up my books with the family library taking up about thirty of these &#8216;medium duty&#8217; banker&#8217;s boxes.<br>Percy&#8217;s sour expression at the situation, as you may imagine, matches my own.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But for this week&#8217;s <strong>musing<\/strong>, I wanted to riff a bit off of a <a href=\"https:\/\/bsky.app\/profile\/bretdevereaux.bsky.social\/post\/3mu5zsyfozc27\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/bsky.app\/profile\/bretdevereaux.bsky.social\/post\/3mu5zsyfozc27\">bluesky conversation <\/a>I had <strong>concerning the fantasy staple: the tavern where the party comes together and gets quests<\/strong>.  It was prompted by seeing the trailer for the upcoming <em><a href=\"https:\/\/store.steampowered.com\/app\/2837690\/Dungeons__Dragons_Long_Rest_Tavern\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/store.steampowered.com\/app\/2837690\/Dungeons__Dragons_Long_Rest_Tavern\/\">Dungeons and Dragons: Long Rest Tavern<\/a><\/em>.  Indeed, the fantasy tavern as the hub of questing has become such a staple that it has an entire <em>genre<\/em> of games built around it.  But I thought it would be interesting to think about the sort of role such a place could take.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What immediately struck me is how the role of the tavern has kind of metastasized, from the place where Frodo, Sam, Merry and Pippin happen to meet Aragorn in <em>The Lord of the Rings<\/em> to a sort of standard &#8216;you all meet in a tavern&#8217; start to many Dungeons and Dragons campaigns to what we get in many of these &#8216;tavern management&#8217; games, where tavern-keeping is an explicit, institutional part of the &#8216;adventuring economy.&#8217;  In <em>Long Rest Tavern<\/em>, to judge by the trailer, the tavern owner is even responsible for assigning adventuring parties to specific quests, acting as a kind of &#8216;violence-specialist temp agency&#8217; from the look of it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now I don&#8217;t want to say this vision of the fantasy tavern is <em>entirely<\/em> crazy, but I think it is missing some elements, in part because my sense is that it evolved not as a sociological story-telling device saying something about the nature of fictional worlds, but rather as a kind of gameplay convenience: every DM must, for almost every campaign, come up initially with a reason why the player-characters &#8211; a group of exceptional strangers &#8211; meet up and decide to work together.  &#8220;You all meet in a tavern&#8221; is simply such wonderfully effective shorthand that it become broadly common without needing to be very tethered to the actual fictional worlds.  Here, after all, is a place that a regular person can think of and visualize, where strangers might meet.  It works.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But I want to overthink it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We first need to begin not with the tavern but with the question of &#8220;who employs adventurers here?&#8221;  It sure isn&#8217;t likely to be a tavern keeper &#8211; no one could can shell out the payment for a party of level 8 adventurers is washing dishes.  Instead, we should probably expect the biggest employer of adventurers to be the same as the largest employers of mercenaries more generally.  Adventurers, in the D&amp;D sense, are largely just small groups of mercenaries who specialize in particular kinds of problems &#8211; we might broadly define the &#8216;occupation&#8217; as something like &#8216;monster slayers.&#8217;  And in a magical fantasy world, it actually makes sense that fighting magical or monstrous things might be a distinct, if overlapping, occupation from warriors, soldiers and such hired to engage in normal intercommunal violence (that is, warfare).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Which is to say, we&#8217;d probably expect the most common figures employing adventurers would probably be the state or local Big Men in non-state societies. They&#8217;re not going to do this personally, of course, they&#8217;ll use a cutout to do it for them. That may well be the tavern keeper, although I suspect that some junior aristocrat or official is more likely: someone whose job is &#8216;coordinate the recruitment and assignment of adventurer-mercenaries.&#8217; Essentially <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/06\/19\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-iib-officials-contractors-and-professionals\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/06\/19\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-iib-officials-contractors-and-professionals\/\">a military contractor of the sort we were just discussing<\/a>!  Of course other individuals in a non-state polity where violence is fragmented might well also seek adventurers: a village with a problem, a smaller Big Man and so on.  But the obvious place for them to go when hiring is <em>where the Big Man <\/em>(or the state) hires, because that&#8217;s where the adventurers will actually be.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The next question is <em><strong>where<\/strong><\/em> to find these fellows.  And the answer is <em><strong>in large towns<\/strong><\/em>.  Which is striking because a quick glance at the genre of &#8216;fantasy tavern keeping games&#8217; and most of the taverns seem to be set in small towns, villages and forests (presumably for the &#8216;cozy&#8217; vibe).  There are exceptions, of course (the Yawning Portal in Waterdeep comes to mind), but often the &#8216;fantasy tavern&#8217; is quite location-independent, which it wouldn&#8217;t be.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The issue here is that &#8216;adventurers&#8217; are, for the most part, specialists, in societies where the vast majority (upwards of 80%) of the population are non-specialist farmers and herders.<span id='easy-footnote-20-37003' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/04\/fireside-friday-september-4-2026\/#easy-footnote-bottom-20-37003' title='While we might think of &amp;#8216;farmer&amp;#8217; as a specialist job, in an agrarian society where farmers make up the vast majority of the population, it is as close to &amp;#8216;unspecialized&amp;#8217; as you can get.  Labor &amp;#8216;specialization&amp;#8217; is culturally contingent.  In the United States, an Uber or DoorDash driver is &amp;#8216;unspecialized&amp;#8217; labor because most Americans know how to drive, but the same is not true of societies with fewer cars.'><sup>20<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  If your goal is to find a specific specialist in a society that has very few of <em>any<\/em> kind of specialized labor, you are going to want to seek them in the largest, densest population centers you can find.  If &#8216;wizard&#8217; is a job held by one in every thousand, you&#8217;ve got a much better chance of finding one looking for work in a town of 50,000, than in a village of 500.  A large town provides both a concentration of specialists (of all kinds), but also a concentration of wealthy people who can afford to hire those specialists.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And this isn&#8217;t all entirely theory, we have a good guideline for how the private recruitment of violence specialists might work in a pre-modern or early modern context because of course there were quite a lot of mercenaries getting recruited in pre-modern or early modern contexts!  And what is striking is that even in cultures where the aim was to recruit farm boys (because they were assumed to make better soldiers than city-dwellers; this was the dominant assumption in early modern Europe, for instance), <strong>you recruit them in a town<\/strong>.  Or in many cases, you recruit them <em>outside<\/em> of a town.  A lot of towns, quite understandably, are touchy about letting armed bands of violence-doers inside the city walls and if they have the political and security position necessary to forbid such groups entry, they usually will.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So for a society which has need for a second kind of &#8216;violence specialist&#8217; (beyond regular soldiers or knights or what have you), who specialized in what we might term &#8216;monster removal,&#8217; you might expect the local political authority (who would be the largest employer of such), to set up a standard place for recruiting them, perhaps just <em>outside<\/em> the town\/castle\/city walls.  It&#8217;s not hard to imagine a combined inn\/tavern springing up next to that, to cater to the traffic, and thus get roughly to the &#8216;fantasy tavern.&#8217;  That said, I find myself wondering: if a locality has so many &#8216;monster&#8217; related problems, why is the king\/lord\/state contracting adventurers on a one-off basis?  Why doesn&#8217;t he have them on permanent retainer?<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The easy answer, from a world-building perspective, is to make &#8216;monster&#8217;-type problems rare <em>enough<\/em> that there isn&#8217;t any cause to keep adventurers on permanent employment, but that is the death of the fantasy tavern, since it would lack the kind of continuous clientele necessary (instead, we might imagine adventurers functioning something more like itinerant craftsmen and other specialists in such a world).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The other option I can think of would be some kind of guild, with a legal monopoly on offering &#8216;monster removal&#8217; services.  Often &#8216;adventurer&#8217;s guilds&#8217; in fantasy worlds are vast, continent sprawling institutions, but we ought to expect this to work like other guilds: extremely local, perhaps with each large town having its own guild of adventurers which controlled membership, extracted fees, regulated the trade and provided for widows and such &#8211; the sort of things historical guilds did.  In that case, the place you would go to hire an adventurer wouldn&#8217;t be a tavern, but a guild hall.  It might well have some of the same facilities (a kitchen, dining spaces, lodging), but they would be for the members, rather than public.  Such a guild would then have a fair bit of price-setting and bargaining power, even potentially against the state or local lord.  Of course, they&#8217;d also have a role in preventing non-members from offering services &#8211; one might expect rather violently.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Alas, neither of these options &#8211; itinerant companies of monster-hunters or local established guilds of them &#8211; offers much space for the freewheeling fantasy tavern.  Crucially, they also don&#8217;t offer much space for the fantasy cliche of a group of unrelated adventurers meeting for the first time.  That, in turn, I think, speaks to the degree to which pre-modern societies simply don&#8217;t throw strangers together like that very much, as human mobility is much lower.  &#8220;Here&#8217;s a room full of people you don&#8217;t know, make friends&#8221; is a very common modern life challenge, but an infrequent (not <em>unknown<\/em>, but infrequent) pre-modern one.  Tolkien seems to understand this: both Thorin and Company and the Fellowship of the Ring are <em>unusual<\/em> groups in that they include members who are more or less strangers to each other.  As a result, it takes quite exceptional circumstances for them to form.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That said, because Dungeons and Dragons campaigns &#8211; and similar other rulesets and settings &#8211; demand as a part of the structure of the <em>game<\/em> (as distinct from the story) that player-characters generally be strangers to each other, I think the &#8216;fantasy tavern&#8217; will continue and I would expect to see its steady drift from a convenient storytelling assumption to an established part of the lore, to becoming a <em>customary institution<\/em> of sorts, to continue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On to <strong>Recommendations:<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">First again for my own stuff.  I am back at <em>Foreign Policy<\/em> with &#8220;<a href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/08\/21\/iran-military-lessons-tactics-strategy-trump\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/08\/21\/iran-military-lessons-tactics-strategy-trump\/\">The U.S. Is Learning the Wrong Lessons in Iran<\/a>,&#8221; arguing that the focus on smaller-picture, often narrowly military issues (magazine depth, drone defenses, minesweeping, etc) runs the risk of obscuring the much more foundational strategic failures in the war.  In particular, that the mission the military was asked to accomplish &#8211; regime change entirely from the air or, failing that, neutralizing Iran&#8217;s long-range strike capability entirely from the air &#8211; was probably always impossible.  At the very least, no one has ever managed to achieve these tasks before and many have tried.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I also made an appearance on <em>The Rest Is History<\/em> <a href=\"https:\/\/therestishistory.com\/episodes\/the-general-who-made-rome-invincible\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/therestishistory.com\/episodes\/the-general-who-made-rome-invincible\">discussing the Marian reforms<\/a>, though I think the episode is a &#8216;bonus episode&#8217; that requires being a subscriber.  Of course if you want my take on the Marian reforms in written form (in a bit more detail than one can fit in a podcast), <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2023\/06\/30\/collections-the-marian-reforms-werent-a-thing\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"acoup.blog\/2023\/06\/30\/collections-the-marian-reforms-werent-a-thing\/\">you can find that here<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Meanwhile, also at Foreign Policy and worth your time is Lucian Staiano-Daniels (author of <em>The War People<\/em>, recommended here), writing &#8220;<a href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/08\/07\/history-hormuz-straits-iran-war-trump\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/08\/07\/history-hormuz-straits-iran-war-trump\/\">The Straits Are Not OK<\/a>,&#8221; on the historical impact of maritime choke points and in particular on how the Sound Toll deformed Danish policy.  In short, because tolls from the \u00d8resund went directly to the Danish crown, it enabled Danish kings to engage in a lot of warfare (like involvement in the Thirty Years War) without consulting their parliament.  The result was disaster for Denmark and one wonders, should the IRGC likewise end up with its own revenue source in the form of tolls on the Strait of Hormuz, if those funds will likely fuel foreign adventurerism that may prove disastrous to Iran and the wider region.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In somewhat old but still interesting museum news: I remarked quite some time ago on social media that there were a pair of iron <em>kopides<\/em> (singular <em>kopis; <\/em>forward-curving Greek swords) in the Met which, given their thin provenance and the general rarity of such weapons (it is <em>very hard<\/em> to find a well-preserved <em>kopis<\/em>) I figured they were unlikely to have been obtained fully legally.  I had waited until after I had the information on them I needed for my research to ask the Met the forbidden question (&#8220;could you please confirm if there is any additional provenance information for the items&#8230;&#8221; &#8211; sent back in 2021) after which the Met has never returned any of my emails ever again.  So you may imagine my amusement to find that <a href=\"https:\/\/www.metmuseum.org\/art\/collection\/search\/257576\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/www.metmuseum.org\/art\/collection\/search\/257576\">both <\/a><a href=\"https:\/\/www.metmuseum.org\/art\/collection\/search\/257585\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/www.metmuseum.org\/art\/collection\/search\/257585\">swords <\/a>had been restituted out of the Met&#8217;s collection in 2025, <a href=\"https:\/\/lootingmatters.blogspot.com\/2025\/11\/further-returns-to-greece-from-met.html\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/lootingmatters.blogspot.com\/2025\/11\/further-returns-to-greece-from-met.html\">repatriated to Greece <\/a>as part of a Justice Department fraud investigation.  Let us all hope that, now that they are home, they are soon put back on display for the public and made available to scholars, as these really are unusually fine examples of the type.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Will the Met ever answer my emails again?  The world may never know.<span id='easy-footnote-21-37003' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/04\/fireside-friday-september-4-2026\/#easy-footnote-bottom-21-37003' title='But I feel no regret: I asked that question &lt;em&gt;knowing&lt;\/em&gt; it would burn that bridge because, to be frank, I refuse to launder antiquities fraud if I can avoid it and I felt I could only footnote my concerns over the provenance of the objects if I first asked about them.  Now, I suppose, I will have to update that footnote again.'><sup>21<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Meanwhile, <a href=\"https:\/\/pasts-imperfect.ghost.io\/pasts-imperfect-8-27-26\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/pasts-imperfect.ghost.io\/pasts-imperfect-8-27-26\/\">over at <em>Pasts Imperfect<\/em><\/a>, a bunch of neat stuff as always, including an interview with Stephanie McCarter, who works on Ovid, Horace and Catullus about the art of translation and the role of the translator&#8217;s choices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">An unusual recommendation, but I have commented a few times in the past that academic book reviews are often written in such a style that it is sometimes hard for regular readers to parse if the work is being endorsed or repudiated.  For an example of what an <em>absolutely savage<\/em> academic review (that still fits within the bounds of etiquette for the form) looks like, <a href=\"https:\/\/bmcr.brynmawr.edu\/2026\/2026.08.31\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/bmcr.brynmawr.edu\/2026\/2026.08.31\/\">check out Stefan Rebenich&#8217;s quite harsh review<\/a> of M. Arnheim&#8217;s <em>Five Thousand Years of Monarchy<\/em> (2025).  I have not read the book, so I cannot comment on the correctness of the review, though if its sins are as Rebenich describes, the review&#8217;s tone seems well-warranted.  The <em>&#8220;quae mutatio rerum!&#8221;<\/em> (&#8220;oh how things change!&#8221;)<span id='easy-footnote-22-37003' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/04\/fireside-friday-september-4-2026\/#easy-footnote-bottom-22-37003' title='Literally &amp;#8220;what a changing of things!&amp;#8221;'><sup>22<\/sup><\/a><\/span> is an especially biting bit of academic knife-turning.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And for this week&#8217;s <strong>book Recommendation<\/strong>, it&#8217;s time for one I have been holding in my pocket since October of last year, N.A.M. Rodger, <em><a href=\"https:\/\/amzn.to\/4ymZLCQ\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/amzn.to\/4ymZLCQ\">The Wooden World: An Anatomy of the Georgian Navy<\/a><\/em> (1986).  For those unfamiliar with the periodization of British history, the &#8216;Georgian&#8217; period runs from 1714 to 1830, so this is a study of the Royal Navy in the 1700s and early 1800s.  Much like Lynn&#8217;s <em><em><a href=\"https:\/\/amzn.to\/4hKHAA1\">Giant of the Grand Si\u00e8cle<\/a><\/em><\/em> (1997) which focuses on the French army of a century earlier, <em>The Wooden World<\/em> is not a campaign or battle history, but an institutional study.  Rodger is thus focused not on individual events, but on how the Royal Navy was organized, how its officers were selected and prepared, how its sailors were recruited, what the experience of life on ship was like, how discipline was conducted and so on.  Such an approach has perils, of course, particularly the tendency towards historical compression, to treat the institution as an unchanging constant when of course all institutions change, but Rodger, like Lynn is alive to the way that parts of this institution are changing over time as well, though equally the approach benefits from the fact that in this period the Royal Navy was a fairly famously conservative institution and so changed surprisingly little.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What this sort of approach can give, however, in a sense of <em>what it was like<\/em> to be in a given institution in a given time.  Rodger gives a lot of focus &#8211; frankly, even more than Lynn &#8211; to the <em>experience<\/em> of being in the Royal Navy at this time, for both ratings and officers.  He discusses the role of drink, the food, life aboard ship, the role of wives (invariably ashore), recruitment (including the role of impressment) and so on.  I find this sort of approach important, both because institutions and conditions of life in the past are very different than those for us today and so may catch us by surprise, but also because one of the core questions we bring to history is not just &#8220;what happened?&#8221; but &#8220;what was it <em>like<\/em>?&#8221;  Part of the reason we ask that question is because when we want to reason about decisions we may today, we&#8217;re not just asking, &#8220;what might happen?&#8221; but also &#8220;what might it <em>be like<\/em> if that happened?&#8221; and history can form a useful guide, but only if we have some sense of what it was like to live through an event.  In this sense, <em>The Wooden World<\/em> also serves as a handy counter-point to another of our recommendations, Spector, <a href=\"https:\/\/amzn.to\/3KWlzgU\"><em>At War At Sea<\/em><\/a> (2001), focused on the experience of naval combat in the twentieth century.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Equally important are the insights about institutional culture that come out of a study like this.  Reading through, for instance, the career path of an officer, one begins to get a sense of <em>why<\/em> the Royal Navy as an institution acted the way it did, for better and for worse.  This was a somewhat famously hidebound, conservative institution (navies tend to be such) and with a promotion system defined by demonstrating skill in seamanship combined with a heavy dose of patronage from senior officers, it isn&#8217;t hard to see why.  At the same time, this is a somewhat closed society with very strong shared values and so the command culture of aggressiveness, even in the face of difficult odds &#8211; which would continue to serve Britain well into the 1900s &#8211; is also understandable here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Overall, I think it is simply very valuable for anyone interested in one military institution to read as many studies of this sort about <em>other<\/em> military institutions as possible.  In some cases, you will discover remarkably similarities &#8211; the systems for officer preparation here, effectively a series of command apprenticeships, helped shape my thinking about the way the Romans prepare their officers, for instance &#8211; as well as notable differences.  If one is too focused on a single institution, it is easy to lose sight of what is exceptional, unusual, normal, typical or ubiquitous about it.  Comparison points are essential.  Which is why, even if you aren&#8217;t already interested in 18th century naval warfare, I heartily recommend <em>The Wooden World<\/em>.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Hey folks! Fireside this week! Last week&#8217;s post was a monster (over 10,000 words compared to our more typically ~6,000) which left me with some non-blog catching up to do. Next week, we&#8217;ll be starting our next Teaching Paradox series, this time looking at Hearts of Iron IV, which has been requested for quite some &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/09\/04\/fireside-friday-september-4-2026\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Fireside Friday, September 4, 2026<\/span> <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":156979701,"featured_media":37061,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"advanced_seo_description":"","jetpack_seo_html_title":"","jetpack_seo_noindex":false,"jetpack_seo_schema_type":"","_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_wpcom_ai_launchpad_first_post":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"{title}\n\n{excerpt}\n\n{url}","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"_wpas_customize_per_network":false,"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[1319178],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-37003","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-fireside"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/paWMNs-9CP","jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/09\/PXL_20260822_180618507.jpg?fit=4080%2C2775&ssl=1","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37003","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/156979701"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=37003"}],"version-history":[{"count":48,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37003\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":37062,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/37003\/revisions\/37062"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/37061"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=37003"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=37003"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=37003"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}},{"id":36814,"date":"2026-08-28T22:02:13","date_gmt":"2026-08-29T02:02:13","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/?p=36814"},"modified":"2026-08-29T13:06:30","modified_gmt":"2026-08-29T17:06:30","slug":"collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/","title":{"rendered":"Collections: Global Trade and United States Navy"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This week we&#8217;re doing another one of our series of military theory primers, this time focusing on a fairly simple contention: <strong>that the United States Navy is a load-bearing component of the global economy<\/strong>.  I considered attempting to work in A.T. Mahan and the concept of command of the seas in here but simply outlining the basic argument about the navy&#8217;s role in sustaining global standards of living has run out more than 10,000 words, so a primer on Mahan will have to wait for another day.<span id='easy-footnote-23-36814' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/#easy-footnote-bottom-23-36814' title='Which is fine.  Mahan is very focused on the benefits sea power can bring &lt;em&gt;one country&lt;\/em&gt; (the one that has it) and much less interested in the idea that sea power can provide a collective benefit to most or all countries, but it is the latter question I am focused on here.'><sup>23<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The argument here is actually quite easy to state as a series of propositions: global trade is an important part of the global economy, necessary to maintain our standards of living (and in many cases, essential for the survival of people in poorer countries) and seaborne trade makes up the overwhelmingly vast majority of all trade.  Moreover, in history to this point it has been a relative constant that in the absence of major naval powers committed to freedom of navigation, pirates and states at maritime choke-points tend to emerge and seriously disrupt maritime trade.  Finally, at current, only the United States maintains the kind of navy that traditionally has been necessary to keep sea lanes open, thus making the US Navy at present a &#8216;load bearing&#8217; component of the global economy.  Consequently, this makes the United States&#8217; apparent turn away from freedom of navigation troubling &#8211; a move likely to be bad for Americans but also bad for <em>everyone else<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If you nodded your head through all of those points, you are good to go. Hit the tip jar on the way out. But I find that many folks want to contest at least one of those points &#8211; they don&#8217;t think trade is important (or that it only enriches &#8216;big corporations&#8217;) or don&#8217;t realize how substantial sea trade is, or don&#8217;t expect sea commerce to break down in the absence of naval power, or don&#8217;t understand the kind of navy necessary to provide that sort of power. So the <em>rest <\/em>of this far-too-many-words-long post (it turned out to be 10,430) is going to belabor each point, one by one, in order to explain why the United States Navy &#8211; which I should stress is very much an imperfect institution; we are not here to uncritically glaze the USN, just to describe its function &#8211; is configured the way it is and why there is not currently a replacement for it on offer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Also, let me note at the beginning: if you want regular updates on global shipping as well as good explainers about how global shipping works, I cannot recommend Sal Mercogliano&#8217;s <a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/@wgowshipping\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/@wgowshipping\"><em>What&#8217;s Going On With Shipping<\/em> <\/a>channel enough.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But first, as always, building navies is expensive.  Really expensive.  <em><strong>Absurdly expensive<\/strong><\/em>.  If you want to help keep this ship afloat, you can help by spreading the word to new readers and by supporting this project over at <a href=\"https:\/\/www.patreon.com\/user?u=20122096\">Patreon<\/a>. If you want updates whenever a new post appears or want to hear my more bite-sized musings on history, security affairs and current events, you can follow me on Bluesky (@bretdevereaux.bsky.social). I am also active on Threads (bretdevereaux) and maintain a <em>de minimis<\/em> presence on Twitter (@bretdevereaux).<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"jetpack_subscription_widget\"><h2 class=\"widgettitle\"><\/h2>\n\t\t\t<div class=\"wp-block-jetpack-subscriptions__container\">\n\t\t\t<form action=\"#\" method=\"post\" accept-charset=\"utf-8\" id=\"subscribe-blog-3\"\n\t\t\t\tdata-blog=\"161773962\"\n\t\t\t\tdata-post_access_level=\"everybody\" >\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p id=\"subscribe-email\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<label id=\"jetpack-subscribe-label\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tclass=\"screen-reader-text\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfor=\"subscribe-field-3\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tEmail Address\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/label>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"email\" name=\"email\" autocomplete=\"email\" required=\"required\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tvalue=\"\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tid=\"subscribe-field-3\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tplaceholder=\"Email Address\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n\n\t\t\t\t\t<p id=\"subscribe-submit\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"action\" value=\"subscribe\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"source\" value=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/?after=2026-08-06T00%3A00%3A00&#038;page=1&#038;rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fposts\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"sub-type\" value=\"widget\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"redirect_fragment\" value=\"subscribe-blog-3\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" id=\"_wpnonce\" name=\"_wpnonce\" value=\"fd76a9d5bb\" \/><input type=\"hidden\" name=\"_wp_http_referer\" value=\"\/?after=2026-08-06T00%3A00%3A00&#038;page=1&#038;rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fposts\" \/>\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type=\"submit\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tclass=\"wp-block-button__link\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tstyle=\"margin: 0; margin-left: 0px;\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tname=\"jetpack_subscriptions_widget\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tSubscribe!\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/form>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">A World With Trade<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now I want to start by talking about what global trade really <em>is<\/em> and its role in the global economy, because in many cases before I can get to anything about shipping lanes and choke points and pirates and so on, I find many regular folks have already immediately objected that <em>they do not care<\/em> about global trade.  They think of global trade as a thing which mostly benefits big corporations or &#8216;cosmopolitan globalist&#8217; elites.  But, you must pardon me, they are wrong: they do not yet <em>know<\/em> that they care about global trade.  When global trade is disrupted &#8211; even just a relatively little bit! &#8211; and the price of a barrel of oil nearly doubles, leading to a one-third surge in the price of gasoline and a 50% jump in the price of diesel, it turns out they care a great deal.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">They often just don&#8217;t think about that in terms of global trade, because global trade is one of the key things that makes modern prosperity possible, mostly invisibly.  That very invisibility, as we&#8217;ll see in the end, is part of what poses real political problems, but let us first make trade a bit more visible.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The first mistake that folks make here is to assume that trade is a relatively small part of the global economy<\/strong>. It is an easier mistake to make in a place like the USA, which is very big and thus trades with itself more than most, but<strong> globally trade makes up between a quarter to a third of all economy activity<\/strong>.<span id='easy-footnote-24-36814' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/#easy-footnote-bottom-24-36814' title='The standard statistic here that I&amp;#8217;ve seen is &lt;a href=&quot;https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Openness_index&quot; data-type=&quot;link&quot; data-id=&quot;https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Openness_index&quot;&gt;&amp;#8216;trade openness&amp;#8217;&lt;\/a&gt; which is imports and exports combined as a measure of global GDP. But for the question of &amp;#8216;how much global GDP are goods moving country-to-country, that counts each transaction twice (once as an import and once as an export) so we have to halve the figure.'><sup>24<\/sup><\/a><\/span> That is, it turns out, quite a lot. If your household income fell by a third, that would be very difficult for you. If <em>every <\/em>household&#8217;s income fell by a third, the resulting economic contraction would be <em>double the size of the Great Depression<\/em> (which reduced global GDP by roughly 15%) and have all sorts of knock-on effects as those households themselves had to cut back on other, non-imported goods and services.<span id='easy-footnote-25-36814' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/#easy-footnote-bottom-25-36814' title='American GDP contracted by 30% during the Great Depression, so you could also say, &amp;#8220;it would be like the Great Depression in the United States.&amp;#8221; Those were, I recall being told often by my grandparents who were kids at the time, not the best of times.'><sup>25<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The second potential mistake here is to assume that all of this trade is mostly a luxury: that it just accrues to the rich or to rich countries or to big corporations. We may remove the &#8216;rich countries&#8217; here right off: <a href=\"https:\/\/ourworldindata.org\/grapher\/trade-as-share-of-gdp\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/ourworldindata.org\/grapher\/trade-as-share-of-gdp\">a lot of the countries with very high trade-to-gdp ratios<\/a> (imports+exports, thus the ability to exceed 100%) are poor countries (the other big group are small, rich countries): countries like Vietnam (190%), Djibouti (206%), Namibia (108%), Somalia (128%), Libya (137%), Guinea (103%) and so on. We&#8217;ll come back to this in a moment, but <strong>a breakdown in global trade is actually <em>especially<\/em> bad for poorer, developing countries<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Likewise, while big corporations surely profit off of trade &#8211; no poor man ever owned a freighter &#8211; they&#8217;re not the only ones.  We can think about this by thinking about the most staple of all bulk staples: food.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"605\" data-attachment-id=\"36827\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/image-193\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-12.png?fit=1399%2C826&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1399,826\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-12.png?fit=1024%2C605&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-12.png?resize=1024%2C605&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36827\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-12.png?resize=1024%2C605&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-12.png?resize=300%2C177&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-12.png?resize=768%2C453&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-12.png?resize=1200%2C709&amp;ssl=1 1200w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-12.png?resize=1100%2C649&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-12.png?w=1399&amp;ssl=1 1399w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the developing world, access to global food markets is an essential lifeline.  Most developing countries, especially across Africa, are net-food importers, some quite substantially so.  Moreover, whereas food imports in developed countries are often &#8216;exotic&#8217; foods that grow in other climates (think bananas away from the equator), for developing countries, these are often bulk staples.  As we saw in 2008-2010 and again in 2022 and may grimly see again soon, increases in the price of bulk stable foods are associated with political instability and suffering in the developing world.  Because if the price of bread goes up by 25% in the United States, for most Americans that is <em>annoying<\/em>, but in many developing countries it means <em>people go hungry<\/em> because they cannot afford food.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Developing countries are also more likely to have agricultural systems that are exposed to more variability (drought, pests, blight, etc.) as compared to developed countries. And fundamentally <em><strong>everyone<\/strong><\/em> relies on trade to insure against famine in the event of a local failure in food production. <strong>Trade is what allows us to even out a freak drought in one country or a flood in the other to keep everyone fed<\/strong>. That trade may be in the form of market interactions or it may arrive as foreign aid or disaster relief, but it is still the movement of goods from one place, from one country, to another.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Trade is also important for the <strong>develop<em>ing<\/em> part of developing countries<\/strong>.  Doing the industrial revolution from scratch &#8211; <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2022\/08\/26\/collections-why-no-roman-industrial-revolution\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"14692\">designing and building better steam engines, creating factories, developing precision tools, steadily expanding production as all of that industrial capital accrues<\/a> &#8211; took Great Britain something like a century and a half (roughly 1750 to 1900 &#8211; we&#8217;re being quite approximate here) to hit an economic standard we might define as &#8216;middle income&#8217; today.<span id='easy-footnote-26-36814' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/#easy-footnote-bottom-26-36814' title='And of course the existence of a British &lt;em&gt;Empire&lt;\/em&gt; was a meaningful factor in that.'><sup>26<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  But developing countries today that have access to trade &#8211; and here we mean not just the movement of goods (but also that) but also people &#8211; can go through that transformation much faster.  The classic interaction is that developing countries sell raw materials<span id='easy-footnote-27-36814' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/#easy-footnote-bottom-27-36814' title='Or, in some cases, &lt;em&gt;services&lt;\/em&gt;, enabled by modern information technology.'><sup>27<\/sup><\/a><\/span> to import the machinery and experts to build basic manufacturing industries (think steel, concrete, agricultural goods processing and so on) and then sell <em>those<\/em> goods to be able to afford to important the experts (including educators) and advanced equipment to make more complex finished goods.  Because manufacturing, say, a car requires not just raw materials, but the ability to craft high quality materials (like very precise steel alloys) as well as very complex components and very precise parts within low tolerances and that both requires really fancy manufacturing <em>equipment<\/em> (which <em>also<\/em> requires those same high quality materials, complexity and low tolerance components to build) and very skilled workers, designers and engineers.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Trade allows developing countries to jump-start progress on each rung of that ladder, importing the experts who already know how to do these things (and can teach more) and importing the machines that can do these things (with which more may be built), ideally resulting in a high-income, more self-sufficient economy achieved in decades rather than centuries.  And you can see any number of countries that either have accomplished this (China, Japan and South Korea, for instance) or are now accomplishing it (India, Vietnam), often from <em>very low<\/em> initial industrial &#8216;baselines&#8217; (frequently as a result of tremendous neglect or malice at the hands of European imperial masters).  <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As those developing countries work their way up the value chain from raw materials to basic goods (often textiles) to low-cost, low-complexity consumer goods (e.g. plastic toys) to higher complexity consumer goods (cars, washing machines) to the very top of the value chain (software, aircraft, etc.), their standard of living improves, but equally because the cost of labor in those countries is lower, they provide much cheaper goods to <em>developed<\/em> countries.  Those cheaper goods in turn lower the cost of living in developed countries, making the sort of &#8216;American Dream&#8217; middle-class lifestyle available to more people.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Of course even among developed countries, trade does not lose its value &#8211; <strong>there are forms of comparative advantage that have nothing to do with labor costs<\/strong>.  Some industries are so large, technical and expensive that few countries are big enough to absorb the entire demand of it &#8211; aeronautics is a classic example.  It might make sense for some countries to <em>specialize<\/em> in aircraft production, but most countries are too small to have a domestic aircraft manufacturer just for the heck of it &#8211; they&#8217;d be better off specializing in <em>something else<\/em> and using that product to buy the planes.  Meanwhile, some goods are simply hard to produce in certain places: <strong>Norway is never going to grow many bananas<\/strong>, Japan is probably not going to ever be a major producer of oil, Mali is not going to export much in the way of fish.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">All of which is to say that <strong>trade directly improves the living standards of regular people in both developed and developing countries<\/strong> and equally, <strong>we do a lot of it<\/strong>, with trade representing something approaching a third of the global economy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">All of which now brings us to the key observation: <strong><a href=\"https:\/\/unctad.org\/news\/shipping-data-unctad-releases-new-seaborne-trade-statistics\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/unctad.org\/news\/shipping-data-unctad-releases-new-seaborne-trade-statistics\">80% of all goods transported globally move by sea<\/a><\/strong>.  That is a figure which is too big for bold, so let&#8217;s step it up a bit:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">80% of All Good Transported Globally Move By Sea<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There we go.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So not only do more goods move by ship than by aircraft, railway or truck or river barge or what have you, <strong>four times<\/strong> more goods move by ship than by every other alternative system of transportation combined.  And if roughly 30% of global GDP is goods being traded, that means that <strong>about a quarter of global GDP moves by ship each year<\/strong>.  That is a very big part of the global economy!<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The main reason for this is simple: it is <em>much<\/em> cheaper to move goods by sea than by any other method.  For the cost of sending one shipping container across the United States by land (truck or rail; when I checked in 2023 around $2,500-7,500, with some variation by weight and exact route) you could also ship that same shipping container from an American cargo port to <em>any port in the world at all<\/em> (around $6,000).  Shipping by sea is (this is the rule of thumb I was given a few years back when I asked) around three times cheaper than rail, five times cheaper than truck and eight or more times cheaper than air freight.  <strong>That is an <em>enormous<\/em><\/strong> <strong>cost difference<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Believe it or not, that huge difference in cost is actually <em><strong>less<\/strong><\/em> than it was before railways and internal combustion engines made bulk overland transport somewhat affordable.  In antiquity, the ratio of cost (derived from Diocletian&#8217;s Price Edict) for transport between land, river and sea was 20:4:1, with land transport for a given quantity of bulk staples being <em><strong>twenty times<\/strong><\/em> as expensive as land transport.  With the miracles of the industrial revolution, we&#8217;ve brought down &#8216;twenty times as expensive&#8217; to <em><strong>merely!<\/strong><\/em> three to five times as expensive, per ton-mile.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">There are two basic reasons for this.  One is that it simply takes less energy to move things over water than it does to move them through the air or overland.  But the other reason, that I think is worth stressing here is <strong>ships can be really, really big<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"519\" data-attachment-id=\"36970\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/image-195\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-14.png?fit=1920%2C973&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,973\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-14.png?fit=1024%2C519&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-14.png?resize=1024%2C519&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36970\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-14.png?resize=1024%2C519&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-14.png?resize=300%2C152&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-14.png?resize=768%2C389&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-14.png?resize=1536%2C778&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-14.png?resize=1100%2C557&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-14.png?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Via <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Container_ship\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Container_ship\">Wikipedia<\/a>, a pair of Maersk Line container ships, showing just how much cargo they can handle.  Each of these ships, which are Triple E-class container ships, can carry around the equivalent of 18,000 to 20,000 semi-trucks worth of cargo.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A truck can move a single cargo container.  A typical freight train might have 100 or so freight cars each moving about a cargo container.  A large Suez canal capable container ship, by contrast, might carry upwards of <strong><em>20,000 TEUs<\/em><\/strong> (twenty-foot equivalent units, the size of a cargo container).  That means a single container ship might match the cargo capacity of hundreds of trains or <em>tens of thousands<\/em> of trucks.  That holds true for other kinds of freight: a tanker truck can move about 200 barrels (bbls) of liquid, like oil.  Suezmax tankers can get up to a <em>million<\/em> bbls and Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) are often in excess of <em>two million.<\/em><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So the scale that sea shipping can operate on is simply much greater than what is currently possible on land.  Even <em>pipelines<\/em> for oil generally move less than active major shipping lanes (as we&#8217;ve seen demonstrated in the Strait of Hormuz) and of course you cannot move iron ore or consumer goods or grain via pipeline but you can move them in large freighters.  As a result, nearly all long-distance trade moves <em>as far as it can<\/em> by ship before transferring to truck or rail for the &#8216;first mile&#8217; and &#8216;last mile&#8217; of its transit.  <strong>It is thus far to say that global trade<\/strong> &#8211; which, as we&#8217;ve established, is an important part of the global economy which enables rich countries to eat well and poor countries to eat at all &#8211; <strong>is mostly about shipping on the water<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Strait Up Piracy<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">All of that seaborne trade, however, is the product of a long period since 1945 in which there have been relatively minimal disruptions of the security of civilian ships moving over the world&#8217;s oceans.  What I want to note is that <strong>this is not automatic<\/strong>, it is an outcome that has been <em>produced<\/em>.  Instead, the historical pattern has generally been that in the absence of major powers exerting themselves to keep sea lanes open (because it benefits them to do so), what we see is that <strong>sea trade fragments<\/strong>, with polities sitting on maritime choke-points moving to exploit that control (at the expense of everyone else) and both pirates and privateers disrupting shipping more generally.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Piracy, of course, is extremely old: it is treated as a well-established and perfectly normal thing to be doing in Homer, for instance.  We actually have references to sea raiders and pirates even farther back, including in the Amarna tablets (c. 1350 BC).  Now I should note that while we generally think about piracy as ships attacking ships, there is a land based component to it: piracy often also includes the raiding of coastal settlements and at the same time pirates themselves need coastal bases (often with friendly local populations) in order to operate out of.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Notably, a lot of this early evidence for Mediterranean piracy comes in the context of the <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/01\/30\/collections-the-late-bronze-age-collapse-a-very-brief-introduction\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"33464\">Late Bronze Age Collapse <\/a>and the period immediately following it (the latter including piracy&#8217;s place in Homer&#8217;s conception of maritime activity, where it is a normal and regular thing to be doing), <strong>periods of state fragmentation<\/strong> where there weren&#8217;t any major naval powers in the Eastern Mediterranean capable or willing to enforce freedom of navigation.  That changes as we move into the Late Archaic and Classical periods (as reckoned in Greece, so c. 550 BC onwards): the Achaemenid Persians are able to dominate effectively the entire litoral of the Levantine Sea (the part of the Mediterranean between Egypt and Anatolia) and maintained a strong navy &#8211; and we hear a lot less about piracy in this period.  Later emerging Greek naval powers (particularly the Athenian navy after 483) also had an interest in piracy suppression &#8211; Athens was reliant on imported grain and timber and also profited immensely from trade.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That state of affairs continues broadly until the death of Alexander, where we get a resurgence in our evidence for piracy in the context of the Wars of the Diadochoi.  Our visibility here is better and one thing worth noting is that piracy here dovetails with what we might term privateering &#8211; state-sanctioned piracy &#8211; as some of the Macedonians scrapping for control (Demetrius Poliorcetes most notably) hired pirates and mercenaries to harass their enemies.  Men might move smoothly from being mercenary sailors in the service of a king to &#8216;pirates&#8217; and back again while doing effectively the same things on the water.  That said, these states <em>also<\/em> had an interest in trade (especially Rhodes) and so alongside the piracy were efforts in piracy suppression.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"636\" data-attachment-id=\"36975\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/image-196\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-15.png?fit=1505%2C935&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1505,935\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-15.png?fit=1024%2C636&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-15.png?resize=1024%2C636&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36975\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-15.png?resize=1024%2C636&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-15.png?resize=300%2C186&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-15.png?resize=768%2C477&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-15.png?resize=1100%2C683&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-15.png?w=1505&amp;ssl=1 1505w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Via <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Diadochi\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Diadochi\">Wikipedia<\/a>, a map of the territory of the diadochoi, including the Ptolemaic Kingdom with its fairly expansive naval holdings, mostly lost by the 160s.  Rome crippled these key powers without replacing them and got a serious pirate problem in the bargain.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This system famously gets out of hand when the Romans in the mid-second century destroyed or crippled most of the major maritime powers of the Eastern Mediterranean (Macedon, the Seleucid Kingdom, the Ptolemaic Kingdom, Rhodes, Pergamum) but didn&#8217;t move into the region to replace them.  This ends up leading to a series of relatively Roman commands against pirates in various parts of the eastern and central Mediterranean: L. Fabius Labeo in 189, M. Antonius in 102, L. Licinius Lucullus in 86, P. Servilius Vatia in 78, M. Antonius Creticus in 74, L. Caecilius Metellus in 70.  This eventually culminates in Cn. Pompeius (Pompey)&#8217;s famous command against the pirates in 69, where he was given unprecedented authority to operate basically everywhere in the Mediterranean (using subordinates to coordinate distant activity), a command whose overweening scale is one of the major marker points in the emergence of the Late Republican &#8216;rogue general&#8217; in Roman history.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Pompey&#8217;s success here is, as far as I can tell, actually emblematic of how anti-piracy campaigns succeed: he targeted the pirate&#8217;s coastal bases, not their boats and used the coercive threat of force to negotiate rather than just trying to wipe out all pirates.  In the end, Pompey smashed some strongholds and used the leverage the threat of that gave him to resettle the pirates (and their supportive populace) inland, away from the coast.  Roman piracy suppression after Pompey is much more successful: as Roman controlled effectively the whole Mediterranean litoral, it could deny pirates bases <em>everywhere<\/em> &#8211; although through the imperial period the Romans still had to maintain a navy to keep the trade lanes, upon which their empire&#8217;s prosperity relied, open.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">To simplify greatly, we see a similar set of processes in the &#8216;Golden Age of Piracy&#8217; (c. 1650 to c. 1730).  It was enabled by state fragmentation and warfare, particularly the rivalries between England and France to one side and Spain on the other.  It ended in part because those wars ended, but notably also with the application of the same mix of coercion and negotiation, perhaps most famously with the destruction of the &#8216;Republic of Pirates&#8217; at Nassau &#8211; many pirates took the offered &#8216;King&#8217;s Pardon&#8217; leaving the remainder isolated enough to be destroyed in detail and for British power over the Bahamas to remove the coastal bases necessary for piracy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And we see a similar interaction with the Barbary Pirates in the Mediterranean.  The activities of the Barbary pirates also arose out of a kind of fragmentation, as the Barbary states were weakly controlled vassals of larger Muslim states (most notably from the 1500s on, the Ottoman Empire).  To <em>greatly simplify<\/em>, initially European (and later, American) states found it most expedient to simply pay off these states, but as the balance of power shifted in their favor in the 1800s, they shifted towards coercion.  The United States famously ended most Barbary raiding of its commerce with the <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Second_Barbary_War\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Second_Barbary_War\">Second Barbary War <\/a>(1815), a major achievement for its young navy, with Britain and the Netherlands following suit the next year with the<a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Bombardment_of_Algiers_(1816)\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Bombardment_of_Algiers_(1816)\"> Bombardment of Algiers <\/a>(1816).  Once again the ultimate resolution came when naval powers were able to demonstrate their ability not just to strike pirate ships but to project power inland either by bombardment or the landing of troops.  <strong>It is the ability to shut down the <em>bases<\/em> which suppresses piracy successfully in the long term<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"714\" data-attachment-id=\"36977\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/image-197\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-16.png?fit=1280%2C892&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1280,892\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-16.png?fit=1024%2C714&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-16.png?resize=1024%2C714&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36977\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-16.png?resize=1024%2C714&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-16.png?resize=300%2C209&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-16.png?resize=768%2C535&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-16.png?resize=1100%2C767&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-16.png?w=1280&amp;ssl=1 1280w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Via <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Bombardment_of_Algiers_(1816)\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Bombardment_of_Algiers_(1816)\">Wikipedia<\/a>, a painting, Bombardment of Algiers by George Chambers (1836), depicting, somewhat dramatically, the nine-hour bombardment of Algiers by the Royal and Dutch Navies in 1816.  An example of power projection ashore as the Anglo-Dutch fleet could credibly threaten to essentially destroy the city (which is coastal) from the water.<br>Ironically, the fleet was able to effectively bluff a surrender out of Omar Agha, the Dey of Algiers, by announcing they would continue their bombardment if he did not surrender, despite being almost totally out of ammunition.  The Dey, unaware of this, surrendered rather than endure a continued bombardment &#8211; a useful reminder that the effective window for negotiation may often be narrow and easily missed.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now alongside pirates, states and other larger polities can also be a problem for maritime trade <strong>if they sit on major choke-points<\/strong>.  As you can see on the trade-route map below, <strong>most trade moves through one or more &#8216;choke points&#8217;<\/strong> &#8211; narrow sea passages where alternative routes are either much longer or simply unavailable.  Some of these are major canals (Panama, Suez) or narrow straits or channels (the English Channel, the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab el-Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca, the \u00d6resund, the strait of Gibraltar, the Turkish straits and so on).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"512\" data-attachment-id=\"36866\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/image-194\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-13.png?fit=1920%2C960&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,960\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-13.png?fit=1024%2C512&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-13.png?resize=1024%2C512&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36866\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-13.png?resize=1024%2C512&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-13.png?resize=300%2C150&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-13.png?resize=768%2C384&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-13.png?resize=1536%2C768&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-13.png?resize=1100%2C550&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-13.png?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Via <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Maritime_transport#\/media\/File:Shipping_routes_red_black.png\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Maritime_transport#\/media\/File:Shipping_routes_red_black.png\">Wikipedia<\/a>, a map showing the density of commercial shipping on the world&#8217;s oceans.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">While <strong>most countries globally have an interest in relatively free movement through these shipping channels<\/strong>, the <strong>countries directly on these choke-points may have an interest in <em>extracting value<\/em> from their control<\/strong>.  The classic example of this is the<a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Sound_Dues\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Sound_Dues\"> Sound Tolls<\/a>, the toll that Denmark extracted from ships passing the \u00d6resund until 1857, which at points made up the majority of the Danish state&#8217;s revenue.  While any <em>one<\/em> such &#8216;closed&#8217; or tolled strait may be little more than an inconvenience globally (although notice <em>just how much<\/em> of an inconvenience restricts on the Strait of Hormuz have been!), because nearly all shipping moves through at least one if not more of these choke-points, if <strong>other countries<\/strong> were to follow suit and every country on a choke-point tried to maximize extraction off of it, the result would be a major drop in global trade, which, as discussed above, would lead to a sharp decline in living standards in rich and poor countries alike.  Everyone would be worse off.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The current global system, which assumes freedom of navigation in nearly all of these waterways and only allows fees to be charged to the degree that ships require active assistance to navigate a given choke-point (canals have to be maintained and some straits &#8211; though not the Hormuz &#8211; are narrow enough that safe passage requires help (&#8216;pilotage&#8217;); the Turkish straits are the <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Montreux_Convention_Regarding_the_Regime_of_the_Straits\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Montreux_Convention_Regarding_the_Regime_of_the_Straits\">classic example of the latter<\/a>) is<a href=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/08\/07\/history-hormuz-straits-iran-war-trump\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/foreignpolicy.com\/2026\/08\/07\/history-hormuz-straits-iran-war-trump\/\"> largely a product of the 1800s<\/a> eventually codified in the 1982 <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Convention_on_the_Law_of_the_Sea\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/United_Nations_Convention_on_the_Law_of_the_Sea\">United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea<\/a> (UNCLOS), a result of imperial maritime powers (first Britain, later the United States) twisting arms in order to establish a global standard of &#8220;<a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Innocent_passage\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Innocent_passage\">innocent passage<\/a>.&#8221;  That said, this standard was always backed up, implicitly or explicitly, by force: countries agreed to these limitations in part because everyone understood that if they didn&#8217;t, the imperial powers would <em>make them<\/em> because those imperial powers relied heavily on the free movement of goods and people over the water.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And we should be clear here: that this state of affairs &#8211; few-to-no pirates, open choke-points &#8211; benefited humanity as a whole was for the most part a happy side benefit of imperial maritime powers (initially mostly Britain, then later the United States and Britain, then later mostly the United States) pursuing their own interests.  I want to stress that very clearly for any &#8216;America First&#8217;ers still sticking around: while this system benefits most people globally, <strong>we built this system because it <em>benefits us in particular<\/em><\/strong>.  As we&#8217;re going to see in a moment when we get to blockades, <strong>we wrote the rules to favor us, to favor the kind of naval power we have and the kind of trade we engage in<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A good example of this are the rules for when it is <em>legal<\/em> for a country to disrupt trade.  On the one hand, unilaterally closing a shipping lane (as Iran has done) is illegal, as is unannounced attacks on shipping (which is to say, piracy).  <em>However<\/em>, blockades are legal as part of war, assuming the blockading country declares the blockade, declares what goods are contraband (they need to be at least thinly connected to military activity) and provides any ship attempting to run the blockade a change to turn around before being engaged.  In practice, that means that <strong>international law bans all disruptions of maritime trade <em>except<\/em> the kind only countries with large power-projection surface fleets<\/strong> (of the kind Britain and the United States, who largely wrote the rules (along with, post-1945, the USSR), have) <strong>can perform<\/strong>.<span id='easy-footnote-28-36814' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/#easy-footnote-bottom-28-36814' title='The same is true for embargoes with collateral sanctions.  Declaring &amp;#8216;no one else can do civilian trade with XYZ country&amp;#8217; and attempting to enforce it militarily is against the rules, but declaring &amp;#8216;anyone who trades with XYZ country cannot trade with us&amp;#8217; is not.  The result is that the largest economies &lt;em&gt;everyone&lt;\/em&gt; trades with (the United States, the EU, in theory China but they haven&amp;#8217;t used this leverage) can shut down quite a lot of &amp;#8216;above board&amp;#8217; trade to a given smaller enemy country.  That is, in practice, how sanctions against Iran or Russia work: Iran and Russia may not care if the United States sanctions their businesses, but their international business partners do (because they also do business in the USA or the EU), which either cuts off business or requires it to move through deniable intermediaries (thus, in part, the &amp;#8216;shadow fleet&amp;#8217;), which imposes substantial additional costs.  &lt;strong&gt;It&amp;#8217;s another example of how the great powers essentially wrote the rules in a way that favors their tools and disfavors the tools of other countries&lt;\/strong&gt;.'><sup>28<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  Instead of writing international law to say, &#8220;only the United States, Great Britain and maybe the Soviet Union can cut off trade&#8221; the solution was to say, &#8220;you can only cut off trade via this specific method which only the United States, Great Britain and maybe the Soviet Union can actually perform.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But maintaining and enforcing those rules remains reliant on <strong>naval power<\/strong> or more correctly <strong>it remains reliant on a certain specific <em>kind<\/em> of naval power<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Power Projection Navies<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The distinction I want to draw here is the specific subset of navies <strong>able to project power over the oceans<\/strong>.  Navies, after all, come in different sorts.  One distinction you will hear quite often is between a <strong>blue water navy<\/strong> (a navy capable of operations on the oceans, the &#8216;high seas&#8217;) and a &#8216;brown water navy&#8217; (which only operates along the rivers and coastlines of its country) or &#8216;green water navy&#8217; (not capable of global projection, but able to push out into local oceans and seas).  <strong>But not all blue water navies are made equal either<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As noted above, effectively suppressing piracy long-term generally requires the ability not merely to get to the body of water in question, but to <strong>have the ability to project power ashore<\/strong>, because the ultimate piracy suppression requires removing the coastal bases that pirates operate on.  Likewise, the kind of coercion that can compel potentially truculent countries sitting on maritime choke-points to allow unhindered traffic generally also requires the ability to project power ashore.  It isn&#8217;t enough to threaten to sink that country&#8217;s navy (especially if they don&#8217;t have much of one), you need to be able to threaten to bombard key cities or deliver a seaborne invasion (we&#8217;ll come back to why this is such a problem in the Strait of Hormuz in a moment).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Since trade is <em>global<\/em>, maintaining <em>global<\/em> maritime networks means we either need one navy with global projection (which is generally how this works) or a consortium of regional navies that maintain these capabilities in their neighborhood.  In practice for the last few centuries, relying on one or a few big navies with global projection has been the norm.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So we need a navy <strong>capable of <em>global <\/em>projection<\/strong>, which includes the ability to <strong>get to any key choke-point<\/strong>.  It has to, once on station, be able not only to defend itself against other ships <strong>but also project power ashore<\/strong>.  Since projecting power ashore is a process that invariably takes time <strong>it also needs to be able to <em>sustain<\/em> itself at any key choke-point<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first requirement alone actually already rules out most of the world&#8217;s navies: only a handful of relatively large, relatively wealthy countries maintain navies with a significant number of large warships (generally destroyers and bigger) that can actually do oceanic operations on the regular.  Most smaller countries instead operate a mix of smaller frigates, corvettes and cutters which are perfectly serviceable for defending and policing their own territorial waters, but are not suitable for long distance operations.  You can actually see this distinction with remarkable clarity because the United States doesn&#8217;t operate just one navy &#8211; it operates two: the US Coast Guard would, for most countries, <em><strong>be the navy<\/strong><\/em>.  But for blue water operations, we&#8217;re generally going to want larger ships: both because larger ships are more capable (they can carry more weapons, munitions and supplies) but also simply because open ocean travel often demands bigger ships due to more intense weather and longer time at sea.  Of course, bigger ocean-going warships are going to be more expensive (which is why countries that have no designs on creating a blue water navy tend to prefer smaller, cheaper coastal ships).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But blue water isn&#8217;t enough: <strong>we need to be able to <em>project power ashore<\/em><\/strong>.  Historically, the right ship for this kind of power projection has varied, but since 1945 <strong>the ship type for power projection ashore has been the aircraft carrier<\/strong>, particularly a <em>fleet<\/em> carrier.  Many navies operate smaller carriers that mostly carry helicopters and maybe a handful of vertical take-off-and-landing (VTOL) platforms, but if you want to actually project power ashore, you need a large airwing of full-sized capable fixed-wing aircraft.  You can actually see this distinction in the US Navy as well.  When we say &#8216;the United States has 11 aircraft carriers&#8217; we&#8217;re only counting the CVNs, the <em>fleet<\/em> carriers.  The United States <em>also<\/em> maintains a bunch of amphibious warfare ships &#8211; 2 America-class LHA (landing helicopter assault) and 7 Wasp-class LHD (landing helicopter dock) &#8211; which in any other navy would be treated as aircraft carriers, given that they can both operate fixed-wing aircraft.  But while these ships exist to <em>support<\/em> amphibious operations, you wouldn&#8217;t want to rely on them exclusively to project air power, especially against an enemy who can actually shoot back.  You want the much larger air wing of a CVN (40+ strike aircraft, as compared to half a dozen on an LHA\/LHD).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"731\" data-attachment-id=\"36979\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/image-198\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-17.png?fit=1280%2C914&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1280,914\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-17.png?fit=1024%2C731&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-17.png?resize=1024%2C731&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36979\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-17.png?resize=1024%2C731&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-17.png?resize=300%2C214&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-17.png?resize=768%2C548&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-17.png?resize=1100%2C785&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-17.png?w=1280&amp;ssl=1 1280w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Via <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Carrier_strike_group\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Carrier_strike_group\">Wikipedia<\/a>, a United States Navy carrier strike group, organized around the USS George Washington (CVN-73), taken in 2003.  The supply ship is in the back, while the carrier is supported by what looks to be three Ticonderoga-class cruisers and three Arleigh Burke class destroyers.  I don&#8217;t immediately recognize the ship to the far right (maybe a Whidbey Island-class dock landing ship?  Let me know in the comments).<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now there has been a <em>lot<\/em> of chatter lately about if aircraft carriers are actually obsolete, most of it being about the ways in which modern anti-ship missiles make aircraft carriers vulnerable.  But aircraft carriers have <em>always<\/em> been vulnerable &#8211; look how many of them the RN, USN and IJN lost in WWII!  The question is not &#8216;is the carrier vulnerable?&#8217; but &#8216;what role does the carrier serve and can any other ship perform it?&#8217;  And the answer is that <strong>a (fleet) carrier is the striking arm of a fleet, able to project a <em>lot<\/em> of combat power out a long distance<\/strong> and no, <strong>no other ship is able to do that<\/strong>.  Yes, you can throw missiles out of VLS (vertical launch system) cells on a destroyer or a frigate, but you are quite limited as to how many of those missiles you can carry and missiles are a lot more expensive than bombs.  A carrier can, over time, output a lot more &#8216;boom&#8217; at a lot greater distance using its air wing (while its air wing also <em>protects<\/em> the fleet as well).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And that&#8217;s really relevant for us because we&#8217;re interesting in projecting a lot of combat power ashore, often while keeping our vulnerable ships reasonably far away from any coastal weapons.  The big carrier is the <em>sine qua non<\/em> of doing this sustainably over a long period, which is why countries continue to build them: China&#8217;s People&#8217;s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) certainly doesn&#8217;t think that carriers are obsolete!  A carrier thus is the modern form of a ship doing shore bombardment &#8211; able to throw a lot of boom at coastal (and inland) targets &#8211; and also required if you intend to actually put troops on land (where they will require both air cover and air support).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">A carrier thus makes the threat to drop the marines (US Marines, Royal Marines, etc.) on someone credible. Of course you <em>also<\/em> need marines available to be dropped and the shipping and landing infrastructure to get them to the theater and onto land. The US Navy does this via the combination of Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) with a Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG); the former being what you are putting ashore and the latter being the ships to support doing so.  Prior to that, of course, this task was done by the British; as Lord Edward Grey famously put it, &#8220;the British army should be a projectile to be fired by the Royal Navy.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Of course, once you have that fleet, capable of moving to any given choke-point or sea lane and projecting power (including power ashore), you also need to be able to potentially sustain it there, keeping ships in supply and rotating them as necessary to maintain a continual presence until those operations ashore are complete.  And <em><strong>that<\/strong><\/em> requires more than just ships, it requires a global network of logistics bases.  In the Age of Steam, these were coaling stations &#8211; places where a navy could stockpile coal and other necessary supplies to resupply fleets.  Of course, one coaling station wasn&#8217;t enough, you needed a connected network of them so ships traveling to distant oceans could sail from one station to the next, refilling their coal bunkers at each point.  The British, of course, maintained the most expensive such network in the late 1800s and early 1900s, enabling the royal navy to operate in effectively any ocean.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">During the 1900s, the United States undertook to set up a similar network and indeed one of the exercises I sometimes do with my students is noting how neatly many of the United States&#8217; key naval bases parallel neatly the older British network, with the United States in some cases sharing or taking over the exact bases the Royal Navy had once used.  That network of bases let you run supplies short distances to your fleet on station, rather than having to do shuttle runs all the way from the home country or &#8211; worse yet &#8211; be in a situation where the fleet only has the supplies it can bring with it when it departs, operating with a fixed &#8216;timer&#8217; for its operations.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That said, the problem of logistics combined with how big full-sized carriers (even sub-super-carrier) are brings in another implication: <strong>you probably want nuclear-powered carriers<\/strong>.  Fuel is one of the largest logistics needs for a fleet that is on the move or actively doing an operation and these ships need a lot of it.  But the thing is, for a carrier-centered task force, the carrier is probably at least <strong>half of the total displacement<\/strong> of the force.  <a href=\"https:\/\/bsky.app\/profile\/bretdevereaux.bsky.social\/post\/3msgktjgia32j\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/bsky.app\/profile\/bretdevereaux.bsky.social\/post\/3msgktjgia32j\">A USN carrier strike group (CSG)&#8217;s displacement<\/a> is around 100,000 tons of carrier, around 40,000 tons of surface ship and around 20,000 tons of submarine.  The carrier and the submarines are nuclear powered, so the force is roughly 75% nuclear by weight.  The advantage here is that on a practical, operational scale, nuclear carriers and submarines can operate almost indefinitely without refueling.  You will run out of munitions, out of food, out of sailor&#8217;s sanity <em>long<\/em> before you need to change out the reactor fuel.  <strong>Having your carriers be nucleared powered is <em>really expensive<\/em><\/strong> (it requires a large body of trained nuclear technicians and engineers), <strong>but it makes global power projection <em>much easier<\/em><\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>What those ingredients <\/strong>&#8211; a blue water navy with power-projection assets (read: carriers and amphibious warfare capability) supported by a network of logistics bases allowing them to operate globally &#8211; <strong>what those ingredients let you do is <em>threaten<\/em> force on anyone who would close down the global shipping lanes<\/strong> (closures that would, to be clear, violate international law under UNCLOS). Historically speaking, once this hammer is in hand, while it may have to be demonstrated form time to time, <strong>for the most part it exists as latent force<\/strong>.  If you are doing it right, your navy should not actually be doing a lot of fighting, because everyone involved should understand you <em><strong>would<\/strong><\/em> drop the hammer if they made you, so they don&#8217;t make you.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It&#8217;s <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2022\/03\/11\/collections-nuclear-deterrence-101\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"11735\">deterrence<\/a>, but using a conventional military force (a navy) rather than nuclear weapons.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So if we want to stand back for a moment, we can say <strong>one of the main purposes of large power-projection navies is to deter disruptions to shipping<\/strong>.  It isn&#8217;t their only purpose, of course, but it is perhaps their chief purpose.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Unique Role of the United States Navy<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So to recap before moving forward: global trade is essential for providing for modern living standards and most of that trade must move by sea.  Sea lanes do not keep themselves open, historically they must by <em>kept open<\/em>, typically by a particular form of naval power, which I&#8217;ve termed a &#8216;power projection&#8217; navy &#8211; one which is able to logistically sustain itself at long distances and project combat power ashore (via bombardment, air strikes and landing troops).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><em>Doing that mission<\/em>, in turn requires a navy that has a substantial supply of larger surface warships (destroyers, cruisers, as opposed to corvettes, cutters and frigates), as well as larger aircraft carriers (which provide the modern shore strike capability), supported by a robust global network of supply bases.  Since no country maintains a worldwide colonial empire anymore, that robust global network of bases has to be predicated on a robust global network of allies and security partners.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And I&#8217;ll cut to the chase: <strong>at present, only the United States Navy can do this<\/strong>.  No other country is even really on the <em>verge<\/em> of doing it, though one country may be moving in that general direction.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first angle we can think about this through, of course, is power projection assets, which is to say, &#8220;which countries have fleet carriers, anyway?&#8221;  Not very many, it turns out.  The People&#8217;s Republic of China currently has three aircraft carriers, all diesel based; a fourth, rumored to be nuclear-powered and super-carrier sized, is on the way.  The United Kingdom maintains two fleet carriers (the Queen Elizabeth class), which are fairly large and robust, but diesel powered.  France has the Charles de Gaulle, the only other large nuclear-powered carrier deployed globally outside of the United States navy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">After that, the pickings get slim quick.  India has a pair of diesel-powered carriers, but they&#8217;re both quite small.  Russia <em>had<\/em> a diesel powered carrier, which it did use for power projection in the Syrian Civil War, but the Kuznetsov is both not a very good carrier and also has been inoperative and in need of repairs for almost a decade now.  Then we have navies which operate some small carriers that are basically on the scale of a USN LHD or LHA: Italy and Japan have two each, Spain has one.  Frankly, all of the carriers in this paragraph are too small to do serious power projection on their own (the Kuznetsov&#8217;s Mediterranean operations were in support of the former Syrian Assad regime, which also offered the Russians land bases).  They can <em>enhance<\/em> a fleet which already includes a powerful air component (indeed, this is a key part of the mission for the smaller NATO carriers &#8211; they can assume that in a big operation, they&#8217;ll have a friendly Nimitz, Ford, Queen Lizzie or Chuck d&#8217;G to support), but they cannot offer the necessary combat power on their own.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"673\" data-attachment-id=\"36982\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/image-199\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-18.png?fit=1280%2C841&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1280,841\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-18.png?fit=1024%2C673&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-18.png?resize=1024%2C673&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36982\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-18.png?resize=1024%2C673&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-18.png?resize=300%2C197&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-18.png?resize=768%2C505&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-18.png?resize=1100%2C723&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-18.png?w=1280&amp;ssl=1 1280w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Via <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Operation_Prosperity_Guardian#\/media\/File:USS_Dwight_D._Eisenhower_(CVN-69)_USS_Laboon_(DDG-58)_Forbin_(D620)_ITS_Cavour_(CVH_550)_RedSea_7_June_2024.png\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Operation_Prosperity_Guardian#\/media\/File:USS_Dwight_D._Eisenhower_(CVN-69)_USS_Laboon_(DDG-58)_Forbin_(D620)_ITS_Cavour_(CVH_550)_RedSea_7_June_2024.png\">Wikipedia<\/a>, an image from 2024 of the USS Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) operating alongside the USS Laboon (DDG-58), the French Horizon-class frigate Forbin (D620) and the Italian carrier Cavour.<br>A lot of European naval procurement has assumed that in any fight, NATO navies would be fighting alongside the United States Navy, and so what ships they have built are often aimed at supplementing that core capability, rather than replicating it.  One manifestation of this is that a number of European navies have better minesweeping capabilities than the USN, a sensible burden-sharing arrangement that proved awkward when the United States unilaterally went to war with Iran without consulting any of our allies.<br><strong>It turns out that it is good to have allies and even better to consult them with your plans<\/strong>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">When the current crisis in the Hormuz began, I saw people asking why European or Chinese navies didn&#8217;t intervene to keep the shipping lanes open, especially given that it was their oil being blocked.  And the answer here is quite simple: <strong><em>they couldn&#8217;t<\/em><\/strong>.  It is one thing to have a military capability at home.  It is something <em><strong>very different<\/strong><\/em> to be able to project that power overseas and right now the only country that has a full suite of power projection assets is the United States.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We&#8217;ve already discussed above the limitations imposed by non-nuclear-powered carriers: maintaining them at sea for long periods is a lot more logistically intensive, which is why countries that think they might be doing power projection missions with carriers tend to at least think <em>really hard<\/em> about having them be nuclear powered.  That said, the travails of the Royal Navy really speak to how hard this is to do &#8211; and why so few small countries do it.  Maintaining a bespoke military nuclear program that can design <em><strong>and maintain<\/strong><\/em> a meaningful number of compact nuclear reactors is no small task.  For four decades the Royal Navy has<a href=\"https:\/\/www.19fortyfive.com\/2026\/08\/the-royal-navy-has-taken-43-years-to-dispose-of-1-nuclear-submarine-loaded-with-reactor-fuel-and-22-more-need-to-be-broken-up\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/www.19fortyfive.com\/2026\/08\/the-royal-navy-has-taken-43-years-to-dispose-of-1-nuclear-submarine-loaded-with-reactor-fuel-and-22-more-need-to-be-broken-up\/\"> struggled to actually decommission old nuclear-powered submarines<\/a><span id='easy-footnote-29-36814' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/#easy-footnote-bottom-29-36814' title='Nuclear power provides &lt;em&gt;even more&lt;\/em&gt; benefit to submarines than to carriers (you can keep a nuclear powered submarine submerged for very long periods of time, while moving at full speed), which is why you see countries that have nuclear-powered submarines but not nuclear-powered carriers'><sup>29<\/sup><\/a><\/span> in part because they have a hard time getting enough nuclear technicians to supervise removing and safely disposing of the reactors in them.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The United States Navy pours a <em>tremendous<\/em> amount of resources into training nuclear propulsion specialists<\/strong>.  Indeed, this is something I&#8217;ve interacted with directly, because I teach at a university that has both a Navy ROTC program and a research reactor.  When I taught US Naval History, required by the NROTC program, <em>a lot<\/em> (more than half, I think) of my NROTC students were nuclear engineering majors.  Smaller countries are simply going to struggle to generate enough nuclear technicians and engineers to sustain such a program without a huge, dedicated national effort.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Nevertheless, not (currently) having nuclear-powered carriers puts meaningful limits on China and the UK&#8217;s ability to employ their carriers on power projection missions.  That, of course, interacts with the systems of global basing.  Here, I think <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Chinese_anti-piracy_operations_in_the_Gulf_of_Aden#2021%E2%80%93present\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Chinese_anti-piracy_operations_in_the_Gulf_of_Aden#2021%E2%80%93present\">China&#8217;s experience in anti-piracy operations off of Somalia<\/a> is actually really instructive.  The PLAN has been sending task forces to operate in the Gulf of Aden since 2008 when the issues there became acute.  But despite the fact that there are signs that the People&#8217;s Republic of China is trying to assemble a network of bases through the Indian Ocean (termed by western analysts a &#8216;string of pearls&#8217;), the structure of PLAN missions was pretty consistent: each force was one frigate, one destroyer and one supply ship.  Each mission lasts about 180 days, including travel time from China, time on station and the return trip.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"285\" data-attachment-id=\"36986\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/image-200\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-19.png?fit=1852%2C515&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1852,515\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-19.png?fit=1024%2C285&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-19.png?resize=1024%2C285&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36986\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-19.png?resize=1024%2C285&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-19.png?resize=300%2C83&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-19.png?resize=768%2C214&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-19.png?resize=1536%2C427&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-19.png?resize=1100%2C306&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-19.png?w=1852&amp;ssl=1 1852w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Via <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Chinese_aircraft_carrier_Fujian\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Chinese_aircraft_carrier_Fujian\">Wikipedia<\/a>, the Fujian, China&#8217;s current largest aircraft carrier, displacing some 80,000 tons (about 80% of a Ford-class super-carrier.  It is currently China&#8217;s only CATOBAR (catapult-assisted take-off, barrier arrested recovery) carrier, a capability which lets it launch heavier and more capable fighters more rapidly than older &#8216;ski jump&#8217; designs.  It&#8217;s air wing is still meaningfully smaller than a Nimitz or Ford-class carrier (52 aircraft compared to c. 75), but still quite formidable.<br><\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That short duration is pretty striking, because the c. 15,000 ton displacement (not including the support ship) PLAN squadrons here have roughly the same amount of support ship (one ship, in the 20,000 tons displacement range) as many American carrier strike groups (as noted above, a CSG is <em>160,000<\/em> tons displacement &#8211; ten times the size; it has <em>far<\/em> more combat power), but these exercises remain small and comparatively short.  The suspicion one has is that what is happening here is that each of these squadrons is leaving the Chinese mainland with most of the supplies they are going to get on their one supply ship (which represents more than half of the total displacement of the squadron!) and so they have to transit <em>all the way back home<\/em> when that runs out.  <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/People%27s_Liberation_Army_Support_Base_in_Djibouti\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/People%27s_Liberation_Army_Support_Base_in_Djibouti\">There is a Chinese naval base in Djibouti<\/a> that must also be playing a key logistics role here, but the short duration and small size of the PLAN forces really is suggestive of the approach here.  This approach, of course, is hardly sufficient to allow the PLAN to deploy basically anything in the Atlantic or Eastern Pacific or basically anywhere except the west Pacific and Indian Ocean.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">At that scale, for the PLAN to deploy the combat-power equivalent of an American CSG to the western Indian Ocean (which, because their flight decks are smaller, would require basically all of them) would probably require nearly the entire PLAN logistics fleet and strain PLAN logistics such that the fleet couldn&#8217;t be kept there long and would be very vulnerable if it did not accomplish its objective very rapidly.  In naval warfare, you <em>do not<\/em> want to be caught in a fight at the ragged end of your logistics tether with low fuel or munitions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now the PLAN apparently <em>is building<\/em> a nuclear-powered carrier.  They <em>are trying<\/em> to begin setting up networks of logistics bases.  That suggests at least some interest in the PRC in moving towards a global power projection navy, though I would note that history is replete with countries that <em>started<\/em> to invest in that kind of navy only to revert back to regional defense navies when it became clear just how jaw-droppingly expensive such a navy would be.  In either case <strong>naval strategy is built strategy<\/strong> and the PLAN probably has at least a decade to go before they have the rudiments of a truly global power projection navy, even if they steamed there at full speed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Which brings us to a key conclusion<strong>: at present, only the United States Navy is capable of performing the kind of power projection which sustained maritime commerce<\/strong> and at present, no other navy is particularly close to being able to replicate that capability.  The two most obvious candidates to replace the United States would presumably be China or some kind of combined EU Navy, but it is not clear that China is actually <em>interested<\/em> in maintaining global maritime commerce beyond their own and a combined EU Navy on the USN&#8217;s scale would face tremendous political and economic hurdles, to say the least.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>For now, the United States Navy is the only game in town<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Which, it turns out, may be a problem.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Implications<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">You may have noticed that the infrastructure of global maritime security is fraying lately.  Indeed, I would argue, it has been fraying for quite some time.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Although establishing a direct causation is impossible, the fact that the beginnings of these issues correlate to the point at which the United States&#8217; Global War on Terror began to go south and thus the American public began (understandably) decisively souring on America&#8217;s traditional role as the guarantor of the global system does not seem like an accident.<span id='easy-footnote-30-36814' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/#easy-footnote-bottom-30-36814' title='I&amp;#8217;d be remiss if I didn&amp;#8217;t note that there&amp;#8217;s a good argument to make that the War in Iraq (2003-2011) &lt;em&gt;also&lt;\/em&gt; represents an abandonment of the United States&amp;#8217; global role, but that is a sticky question for another day.  What matters here is that perceived failure in the GWOT is very specifically and explicitly a foundation of the current &amp;#8216;America First&amp;#8217; movement which evidently isn&amp;#8217;t against intervention &lt;em&gt;per se&lt;\/em&gt;, but is against intervention to uphold the &lt;a href=&quot;https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2023\/07\/07\/collections-the-status-quo-coalition\/&quot; data-type=&quot;post&quot; data-id=&quot;19921&quot;&gt;Status Quo global order&lt;\/a&gt;.'><sup>30<\/sup><\/a><\/span> Instead, it has led to the current baleful condition where in the United States is the only state capable of actually sustaining the global maritime system but at the same time is anywhere from indifferent to <em>actively hostile<\/em> to it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The earliest of the current woes back back to the mid-aughts with<a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Piracy_off_the_coast_of_Somalia#Summary_of_events\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Piracy_off_the_coast_of_Somalia#Summary_of_events\"> the rise of piracy off of the coast of Somalia<\/a>.  That piracy intensified dramatically in 2008 and 2009, though by 2013 or so a robust international effort had largely clamped down on pirate activity.  <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Red_Sea_crisis#\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Red_Sea_crisis#\">Starting in 2023<\/a>, however, the United States was not able to fully restore shipping through the Bab-el-Mandeb, a crucial maritime choke-point (it&#8217;s where traffic moving through the Suez and the Red Sea gets to the Indian Ocean).  Traditionally, the American response &#8211; all the way since the First Barbary War (1801-1805) to a state (and the Houthis are, in practice, the government of large parts of Yemen) disrupting its shipping in this manner would be to invade and topple that regime.  Instead, for very obvious reasons, the political will to land the marines in Yemen simply didn&#8217;t exist, so the response was instead Operation Prosperity Guardian, an effort to accomplish the mission through ship defense and air strikes.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Then, of course, early in 2026, the United States <em>started<\/em> a major regional<a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/03\/25\/miscellanea-the-war-in-iran\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/03\/25\/miscellanea-the-war-in-iran\/\"> war with Iran which resulted in the closure of the Strait of Hormuz<\/a>.  What is striking about this decision is that <strong>deciding to go to war with Iran required disregarding freedom of navigation &#8211; traditionally an <em>overriding American strategic interest<\/em> &#8211; as unimportant<\/strong>.  Of course some of that was simply because the war&#8217;s planners &#8211; <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/03\/25\/miscellanea-the-war-in-iran\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/03\/25\/miscellanea-the-war-in-iran\/\">being dumb as hell<\/a> &#8211; assumed they would accomplish a quick and easy victory.  But equally it is hard not to notice that the decision to disregard freedom of navigation &#8211; at least until the oil price spike reminded everyone why it was important &#8211; came from an administration that is also the first American presidency to be <strong>openly hostile to global trade since the 1930s<\/strong>.  Moreover, <strong>once again the political will in the United States for ground operations which might restore trade simply does not exist<\/strong>.<span id='easy-footnote-31-36814' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/#easy-footnote-bottom-31-36814' title='To be clear, reasonably so, I would argue (and indeed, &lt;a href=&quot;https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/03\/25\/miscellanea-the-war-in-iran\/&quot; data-type=&quot;post&quot; data-id=&quot;34358&quot;&gt;have argued&lt;\/a&gt;).  Such operations would be enormously costly in both blood and treasure.  Instead, a United States truly committed to freedom of navigation would have judged that whatever was to be gained by a war with Iran (not much, in the event) was not worth the disruption to that key strategic interest.'><sup>31<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I want to note something actually quite important here: <strong>the war in Iran does not represent a <em>failure<\/em> of US maritime deterrence, but an <em>abandonment<\/em> of it<\/strong>.  Prior to the decision to launch a massive decapitation and regime-change strike on the Iranian Regime, the United States <em>was deterring<\/em> Iran from doing the <em>very obvious thing<\/em> and using its geographic leverage over the strait as a tool against its regional rivals (the Arab Gulf states).  The Iranian Regime operated under the quite reasonable conclusion that if it <em>did<\/em> try to shut down shipping in that region, the United States might respond with overwhelming strikes, perhaps aimed at regime change.  That threat was sufficient to achieve deterrence.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <strong>problem<\/strong>, of course is that once you <strong>do those attacks <em>anyway<\/em><\/strong> they no longer have deterrence value: you cannot threaten someone with something you are already doing.  You especially cannot threaten someone with a bullet <em>you have already fired and cannot fire again<\/em>.  Once the Iranian Regime was placed in an existential (for it) war, they had no reason <em>not<\/em> to close the strait or assert their control over it and so of course they promptly did so.  Iran didn&#8217;t decide it could &#8216;take&#8217; the American retaliation and thus decide to close the straight, it realized it was <em>already<\/em> taking the maximum American retaliation and so would pay no greater cost <em>for<\/em> closing the strait.  <strong>The United States, in attempting regime change in Iran<em> abandoned<\/em> its maritime deterrence<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz isn&#8217;t even the only current maritime crisis.  There have also been renewed attacks on shipping in the Bab-el-Mandeb but even more than this, Putin&#8217;s War in Ukraine has taken dramatically to the waves with<a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Ukrainian_attacks_on_the_Russian_shadow_fleet\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Ukrainian_attacks_on_the_Russian_shadow_fleet\"> Ukrainian efforts to shut down Russian exports to strangle the Russian war economy<\/a> and<a href=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/ukraines-nova-poshta-says-depots-destroyed-russian-attacks-2026-08-28\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/www.reuters.com\/world\/ukraines-nova-poshta-says-depots-destroyed-russian-attacks-2026-08-28\/\"> Russian retaliation<\/a>.  While Iranian disruptions of shipping in the Strait of Hormuz have involved striking a few ships here or there (<a href=\"https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/world\/middle-east\/irans-attacks-on-ships-in-hormuz-pile-up-testing-u-s-military-restraint-6ff9f5dd\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/www.wsj.com\/world\/middle-east\/irans-attacks-on-ships-in-hormuz-pile-up-testing-u-s-military-restraint-6ff9f5dd\">adding up to more the 70 such attacks since the war began<\/a>), Ukraine is operating on a much larger scale, having struck more than 200 ships in just a couple of months.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>The United States is retrenching<\/strong> and in some cases is even becoming actively hostile to <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2023\/07\/07\/collections-the-status-quo-coalition\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"19921\">the global international order<\/a>.  Consequently, <strong>every other country in the world must confront the possibility of a future in which the United States Navy does not guarantee the global maritime system<\/strong>.  In the period from 1914 to 1945, as Great Britain increasingly found that it lacks the economic resources to maintain its role as the global guarantor of that system, the United States was both ready and willing to act, first as a partner (from 1918 to 1945) and eventually as the primary guarantor.  <strong>There was a country <em>to pass the baton to<\/em>.<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What the above analysis is meant, in part, to show <strong>is that there is no country to pass the baton to now<\/strong>, nor does one appear likely to emerge soon.  The PLAN is, as noted, likely many years away from being able to pick of the mantle, but more to the point it is not clear that the PRC is <em>interested<\/em> in doing so.  The PRC&#8217;s policy in its nearer seas has not been &#8216;a rising tide lifts all boats,&#8217; but a mix of dominance politics and <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nine-dash_line\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Nine-dash_line\">beggar-thy-neighbor revanchism<\/a>.  When disaster strikes coastlines, the United States Navy has, historically, been a key player in humanitarian relief efforts, the PLAN much less so.  When in<a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Humanitarian_response_to_Typhoon_Haiyan#\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Humanitarian_response_to_Typhoon_Haiyan#\"> 2013 a major typhoon hit the Philippines<\/a>, the United States sent $37m in disaster relief and a humanitarian relief force that included numerous ships including a complete carrier-strike group.  Those fleet carriers are useful for projecting firepower ashore, but they&#8217;re also <em>really useful<\/em> for delivering humanitarian aid in conditions where ports, roads and railroads may be inoperative.  By comparison, the PRC sent $200,000 and one hospital ship.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The thing is, <strong>there is no way to build a power-projection navy quickly<\/strong> and there <em><strong>really<\/strong><\/em><strong> is no way to build it cheaply<\/strong>.  Modern warships take time to build and cost a lot of money and effectively projecting power globally hinges on the <em>most expensive<\/em> and difficult to build platforms.  Starting a naval buildup from nothing is not too hard &#8211; because you are not carrying the running costs of existing ships &#8211; but that stops being the case as your fleet expands.  The United States Navy costs on the order of $230-280bn per year.  Another country might do it cheaper, but even something like half that cost would require even the wealthiest countries to massively increase their military budget.  China may be building up to this kind of navy, but they are years (probably <em>decades<\/em>) away and likely would need to expand their capital ship fleet something like three-fold, which is hardly a trivial expense.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But as we&#8217;ve established, <strong>the United States Navy is effectively a load-bearing component of the global economy<\/strong>.  While obviously not all trade would cease if the United States dissembled its fleets, the crisis in Hormuz seems to make it fairly clear that maritime trade would be both reduced and quite a bit more expensive.  And the economics of long-distance bulk transport mean that land- and air-based options simply cannot replace maritime shipping.  <strong>If the trade lanes are not kept open, they may not close completely, but history suggests they will narrow<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">One counter-argument here is to assert that, unlike in previous centuries, there simply aren&#8217;t enough states on major choke-points with an incentive to close them down to make this a problem.  I think the last few years have thrown up considerable challenges to this notion, as we see states and non-state actors doing exactly that in the Black Sea, the Red Sea, the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf &#8211; and regional powers unable to resolve the problem.  As we saw above, that is the normal historical pattern, slowly reasserting itself and I think, if American retrenchment continues, we ought to expect that to continue.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now of course even in that future, global trade doesn&#8217;t simply stop altogether.  It simply becomes more constrained, more limited and more expensive.  Some goods become less available, ships have to take the long way around or pay expensive tolls, perhaps in some areas they have to mount greater security precautions and all of those costs get passed to the consumer.  Armed merchantmen were common in some periods of history, but it is worth noting that arming merchant ships has never been sufficient to fully protect a merchant marine, for the obvious reason that the defending country must split their defenses across their many, many ships whereas the pirates or rogue states may concentrate all of their force on a single ship of their choosing.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In that world of constrained global trade, we wouldn&#8217;t expect some apocalyptic total economic collapse. But some goods that are commonly available &#8211; out-of-season or out-of-climate fruit, for instance &#8211; might mostly vanish from store shelves. Goods in advanced economies would become more expensive and living standards would decline, as wealthy countries would &#8211; on the margin &#8211; have to &#8216;on-shore&#8217; low value-added industries which would pay worse wages, while at the same time the products themselves (imported or domestically made) got more expensive. <strong>Autarky &#8211; the effort to make most or all of a country&#8217;s needed goods domestically &#8211; is and always will be a losing economic strategy<\/strong>, because it forgoes <strong><a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Competitive_advantage\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Competitive_advantage\">comparative advantage<\/a><\/strong>. But a marked increase in the cost of trade, a reduction in the availability of imported goods will push wealthy countries in that direction and their economic growth will slow as a result.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What is inconvenient for rich countries, however, will arrive as catastrophe to poor countries who, as noted above, will find their opportunities for development curtailed and their access to affordable necessities limited.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Thus my assessment is that <strong>the American voter is making a terrible mistake<\/strong>.  On the waves, there is at present no alternative to American naval power and the result of its absence will be a poorer United States.  Indeed, Americans are <em>right now<\/em> living through a small taste of what that world looks like, as the current administration&#8217;s decision to abandon freedom of navigation as a priority brings almost immediate karma in the form of higher prices for crude oil, diesel and gasoline.<span id='easy-footnote-32-36814' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/#easy-footnote-bottom-32-36814' title='As an aside, while politicians focus a lot on gas prices &amp;#8211; the distillate that people feel hitting their wallet &amp;#8211; in the long term diesel is a bigger deal.  &lt;em&gt;Everything&lt;\/em&gt; in your local store required diesel to get from a warehouse to the shelf (via a truck).  Higher diesel prices thus push up the price of basically &lt;em&gt;everything&lt;\/em&gt; a little bit.'><sup>32<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  Of course a lot of oil has been re-routed around the blockage in Hormuz either via pipelines or sneaking it through via ship-to-ship transfers, but all of that entails <em>additional costs<\/em> which raises prices.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The problem, of course, is that it has taken me 10,000 words to walk through why this is so &#8211; why global trade matters, why specifically <em>maritime<\/em> trade matters, what the USN&#8217;s role in that is and why we cannot simply easily &#8216;burden shift&#8217; to another country.  And the median voter does not have the time in their day to take in a 10,000 word lecture on naval strategy and economics.  <strong>This was always a policy that relied upon the unified commitment of the elite<\/strong>, for the folks actually <em>running<\/em> these things to present a collective understanding to their voters that these capabilities were essential.<span id='easy-footnote-33-36814' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/#easy-footnote-bottom-33-36814' title='To expand briefly: voters quite reasonably do not have time to be educated on every issue.  They take their cues from their elites, from the political and cultural leaders who they understand to have a similar worldview as their own.  If the political elites &lt;em&gt;all&lt;\/em&gt; seem to accept something, the public will generally accept that as true (that&amp;#8217;s why it is so useful to be able to present things as &amp;#8216;bipartisan&amp;#8217; in the United States).  But you lose that &amp;#8216;accepted reality&amp;#8217; if one set of political elites disagrees, as we&amp;#8217;ve seen with issues like vaccine and climate change where there is no real doubt about the facts, but the public &lt;em&gt;thinks&lt;\/em&gt; there is, because the political system &lt;em&gt;acts&lt;\/em&gt; like there is.  The same is true here and honestly the problem is that maritime security and gains through trade are so counter-intuitive to many folks that holding a political consensus to spend &lt;em&gt;two hundred billion dollars a year&lt;\/em&gt; &amp;#8211; even though that spending is probably a &lt;em&gt;net gain&lt;\/em&gt; for Americans &amp;#8211; seems very difficult indeed.'><sup>33<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  Although the facts on the ground have not meaningfully changed, that elite consensus has broken and so here we are.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">It is worth remembering that a worse, poorer world is possible, so that we do not become its authors.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This week we&#8217;re doing another one of our series of military theory primers, this time focusing on a fairly simple contention: that the United States Navy is a load-bearing component of the global economy. I considered attempting to work in A.T. Mahan and the concept of command of the seas in here but simply outlining &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/28\/collections-global-trade-and-united-states-navy\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Collections: Global Trade and United States Navy<\/span> <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":156979701,"featured_media":36979,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"advanced_seo_description":"","jetpack_seo_html_title":"","jetpack_seo_noindex":false,"jetpack_seo_schema_type":"","_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_wpcom_ai_launchpad_first_post":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"{title}\n\n{excerpt}\n\n{url}","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"_wpas_customize_per_network":false,"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[12763,716950140],"tags":[40690,716950583,716950586,716950059,716950587,716950572,716950584,716950585],"class_list":["post-36814","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-collections","category-military-theory-primers","tag-economic-history","tag-global-trade","tag-maritime","tag-military-theory","tag-modern-navies","tag-navies","tag-piracy","tag-shipping"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/paWMNs-9zM","jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-17.png?fit=1280%2C914&ssl=1","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/36814","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/156979701"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=36814"}],"version-history":[{"count":100,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/36814\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":36996,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/36814\/revisions\/36996"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/36979"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=36814"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=36814"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=36814"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}},{"id":36676,"date":"2026-08-21T19:11:49","date_gmt":"2026-08-21T23:11:49","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/?p=36676"},"modified":"2026-08-21T19:11:49","modified_gmt":"2026-08-21T23:11:49","slug":"collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-vb-pixel-armies-for-pixel-societies","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/21\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-vb-pixel-armies-for-pixel-societies\/","title":{"rendered":"Collections: Pre-Modern Armies for Worldbuilders, Part Vb: Pixel Armies for Pixel Societies"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is the second half of the final part (<a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/06\/05\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-i-why-they-fight\/\">I<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/06\/12\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-iia-mobilization-without-administration\/\">IIa<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/06\/19\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-iib-officials-contractors-and-professionals\/\">IIb<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/06\/26\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-iii-paying-for-it\/\">III<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/07\/18\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-iva-leadership\/\">IVa<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/07\/24\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-ivb-cohesion\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/07\/24\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-ivb-cohesion\/\">IVb<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/07\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-va-putting-it-together\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"36425\">Va<\/a>, Vb) of our apparently five-part series laying out some general guidelines for how pre-modern armies are organized, with fictional worldbuilding and historical patterns in mind. Last time we started checking some fictional militaries against the general patterns we&#8217;ve laid out and we&#8217;re going to continue doing that this week.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This week, I want to turn to some of the more complex militaries structures we&#8217;ve discussed and I found they were more common in my repertoire of video games than film or literature, perhaps because the ultra-long-form structure of many video games provides a lot more space to explore complex institutions.  So this week, we&#8217;re going to look at an example of a professional standing army in the Imperial Legion of <em>The Elder Scrolls<\/em> series, some private enterprise war through the Vailian Trading Company of <em>Pillars of Eternity II: Deadfire<\/em> and the finally try to untangle the military system of Baldur&#8217;s Gate from the broader <em>Forgotten Realms<\/em> constructed world (including but not limited to <em>Baldur&#8217;s Gate 3<\/em>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But first, as always, recruiting and maintaining large pre-modern armies is expensive! Much like many of those pre-modern armies, this project is supported by devolving the costs of my ruinous book-buying habit on to <s>recruits<\/s> readers. You can help by spreading the word to new readers and by supporting this project over at <a href=\"https:\/\/www.patreon.com\/user?u=20122096\">Patreon<\/a>. If you want updates whenever a new post appears or want to hear my more bite-sized musings on history, security affairs and current events, you can follow me on Bluesky (@bretdevereaux.bsky.social). I am also active on Threads (bretdevereaux) and maintain a <em>de minimis<\/em> presence on Twitter (@bretdevereaux).<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"jetpack_subscription_widget\"><h2 class=\"widgettitle\"><\/h2>\n\t\t\t<div class=\"wp-block-jetpack-subscriptions__container\">\n\t\t\t<form action=\"#\" method=\"post\" accept-charset=\"utf-8\" id=\"subscribe-blog-4\"\n\t\t\t\tdata-blog=\"161773962\"\n\t\t\t\tdata-post_access_level=\"everybody\" >\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p id=\"subscribe-email\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<label id=\"jetpack-subscribe-label\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tclass=\"screen-reader-text\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfor=\"subscribe-field-4\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tEmail Address\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/label>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"email\" name=\"email\" autocomplete=\"email\" required=\"required\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tvalue=\"\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tid=\"subscribe-field-4\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tplaceholder=\"Email Address\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n\n\t\t\t\t\t<p id=\"subscribe-submit\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"action\" value=\"subscribe\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"source\" value=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/?after=2026-08-06T00%3A00%3A00&#038;page=1&#038;rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fposts\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"sub-type\" value=\"widget\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"redirect_fragment\" value=\"subscribe-blog-4\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" id=\"_wpnonce\" name=\"_wpnonce\" value=\"fd76a9d5bb\" \/><input type=\"hidden\" name=\"_wp_http_referer\" value=\"\/?after=2026-08-06T00%3A00%3A00&#038;page=1&#038;rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fposts\" \/>\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type=\"submit\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tclass=\"wp-block-button__link\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tstyle=\"margin: 0; margin-left: 0px;\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tname=\"jetpack_subscriptions_widget\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tSubscribe!\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/form>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Imperial Legion<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now I should start by noting one of the obvious quirks of discussing any sort of worldbuilding when it comes to video games which is that video games are the product not of a single vision but of many hands, even more so than film or tv.  After all, even just the dialogue of a single game is the product of more than one writer (<em>Oblivion<\/em> credits six &#8216;Quest Designers&#8217; and two more for &#8216;Additional Writing,&#8217; for instance) and of course a lot of the creative decisions are also made by artists, level designers and so on.  And of course that team might be very different from one game to the next: there&#8217;s a lot of turnover from <em>Morrowind<\/em> to <em>Skyrim<\/em>.<span id='easy-footnote-34-36676' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/21\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-vb-pixel-armies-for-pixel-societies\/#easy-footnote-bottom-34-36676' title='I am focusing here on &lt;em&gt;Morrowind&lt;\/em&gt;, &lt;em&gt;Oblivion&lt;\/em&gt; and &lt;em&gt;Skyrim&lt;\/em&gt; because that&amp;#8217;s what I&amp;#8217;ve played the most of.  I am leaving out &lt;em&gt;Elder Scrolls Online&lt;\/em&gt; for the obvious reason that its empire is a &lt;em&gt;different empire&lt;\/em&gt; to the one we see in the mainline numbered games (&lt;em&gt;ESO&lt;\/em&gt; is set in the Second Era, between the collapse of the Akaviri Potentate and the rise of the Septim Empire, whereas the mainline games have been focused on the ending of the Third Era: the last days of the Septim Empire and the aftermath of its decline).'><sup>34<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  So it shouldn&#8217;t surprise us that there may be some inconsistencies or contradictions; nevertheless there is <em>enough<\/em> continuity here to proceed.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We can begin by sketching out our civilian society.  I really think the society of <em>The Elder Scrolls<\/em> is something we should come back to in more depth, because while it often models itself as the most generic &#8216;generic fantasy world,&#8217; it actually <em>isn&#8217;t<\/em> in some interesting ways.  But we&#8217;ll have to stay brief here.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Tamriel (the world of <em>The Elder Scrolls<\/em>) is, like our previous examples, a complex agrarian society, but it is different in important ways: Tamriel is substantially more urban than either Westeros or Middle Earth.  That isn&#8217;t just reflected in it having larger cities &#8211; these games city sizes are invariably products of graphical limitations, rather than direct one-to-one expressions of worldbuilding &#8211; but in the organization of society: in the places we&#8217;ve seen mostly clearly (Cyrodiil, Morrowind and Skyrim) the Cyrodiillic Empire (from here on, just &#8216;the Empire&#8217; for short) is able to organize its administration entirely through urban centers.  Castles &#8211; fortified private homes  in the countryside &#8211; <em>exist<\/em> in this world, but local administration is urban, even in a relatively under-developed province like Skyrim, where each of the administrative divisions (&#8216;Holds&#8217;) has a capital in an urban settlement, be that a major city for the larger holds (Riften, Windhelm, Whiterun, Markarth and Solitude all seem to be intended as major cities) or smaller towns for the lesser holds (Falkreath, Dawnstar, Morthal and Winterhold).  <strong>This is a society organized around <em>cities<\/em><\/strong>, rather more like the ancient Mediterranean world than medieval Europe in that regard (and given the frequent Roman theming of the Empire, this hardly seems like an accident).  Still <em>agrarian<\/em> &#8211; most of what is going on is still farming &#8211; but meaningfully more urban.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Empire is in turn organized into provinces (nine of them) roughly corresponding to the historic areas of settlement of its constituent fantasy races.  Cyrodiil is the capital province and by far the largest (only Morrowind comes close and much of it is thinly settled) and most populous &#8211; it is the <strong>imperial core<\/strong> and its size and population helps explain why the government in Cyrodiil is able to more-or-less (mostly less, by the time of <em>Skyrim<\/em>) hold the rest of Tamriel.  Each of the provinces has its own internal customary local systems of government.  That may seem strange but pre-modern territorial empires often left local ruling systems in place when they could and Cyrodiil does as well.  In Cyrodiil proper, we see the province is divided into sub-regions (Counties) with a local ruler (a count) who is strongly subordinated to the center.  While the position of count is hereditary, the position has very limited authority (as the <a href=\"https:\/\/en.uesp.net\/wiki\/Oblivion:Count\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.uesp.net\/wiki\/Oblivion:Count\">wiki notes<\/a>).  in practice, <strong>Cyrodiil itself is a state<\/strong> with one legal system dictated from the capital and local &#8216;rulers&#8217; reduced mostly to functionaries who implement that system, rather than independent powers in their own right.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"840\" height=\"606\" data-attachment-id=\"36779\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/21\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-vb-pixel-armies-for-pixel-societies\/image-187\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-6.png?fit=840%2C606&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"840,606\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-6.png?fit=840%2C606&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-6.png?resize=840%2C606&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36779\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-6.png?w=840&amp;ssl=1 840w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-6.png?resize=300%2C216&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-6.png?resize=768%2C554&amp;ssl=1 768w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 840px) 100vw, 840px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Via the Unofficial Elder Scrolls Page wiki, the map of Tamriel released alongside Oblivion, which has been the standard map of the whole empire since that game.  You can see that Cyrodiil is <strong>much larger<\/strong> than any other province, which is remarkable because it is also more densely peopled than any other province as well.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Outside of Cyrodiil, local communities are organized by local laws under local leaders: Morrowind is still ruled by its Great Houses, each with their own territory, while Skyrim is ruled by its Jarls.  These entities retain their own local militaries independent of the Empire and so we ought to understand the periphery here as consisting of vassal polities.  In short the <em><strong>state<\/strong><\/em> part of the Empire is Cyrodiil (and perhaps small parts of the other provinces), but much of the area it rules is non-state client rulers.  That also shouldn&#8217;t be surprising: this was the normal structure for a lot of large empires &#8211; the empires of the Late Bronze Age come to mind especially.  Notably though &#8211; and we&#8217;ll come back to this &#8211; the Imperial Legions (the military force of the Empire proper) maintain pretty obvious &#8216;escalation dominance&#8217; over Cyrodiil&#8217;s vassals (at least until things get pear-shaped in <em>Skyrim<\/em>).<span id='easy-footnote-35-36676' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/21\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-vb-pixel-armies-for-pixel-societies\/#easy-footnote-bottom-35-36676' title='Though it is worth noting that before the Hero and dragons show up, the Empire was minutes away from successfully reasserting its escalation dominance in Skyrim during that opening sequence: the Stormcloak rebellion was about to &lt;em&gt;end&lt;\/em&gt; before Alduin intervenes.'><sup>35<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So we have a fairly well-consolidated state in Cyrodiil which provides the imperial core for the Empire and then a periphery of vassal state- and non-state polities (mostly non-state, as we see them) which the Empire <em>very much<\/em> controls.  <strong>How does the military system map onto that?<\/strong><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Surprisingly well, actually, so long as we account for the limitations in scale imposed by the genre (an RPG cannot have 90,000 men on the screen or it will crash) and the requirement for things like &#8216;town guards&#8217; (so they player doesn&#8217;t murder-hobo entire towns).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <strong>political structure <\/strong>(an imperial government with a core territory that also rules over vassal polities) <strong>is mirrored in the military structure<\/strong>: there is both the Imperial Legion but also local military forces. In <em>Oblivion<\/em>, these local forces (commanded by the counts) are little more than constabularies, something that actually is expressed pretty well in-game by how <em>immediately<\/em> out-matched they are by the Oblivion Crisis compared to the heavier forces of the Imperial Legion. In Morrowind and Skyrim, the forces of the local governments (the Jarls in Skyrim, the [dissertation on the wonderfully complex government of Morrowind here] in Morrowind) look to be quite a bit more substantial: <em>particularly<\/em> in Morrowind, one gets the sense that the armies of the Great Houses and of the Tribunal Temple are quite formidable (heavier, more expensive equipment, more magic, and so on), even if not a match for the Imperial Legion itself.<span id='easy-footnote-36-36676' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/21\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-vb-pixel-armies-for-pixel-societies\/#easy-footnote-bottom-36-36676' title='A lot of my sense of &amp;#8216;escalation dominance&amp;#8217; here is signaled by equipment: the Imperial Legion invariably has heavily armored troops as its backbone, usually in armor that at least &lt;em&gt;looks&lt;\/em&gt; &amp;#8216;mid-game,&amp;#8217; while the county and jarl armies in &lt;em&gt;Oblivion&lt;\/em&gt; and &lt;em&gt;Skyrim&lt;\/em&gt; are in light armor. By contrast, in Morrowind, the Tribunal Temple troops are in &lt;em&gt;late game&lt;\/em&gt; medium armor and the Bouyant Armigers &amp;#8211; the Tribunal Temple&amp;#8217;s knightly order, more or less &amp;#8211; are in &lt;em&gt;late game&lt;\/em&gt; light armor. The Great House armies are more numerous and in mid-game medium armor. That actually fits neatly with the plot of the game itself: &lt;em&gt;Morrowind &lt;\/em&gt;takes place at a time when the Empire is much stronger than it is in &lt;em&gt;Skyrim&lt;\/em&gt;, yet we get the clear sense that it still needs to be a lot more cautious and diplomatic in dealing with the powers in Morrowind.'><sup>36<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  That makes sense: in order to maintain control, the Imperial Legion has to maintain &#8216;escalation dominance&#8217; &#8211; the ability to win at higher levels of escalation (thus dissuading potential foes <em>from escalating<\/em>) &#8211; over the many regional armies of the empire&#8217;s provinces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"456\" data-attachment-id=\"36770\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/21\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-vb-pixel-armies-for-pixel-societies\/morrowind-imperial-legion1\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Morrowind-Imperial-Legion1.png?fit=1607%2C716&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1607,716\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"Morrowind Imperial Legion(1)\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Morrowind-Imperial-Legion1.png?fit=1024%2C456&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Morrowind-Imperial-Legion1.png?resize=1024%2C456&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36770\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Morrowind-Imperial-Legion1.png?resize=1024%2C456&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Morrowind-Imperial-Legion1.png?resize=300%2C134&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Morrowind-Imperial-Legion1.png?resize=768%2C342&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Morrowind-Imperial-Legion1.png?resize=1536%2C684&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Morrowind-Imperial-Legion1.png?resize=1200%2C535&amp;ssl=1 1200w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Morrowind-Imperial-Legion1.png?resize=1100%2C490&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Morrowind-Imperial-Legion1.png?w=1607&amp;ssl=1 1607w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Via the <a href=\"https:\/\/en.uesp.net\/wiki\/Main_Page\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.uesp.net\/wiki\/Main_Page\">Unofficial Elder Scrolls Wiki<\/a>, a selection of Imperial Legion soldiers, with rank descending from left to right.  You can see quite clearly that this is n army with relatively uniform, rank-stratified equipment.  The largest difference is gender-based (some armor looks different on women and female legionaries tend to wear skirts in addition to their armor), but by and large the legion is uniform apart from very low ranking recruits.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The <strong>major problem with the local military forces<\/strong> is that they appear to be <strong>standing forces<\/strong> to a substantial degree.  We see a lot of &#8216;guards&#8217; standing around on duty and such.  But in practice, such local rulers aren&#8217;t going to have much need for a standing military force on duty all the time: <strong>most communities have sporadic security needs<\/strong> and small communities generally do not even require much of a permanent, standing constabulary.  Instead, we might expect the permanent force to be a small retinue around the local ruler (we actually do see this in <em>Skyrim<\/em> with the concept of thanes), but beyond that, we might expect a &#8216;raised for the moment&#8217; form of military organization: some sort of levy or militia, possibly with a standing component that is just a rotating period of duty among those liable to be drawn into the full militia in an emergency (a select levy to go with the general levy).  In that case, &#8216;guard&#8217; wouldn&#8217;t so much be a career as it would be something like a two-week shift every year that you had to do, effectively as part of your taxes. <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Imperial Legion (or legions) itself is also a recognizable structure: it seems pretty clearly to be a professional army. Members of the legion are very clearly deployed far from home (a point often exemplified by the legion&#8217;s multicultural recruiting) on a permanent basis and are full-time soldiers. Recruiting seems to be done through volunteers. While we see some recruitment of local auxiliary forces in <em>Skyrim<\/em>, these tend to be lighter troops and might be local auxiliaries: the clear nucleus of the force, we&#8217;re told, arrived with General Tullius from Cyrodiil. The legion is most often stationed in permanent fortifications (we see a lot in <em>Morrowind<\/em>) or key cities (like the Imperial City in <em>Oblivion<\/em>) &#8211; it is not a local militia and makes no effort to be &#8216;everywhere.&#8217; Its equipment is remarkably (though not perfectly) uniform even in regions where its styles are distinctly foreign such as Morrowind or Skyrim, suggesting that equipment is state-issued and somewhat standardized.  It also seems to be a <strong>long-service<\/strong> professional organization: we see quite a few &#8216;old soldiers&#8217; still serving, both in desk-jobs and in combat roles.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"356\" data-attachment-id=\"36777\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/21\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-vb-pixel-armies-for-pixel-societies\/2623190_942\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/2623190_942.jpg?fit=1920%2C667&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,667\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"2623190_942\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/2623190_942.jpg?fit=1024%2C356&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/2623190_942.jpg?resize=1024%2C356&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36777\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/2623190_942.jpg?resize=1024%2C356&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/2623190_942.jpg?resize=300%2C104&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/2623190_942.jpg?resize=768%2C267&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/2623190_942.jpg?resize=1536%2C534&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/2623190_942.jpg?resize=1200%2C417&amp;ssl=1 1200w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/2623190_942.jpg?resize=1100%2C382&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/2623190_942.jpg?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">A pair of Imperial Legion soldiers from Oblivion.  While they retain some of their Roman theme (including an out-of-place Corinthian style helmet that I think is supposed to give Roman vibes, even though it is Greek-inspired), it is striking how much <strong>heavier<\/strong> the armor&#8217;s design is here than in either Morrowind or Skyrim.  It makes the distinction between the plate-armored Imperial Legion and mail-armored town guards very visually striking.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And this is a structure that actually makes a fair bit of sense for a state like this: vassal rulers retain smaller local forces and the Empire largely lets them deal with the day-to-day work of order and administration. Meanwhile, the imperial center, with its greater resources, maintains a large, professional, well-equipped standing army that enables it to coerce those local rulers as well as engage in large-scale warfare. One imagines that, in the event of a major security threat, we&#8217;d see the Imperial Legion forces form the core of a field army, probably supplemented by non-legion local forces.  The amusing thing is, while I think the developers imagine this structure as &#8216;Roman-ish,&#8217; the state it actually recalls to me most clearly is the Neo-Assyrian Empire (fl. 911-626) which maintained a core professional army of full-time infantrymen (in matched pairs of archers and shield-bearers) who were then supported by levies drawn up from the empire&#8217;s vassals.<span id='easy-footnote-37-36676' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/21\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-vb-pixel-armies-for-pixel-societies\/#easy-footnote-bottom-37-36676' title='In contrast to the Roman army, which employed both Roman-citizen full time professionals (the legions) and non-citizen full time professionals (the &lt;em&gt;auxilia&lt;\/em&gt;) but during the early and high empire made relatively little use of militia or levy forces.'><sup>37<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"346\" data-attachment-id=\"36774\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/21\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-vb-pixel-armies-for-pixel-societies\/skyrim-legion\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Skyrim-legion.png?fit=1286%2C435&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1286,435\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"Skyrim legion\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Skyrim-legion.png?fit=1024%2C346&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Skyrim-legion.png?resize=1024%2C346&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36774\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Skyrim-legion.png?resize=1024%2C346&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Skyrim-legion.png?resize=300%2C101&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Skyrim-legion.png?resize=768%2C260&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Skyrim-legion.png?resize=1200%2C406&amp;ssl=1 1200w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Skyrim-legion.png?resize=1100%2C372&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Skyrim-legion.png?w=1286&amp;ssl=1 1286w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">The Imperial Legion in Skyrim.  It is interesting that the legion seems a bit lighter in terms of equipment in Skyrim as compared to previous entries (although the pseudo-Roman theme remains clear).  I wonder if this was an effort to more clearly express that the Empire is &#8216;on the ropes&#8217; in Skyrim&#8217;s time period as compared to previous games, or simply a product of the decision to almost evenly divide the Legion between heavy and light armor troops (whereas Stormcloaks and town guards are mostly light armor types).<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What I think is somewhat underdeveloped &#8211; especially in <em>Oblivion <\/em>and <em>Skyrim<\/em> &#8211; <strong>is the apparatus to pay for all of this<\/strong>.  While other kinds of military systems can have their costs effectively devolved, a state-equipped professional army has to be paid out of the treasury, which in turn demands a state with the ability to raise <em>a lot<\/em> of revenue.  Because it is a <em>volunteer<\/em> professional army, these <strong>soldiers would have to be well paid<\/strong> in order to recruit and retain them.  Notably, we do not see in <em>The Elder Scrolls<\/em>, any indication that these costs are being defrayed by private enterprise war &#8211; the Imperial Legion is not a contractor-based army and commissions in its officer corps are not purchased, but awarded based in merit and internal promotion.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now that&#8217;s not to say we don&#8217;t see <em>any<\/em> of that apparatus.  The Empire clearly raises revenue both through taxes and through state-chartered monopolies.  One of the first things we see in Morrowind is the Syda Neen Census and Excise Office, suggesting both head and excise taxes (excise taxes are taxes on specific goods) and there is a quest related to local tax collection.  That said, the tax infrastructure in Morrowind is relatively minimal and that makes sense: most of the game takes place on Vvardenfel, which is only in the initial stages of having imperial control established.  Notably, what collection we do see is in <em>ports<\/em>, suggesting customs and excise taxes may be central here, which also makes sense for a region that is only slowly being brought fully into central administration: port duties and excise taxes on luxury goods (I <em>recall<\/em>, but cannot find the line of dialogue, where we&#8217;re told that the excise taxes are on alcohol) are easier and quicker things to set up.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But what we don&#8217;t see is a more focused and intense extraction system in Cyrodiil or <em>especially<\/em> in Skyrim.  By the time <em>Skyrim<\/em> takes place, the Empire is no longer at peace, but is recovering from a large war and trying to rapidly prepare for its seemingly inevitable sequel, which should demand high revenues and thus that taxes would be high as well.  Yet &#8216;tax revolt&#8217; is nowhere in the Stormcloak rebellion&#8217;s motivation (they&#8217;re focused more on religious persecution and ethno-nationalism) and we see almost none of the apparatus of extraction that we ought to see for a province that has been long-held by the Empire.  The same is broadly true for Cyrodiil, though there are a couple of quests in <em>Oblivion<\/em> related to things like port taxes in Anvil and such.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Alongside that fairly minimal taxation apparatus, we have another major revenue source, which is the <strong>East Empire Company<\/strong>, a fairly obvious riff off of the British East India Company (even borrowing the &#8216;East&#8217; despite appearing in places like Skyrim that are&#8230;not in the East), a massive vertically integrated company with a bunch of state-chartered monopolies on luxury goods.  That is a very historically rooted way for a state to raise revenue, of course.  <strong>The problem is that it isn&#8217;t enough<\/strong>.  Recall, Tamriel is a complex <em>agrarian<\/em> society: we see no hint of even early mass manufacture, much less <em>industry<\/em>, <strong>so the overwhelming majority of economic activity is going to be in agriculture and pastoralism<\/strong>.  That in turn necessarily means that the revenues generated from something like the East Empire Company are going to be somewhat marginal to the state itself.  The Roman Empire had, for instance, a slew of state monopolies (on things like silver mines) as well as rents on state-controlled lands and resources which the Romans collectively called <em>vectigalia<\/em>, but it is very clear that the large majority of Roman taxes were what the Romans called <em>tributum<\/em>: taxes assessed on agricultural land or produce.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So what we <em>ought<\/em> to see in order to complete the Imperial Legions is the infrastructure, particularly in Cyrodiil and Skyrim, for substantial tax collection on the common folk, particularly on agriculture.  Now that could be structured in two ways: we could see (as we do in <em>Morrowind<\/em>) direct imperial taxation, with imperial officials in each settlement assessing taxes themselves.  Now those officials might be direct employees of the Empire, but an equally likely solution (which we do seem to see in <em>Morrowind<\/em> in Caldera, as I recall) are tax farmers: private businessmen who have contracted to do tax collection in an area.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Alternately, the Empire might do what the Romans eventually did: assess taxes <em>on communities<\/em> and leave it up to local leaders and governments on how to collect those taxes.  Given how visible and important local &#8216;vassal&#8217; rulers are in the Empire, this seems to me the more likely solution: tell the local Jarl or Count or Great House that it is responsible for raising a specific amount of money (or revenue in kind, so a specific amount of grain or recruits or whatever else) and then let them sort it out with their own local administrative apparatus.  That said, if this was the system, <strong>we ought to hear about it more<\/strong>, <em>especially<\/em> in Skyrim where the local revolt against the Empire ought to mean that imperial taxes <em>are<\/em> being collected in some places and are <em>not<\/em> being collected in others.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">All of that said, the fact that the Empire in <em>The Elder Scrolls<\/em> has a somewhat fragmented structure and then has a fragmented military apparatus &#8211; with a professional army enforcing imperial power over a bunch of much smaller local militaries which do the day-to-day work of maintaining law and order &#8211; works as a reflection of the society we&#8217;re shown.  What is missing is mostly just the apparatus of empire itself, which has really been neglected in the setting&#8217;s worldbuilding since <em>Morrowind<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">The Vailian Trading Company<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That said, bringing up the East Empire Trading Company of the <em>Elder Scrolls <\/em>games highlights one odditiy: the EEC lacks its own military force, instead relying primarily on the Imperial Legion (something we see clearly in Solstheim) and only occasionally on local goons.  But of course a massive, state-chartered trading company of this sort is frequently going to have to operate far from the center of imperial control and potentially with local communities that object quite loudly to being so obviously exploited.  As a result, these sorts of &#8216;mega-corps&#8217; tend to operate their own independent military forces: the <em>societates<\/em> of Roman <em>publicani<\/em> that managed the tax-farming system (prior to Augustus&#8217; reforms to the largely community-centered tax system mentioned above, though some taxes remained farmed) maintained private security forces we can see clearly in documentary evidence from Roman Egypt, while early modern trading &#8216;mega-corps&#8217; like the British East India Company or the Dutch VOC maintained full-on private militaries, complete with armies and warships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But we <em>do<\/em> see that structure in <em>Pillars of Eternity II: Deadfire<\/em>.  And let me also just say: if you are a fan of classic computer role-playing games (<em>BG3<\/em>, <em>Wrath of the Righteous<\/em>, <em>Rogue Trader<\/em>, <em>Solasta<\/em>, that sort of thing), you <em><strong>really ought<\/strong><\/em> to give <em>Deadfire<\/em> a spin.  It is very good and very tightly written (and the stronger of the two <em>Pillars<\/em> games).  It&#8217;s also, I think, a better introduction to Eora than the more recent <em>Avowed<\/em> and I really liked <em>Avowed<\/em>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Here the setting is the Deadfire Archipelago, a smaller region in the larger world of Eora, with three principle military powers along with a fourth minor power (the Principi sen Patrena, a very loose pirate confederation that survives to a significant degree in the shatter-zone created by the other three that we&#8217;ll leave aside here) and all three are actually pretty well realized.  The actually indigenous local power are the Huana.  They are significantly fragmented: the strongest tribe (the Kahanga) are a complex agrarian society with a large capital city (Neketaka) that exert an imperial overlordship over smaller tribes and communities in their periphery.  Their society is a caste-based one and their military structure follows that: the priests (including &#8216;Shapers&#8217; who wield powerful magic) and the warriors both are drawn from the highest caste, the Mataru, which thus acts as a hereditary military-and-religious aristocracy which also &#8211; not by accident &#8211; controls most of the wealth.  Their military is thus drawn primarily from this upper-class, drawing its cohesive principle from the exclusivity and strong social expectations for that class, financed by the wealth of its role as the ruling elite (that is to say, wealth extracted from the lower, worker classes).  But of course that system imposes strong limits too: the military cannot be readily expanded beyond those classes effectively and the entrenched class interests of the elite render the Huana military static and unresponsive to new technology &#8211; though formidable, their position relative to rivals is <em>deteriorating<\/em>.  As a result, the player&#8217;s interactions with the Huana are always contextualized by the Huana leadership&#8217;s own sense of growing military vulnerability to incursions from foreign colonial powers, of which they have two.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"576\" data-attachment-id=\"36791\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/21\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-vb-pixel-armies-for-pixel-societies\/attachment\/2026081\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/2026081.jpg?fit=1920%2C1080&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,1080\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"202608~1\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/2026081.jpg?fit=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/2026081.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36791\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/2026081.jpg?resize=1024%2C576&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/2026081.jpg?resize=300%2C169&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/2026081.jpg?resize=768%2C432&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/2026081.jpg?resize=1536%2C864&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/2026081.jpg?resize=1200%2C675&amp;ssl=1 1200w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/2026081.jpg?resize=1100%2C619&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/2026081.jpg?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">From Pillars of Eternity II: Deadfire, the Huana capital of Neketaka.  The vertical structure replicates the class structure: the military and religious castes are at the top and their trash and refuse <strong>literally<\/strong> flow down to the artisan and eventually worker castes at the bottom.  It is a neat visual expression of the society made all the more striking by Queen&#8217;s Berth (controlled by the VTC) and the Brass Citadel (controlled by the RDC) strangling the city economically from the bottom up.  The player can side with the Huana, but their rulers are not interested in changing their culture and it is hard to see how their rigid, unchanging social system can hold out against the dynamic, predatory invaders for long.<br>Deadfire is a <strong>really good RPG<\/strong> and I really encourage you to give it a try if you haven&#8217;t.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first is the Royal Deadfire Company, which represents the distant maritime kingdom of Rauatai in the Archipelago.  The name is something of a euphemism: the institution <em>began<\/em> as the Rauatai Trading Company, but was brought under the direct control of the ruler of Rauatai (the <em>ranga-nui<\/em>) and converted into the RDC, which in practice isn&#8217;t really a trade company anymore, but an expeditionary force, an army of the government of Rauatai which aims to conquer the region &#8211; albeit gradually, because the Huana are still strong enough to make a direct war of conquest a risky proposition.  The RDC is thus effectively an expeditionary force of professional soldiers, funded and maintained by Rauatai (itself a large maritime empire) doing &#8216;<a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2021\/05\/14\/collections-teaching-paradox-europa-universalis-iv-part-iii-europa-provincalis\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2021\/05\/14\/collections-teaching-paradox-europa-universalis-iv-part-iii-europa-provincalis\/\">ports-and-forts<\/a>&#8216; imperialism.  Consequently, what we see of them are fortified staging posts (notably Hasongo) to support their navies and channel goods back to the homeland and nearly all of the people we see are military personnel more or less directly employed by the Rauataian state.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1000\" height=\"564\" data-attachment-id=\"36787\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/21\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-vb-pixel-armies-for-pixel-societies\/image-189\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-8.png?fit=1000%2C564&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1000,564\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-8.png?fit=1000%2C564&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-8.png?resize=1000%2C564&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36787\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-8.png?w=1000&amp;ssl=1 1000w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-8.png?resize=300%2C169&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-8.png?resize=768%2C433&amp;ssl=1 768w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1000px) 100vw, 1000px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Via the <a href=\"https:\/\/pillarsofeternity.fandom.com\/wiki\/Hasongo\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/pillarsofeternity.fandom.com\/wiki\/Hasongo\">Wiki<\/a>, the Rauataian main base at Hasongo (which has been better days).  While there is a port and storage here, you can very visibly see this is a military outpost first and barely a civilian settlement at all.  The contrast with the VTC outposts, which almost invariably have a large local population and lots of civilian economic activity, is marked.  The RDC is a predatory, exploitative army of conquest, whereas the VTC is a predatory, exploitative company.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Notably, as an aside, we don&#8217;t get as much information about the rest of Rauatai&#8217;s military that I recall.  Honestly, I&#8217;d think something like a core army of conscripts might make sense (given how militarized the society is described as being), with only the forces deployed permanently abroad (like the RDC) being composed of professional &#8216;long-timers.&#8217;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In contrast to the RDC which is almost an army of a foreign state, the third power really is a trading company first: the Vailian Trading Company (itself a pretty clear echo of the <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Dutch_East_India_Company\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Dutch_East_India_Company\">Dutch VOC<\/a>, down to the similar acronym).  One oddity worth noting is that the VTC is not attached to one state, but several, representing the combined efforts of the Vailian <em>Republics<\/em>, a loose confederation of city-states.  The nearest historical parallel here may actually be something like the historical <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Hanseatic_League\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Hanseatic_League\">Hanseatic League<\/a>.  But where the RDC is essentially an arm of the Rauataian state, the VTC is doing something different: <strong>private enterprise war<\/strong>.  The VTC is a company, run by a board of directors, answerable to investors in the Vailian Republics under a charter sanctions by their confederation.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"570\" height=\"380\" data-attachment-id=\"36782\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/21\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-vb-pixel-armies-for-pixel-societies\/image-188\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-7.png?fit=570%2C380&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"570,380\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-7.png?fit=570%2C380&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-7.png?resize=570%2C380&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36782\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-7.png?w=570&amp;ssl=1 570w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-7.png?resize=300%2C200&amp;ssl=1 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 570px) 100vw, 570px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">From the <a href=\"https:\/\/pillarsofeternity.fandom.com\/wiki\/Vailian_Trading_Company\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/pillarsofeternity.fandom.com\/wiki\/Vailian_Trading_Company\">Wiki<\/a>, the banner of the Vailian Trading Company.  The five stars are meant to indicate the company is recognized by all five of the major constituent Vailian Republics.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And (unlike the EEC of the <em>Elder Scrolls<\/em> series), it has its own military to secure and advance its operations, every bit as predatory as the RDC.  And what we see &#8211; and I think this makes sense for the society being presented &#8211; is a <strong>contractor-based <\/strong>military.  Indeed, we meet one of these contractors, Atello Valera, who the VTC has contracted to provide a pretty large security presence, including a number of warships.  What I do think is <strong>missing<\/strong> here is a greater array of contractors and sub-contractors.  Realistically, we might expect the regional heads of the VTC (Ignato Castol and Lueva Alvari, who split maritime and land-based operations between them) to have a few key contractors (whatever the Vailian equivalent to colonels or condottiere is), who would then have sub-contractors running individual ships or companies, with basically everyone in the chain effectively functioning as a sort of &#8216;military entrepreneur.&#8217;  We do get a real sense of that entrepreneurship from the Valeras, but they ought not be the &#8216;only game in town&#8217; on the military side.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"337\" data-attachment-id=\"36784\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/21\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-vb-pixel-armies-for-pixel-societies\/vtc-troops\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/VTC-Troops.png?fit=1316%2C433&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1316,433\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"VTC Troops\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/VTC-Troops.png?fit=1024%2C337&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/VTC-Troops.png?resize=1024%2C337&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36784\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/VTC-Troops.png?resize=1024%2C337&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/VTC-Troops.png?resize=300%2C99&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/VTC-Troops.png?resize=768%2C253&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/VTC-Troops.png?resize=1200%2C395&amp;ssl=1 1200w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/VTC-Troops.png?resize=1100%2C362&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/VTC-Troops.png?w=1316&amp;ssl=1 1316w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">From Pillars of Eternity II: Deadfire, some VTC troops.  There&#8217;s actually neat visual storytelling here.  The soldier on the far left is a company guard and by far the heaviest armed.  Next the three fellows in the one picture are Valera family soldiers, their lighter equipment fitting with the fact that Valera is a <strong>naval<\/strong> military contractor.  Meanwhile the two figures on the far right are soldiers contracted under the Bardattos and resemble more closely the &#8216;average&#8217; VTC soldier we see throughout the game.<br>The VTC, in short, has a bunch of different people contracting soldiers for different tasks, so while there&#8217;s a clear cultural similarity in their equipment, it isn&#8217;t uniform (unlike the RDC, which is quite uniform!)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That said, I think <em>Deadfire<\/em> actually does a good job of correlating militaries and societies: the Huana, Rauatai and Vailians have quite different societies and thus quite different militaries: a warrior-class military with devolved costs that fits the caste-based Huana society, a professional military with standardized state equipment and regular pay that fits the very centralized Rauataian state and finally a private enterprise warfare military using military contractors that fits the decentralized structure of the Vailian Republics.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Defending Baldur&#8217;s Gate<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now we turn to the unusual military structure of Baldur&#8217;s Gate, drawing not just on the recent <em>Baldur&#8217;s Gate 3<\/em>, but more broadly on the lore of the city as part of the Forgotten Realms setting.  We&#8217;re picking one city to focus on in part because it has become the most visible part of the Forgotten Realms&#8217; setting and also because, to be frank, the military, social and economic structures of the Forgotten Realms are kind of a mess.  That&#8217;s not necessarily a harsh criticism &#8211; this was a setting built for specific purposes (facilitating D&amp;D gameplay) rather than worldbuilding verisimilitude.  But that still makes them interesting to talk about from this perspective because they often test public assumptions about what pre-modern societies look like.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">(Note that in <em>BG3<\/em> one of the major plot-points is an effort by one of the villains to unbalance the city&#8217;s military system by adding on an army of evil metal golems to it, in a bid to take over.  I&#8217;m going to leave that part out here, because the Steel Watchers aren&#8217;t part of the stable military system of Baldur&#8217;s Gate.  Ironically, if Gortash had <em>succeeded<\/em>, the military system of Baldur&#8217;s Gate would make a lot more sense: you&#8217;d have a tyrant monarch who ruled the city by virtue of controlling its military.)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"435\" data-attachment-id=\"36797\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/21\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-vb-pixel-armies-for-pixel-societies\/image-191\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-10.png?fit=1920%2C816&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1920,816\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-10.png?fit=1024%2C435&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-10.png?resize=1024%2C435&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36797\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-10.png?resize=1024%2C435&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-10.png?resize=300%2C128&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-10.png?resize=768%2C326&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-10.png?resize=1536%2C653&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-10.png?resize=1200%2C510&amp;ssl=1 1200w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-10.png?resize=1100%2C468&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-10.png?w=1920&amp;ssl=1 1920w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Via the <a href=\"https:\/\/forgottenrealms.fandom.com\/wiki\/Baldur%27s_Gate\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/forgottenrealms.fandom.com\/wiki\/Baldur%27s_Gate\">Wiki<\/a>, a screenshot of Baldur&#8217;s Gate as it appears in Baldur&#8217;s Gate III.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Baldur&#8217;s Gate, in the setting, is a major seaside mercantile city with a large population, clearly part of a larger complex agrarian society.  Its upper-class are wealthy burghers (rather than large landowners) and it is ruled by a council of four &#8216;grand dukes&#8217; who are elected for life.<span id='easy-footnote-38-36676' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/21\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-vb-pixel-armies-for-pixel-societies\/#easy-footnote-bottom-38-36676' title='That is, in itself, an awkward political structure: civic structures that divide power like that tend to do so because they are concerned about one figure making themself king or tyrant, which &amp;#8211; if that&amp;#8217;s a thing you are concerned about &amp;#8211; you generally give them short terms of office and rotate power.  Having a four-man board with life tenure is just an open invitation for someone to spend a lifetime suborning two of the others and thereby becoming king (and then swiftly ensuring the election of their son and their cronies and so on).  By contrast, if you&amp;#8217;re willing to have a Doge act as head of state for life, you&amp;#8217;d generally only have the one of them and then have a &lt;em&gt;different&lt;\/em&gt; body with the power to police their actions (almost always including pretty explicit surveillance).  But I&amp;#8217;ve never gotten a strong sense that Baldur&amp;#8217;s Gate&amp;#8217;s &amp;#8216;Parliament of Peers&amp;#8217; acts as a strong check on the Grand Dukes.'><sup>38<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  It is also a <em>big<\/em> city by pre-modern standards:<a href=\"https:\/\/forgottenrealms.fandom.com\/wiki\/Baldur's_Gate\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/forgottenrealms.fandom.com\/wiki\/Baldur's_Gate\"> the wiki figures<\/a> a population around 120,000 or so in the urban area.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now one thing in the lore is that because the city has a natural defensive position (it is located on an inlet) and because it has a very strong outer wall built by the heroic figure Balduran, for whom the city is named, that it is generally peaceful and does not necessarily require a large army.  The problem here of course is that Baldur&#8217;s Gate doesn&#8217;t just need to defend the city core, <strong>it needs to defend the agricultural hinterland that feeds it<\/strong>.  This is a common problem in fantasy worldbuilding &#8211; <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2019\/07\/12\/collections-the-lonely-city-part-i-the-ideal-city\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"474\">cities divorced from the agricultural lands they require to survive<\/a>.  Nor can this issue be salvaged by saying the Baldur&#8217;s Gate is a city that lives on trade and such.  These are <em><strong>agrarian<\/strong><\/em> societies, which is to say that<a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2020\/07\/24\/collections-bread-how-did-they-make-it-part-i-farmers\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"3822\"> food production<\/a> (via farming) makes up the lion&#8217;s share of the economy, <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2021\/03\/05\/collections-clothing-how-did-they-make-it-part-i-high-fiber\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"6351\">with textile production<\/a> (also via pastoralism, agriculture and peasant labor) making up quite a lot of the rest.  Consequently, in the absence of industrial production, there&#8217;s no amount of economic activity you can be doing in the remaining small slice (think 10-20% at most) of the economy that is going to allow a city to <em>import<\/em> all of its food and fabric.  The <em>only<\/em> activity that can manage this feat is <em><strong>empire<\/strong><\/em>: the (violent) extraction if <em>someone else&#8217;s<\/em> food and fabric, in which case you still have a hinterland, it is simply held by force and coercion.<span id='easy-footnote-39-36676' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/21\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-vb-pixel-armies-for-pixel-societies\/#easy-footnote-bottom-39-36676' title='This is, for instance, how classical Athens manages to be such a large city that it outstrips the agricultural production of its &amp;#8211; also quite large! &amp;#8211; hinterland of Attica.  &lt;strong&gt;The Athenians have an empire&lt;\/strong&gt; for much of the fifth century and it is the wealth of tribute that enables them to import food and live &amp;#8216;like an island&amp;#8217; during the Peloponnesian War.  The same is true for the ability of certain ancient cities (Carthage, Alexandria, Rome) to grow to enormous size: they were first imperial capitals and then centers of imperial administration in a larger empire, so the economic activity that powered them was the collection and movement of taxes.'><sup>39<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  <strong>The city needs a hinterland<\/strong> <strong>and it needs to be defended<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That said, Baldur&#8217;s Gate does have an army &#8211; indeed it has one-and-a-half armies, in practice.  Order in the upper city is kept by an armed constabulary called <strong>The Watch<\/strong> which, <a href=\"https:\/\/forgottenrealms.fandom.com\/wiki\/The_Watch\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/forgottenrealms.fandom.com\/wiki\/The_Watch\">according to the Wiki<\/a>, has about a thousand members, of whom perhaps 300 or so are on active duty at any given time, making this effectively a civic militia.  What keeps the Watch from acting fully like a military is that they are not empowered to operate outside of the city walls.  Amusingly to me, this force of &#8211; at any given moment &#8211; 300 active soldiers and 700 or so reservists, somehow rates a high command with <em>six<\/em> major generals and <em>two<\/em> more senior generals despite being no bigger than a battalion (which would normally by commanded by just one major or captain in our world).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Instead, the main force of Baldur&#8217;s Gate&#8217;s defense is the <strong>Flaming Fist<\/strong>, a mercenary company kept essentially on permanent retainer by the city.  It is a standing, effectively professional force, organized on the employment principle, consisting of &#8211; <a href=\"https:\/\/forgottenrealms.fandom.com\/wiki\/Flaming_Fist\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/forgottenrealms.fandom.com\/wiki\/Flaming_Fist\">according to the wiki<\/a> &#8211; approximately 2,000 soldiers (with a peak strength of 6,000).  The Flaming Fist was founded by a grand duke and it seems like its leader (the marshal) is generally one of the four grand dukes that governs the city.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"920\" height=\"675\" data-attachment-id=\"36798\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/21\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-vb-pixel-armies-for-pixel-societies\/image-192\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-11.png?fit=920%2C675&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"920,675\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-11.png?fit=920%2C675&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-11.png?resize=920%2C675&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36798\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-11.png?w=920&amp;ssl=1 920w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-11.png?resize=300%2C220&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-11.png?resize=768%2C563&amp;ssl=1 768w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 920px) 100vw, 920px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Via<a href=\"https:\/\/forgottenrealms.fandom.com\/wiki\/Flaming_Fist\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/forgottenrealms.fandom.com\/wiki\/Flaming_Fist\"> the Wiki<\/a>, the Flaming Fist doing some recruitment.<br>It is striking how heavy and expensive their equipment is.  Maintaining this organization on a permanent basis would be <strong>extraordinarily expensive<\/strong>, which if I was a citizen of Baldur&#8217;s Gate would get really frustrating, because as far as I can tell the Flaming Fist&#8217;s job is to spend the first two acts of every story about the place losing until the heroes show up and save everyone.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And there are a few problems here.  The first is a problem that afflicts a lot of Forgotten Realms armies which is <em><strong>this is not enough army<\/strong><\/em>.  A city-state with more than 100,000 people in the core urban area certainly ought to be able to muster up a much larger army.  Medieval Ghent had a population by the late Middle Ages around 50,000 and was able to <a href=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Battle_of_Beverhoutsveld\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/en.wikipedia.org\/wiki\/Battle_of_Beverhoutsveld\">put something on the order of 8,000 men on the field to fight against the city militia of Bruges in 1382<\/a> and they were <em>outnumbered<\/em> by the Bruges militia.  Baldur&#8217;s Gate is well over twice the size and yet has a far smaller total force.  Indeed, its fairly close in size to Classical Athens (especially if we account for the missing rural countryside a city of that size must have), which was able to deploy more than 12,000 men against Syracuse, supported by roughly 200 triremes (so around 40,000 rowers) and was able to <em>recover<\/em> from the total loss of that force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But that size problem gets us to an underlying problem in matching up this type of society, its resources and security needs with the kind of army it has.  If we put the Watch aside for now, the primary defense force for Baldur&#8217;s Gate are the Flaming Fists and while the lore describes these fellows as a mercenary company because they sometimes take jobs outside of Baldur&#8217;s Gate, they&#8217;re really a standing army.  No one is going to mistake your mercenary company for an independent outfit if it is <em>also<\/em> traditional that the marshal of the company is also one of the four elected leaders of the city.  That&#8217;s not an independent mercenary company being hired, that&#8217;s a political alliance <em>with Baldur&#8217;s Gate<\/em> enabling another community to gain the protection of its army.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But you may recall as we discussed recruitment and payment principles that the state-supplied (the Flaming Fists have standardized equipment), full-time, long-service professional army is <strong>almost exclusively a creature of large, well-administered <em>empires<\/em><\/strong> and there&#8217;s a reason for that.  For one, only such a large and complex state is capable of mobilizing the resources necessary for such an expensive system and equally only large empires have the kind of round-the-clock security needs to justify one.  That is, after all, the feature that makes professional armies so expensive: they have to be fed, paid, housed and equipped in wartime as well as peacetime &#8211; there is no option to simply send the men back to their homes and jobs.  Thus, while smaller states might maintain a small standing force &#8211; a prince&#8217;s retinue, a small elite unit or a constabulary force &#8211; their military is not <em>built<\/em> around that force, it is built around <strong>forces which can be expanded and contracted to fit changing security needs<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As an aside, this is part of why we can&#8217;t just say the Flaming Fist function basically as a condottieri force.  Italian states raised condottieri in response to specific military threats &#8211; they did not maintain them continuously in peacetime.  Indeed, one of the key advantages of condottieri was precisely that: you could pay them in war time and <em>not pay them<\/em> in peace time, though of course they were also <em>famously<\/em> untrustworthy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The Flaming Fists also do not fit the <em><strong>political<\/strong><\/em> structure of Baldur&#8217;s Gate.  There is a reason that states which do use standing armies <strong>tend to have a <em>unitary<\/em> power structure<\/strong>, like a monarchy, because the very nature of a long-service standing professional army is that whoever wields that army <em><strong>is the state<\/strong><\/em>.  Baldur&#8217;s Gate is ruled by four high officials who serve for life, three of whom collectively share control over a gendarmerie of 300-part timers and one of whom has control over and the loyalty of a standing for of at least 2,000 professional full-time soldiers.  <strong>That is a system that <em>becomes<\/em> a monarchy <em>very fast<\/em><\/strong>.  <em>Political<\/em> power here is fragmented, but for some reason <em>military<\/em> power is not, which is hardly a stable structure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And finally, the Flaming Fists do not fit the <strong><em>social<\/em><\/strong> structure of Baldur&#8217;s Gate either.  This is a city dominated by a class of wealthy burghers (the &#8216;patriars,&#8217; a clear riff off of Roman patricians), whose wealth mostly comes from trade or non-agricultural business.  That&#8217;s <em>fine<\/em> &#8211; there really should be a landholding aristocracy <em>somewhere<\/em> too &#8211; but the problem is that this class is nowhere represented in the military structure.  It&#8217;s the ruling class, whose interests the military system is intended to protect yet these families do not make up the elite of the military, nor its officer class.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We can effectively go in two directions &#8216;fixing&#8217; Baldur&#8217;s Gate: we can make the society fit the military or the military fit the society.  In the first direction: a city which has a professional military force that answers to just one guy (the marshal of the Flaming Fists) isn&#8217;t going to be an oligarchic quasi-democracy.  It is going to be some kind of autocracy: the marshal is going to be the autocrat who sets the rules, <em>de iure<\/em> (as a monarchy) or <em>de facto<\/em> (as a tyranny).  In this case, the weakness of the Watch makes sense: this was the city&#8217;s old militia, now sidelined because it would threaten the power of a tyrant-marshal, who is probably also busy <em>breaking<\/em> the power of the old ruling class (the patriars) and consolidating their wealth into his own political network.  Alternately, we might get a sort of monarchy-within-bounds as we see in Venice and to an extent (with its two kings) in classical Sparta: a single leader does have command over the military, but the rest of the political system is heavily focused on constraining that leader, to the point that they have officials whose sole job is to watch their every move and there are other political institutions empowered to unilaterally remove a marshal who behaves badly.  Even then, a purely professional force seems like a recipe for a self-coup in which the marshal sidelines everyone else because he alone commands the <em>loyalty<\/em> of the Flaming Fists, whatever the political system may say.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The alternative is to come up with a military system that fits the society we see: a somewhat representative oligarchy (with some democratic elements) primarily lead by a handful of elite families that wield outsized wealth.  That kind of society has little need for a large standing army at all: the people <em>with goons<\/em> are <em>also<\/em> the people who wield political power and so the system they need is one that catches petty thieves and resolves disputes between each other, not a system to garrison whole districts of the city.  The Flaming Fists are <em>unnecessary<\/em> for such a society (though the Watch as a gendarmerie which serves the collective interests of the patriars might survive).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now those elite families <em><strong>could<\/strong><\/em> tax themselves extremely harshly in order to maintain a meaningful standing army but <em>why would they?<\/em>  Instead, we ought to expect that Baldur&#8217;s Gate would defend itself with a civic militia that mirrors its own social structure: the very poor are excluded (and probably don&#8217;t vote), while the bulk of the burghers fight as infantry (and have some token political participation) and the patriars serve as officers and cavalry (and have maximum political roles).  Because the patriars &#8211; or the middling burghers &#8211; would rather not tax <em>themselves<\/em>, they&#8217;re going to devolve military costs: everyone buys their own kit and serves based on wealth.  That system might take the form of the sort of conscription-based civic armies we see in Greece and Rome or it might take the form of medieval civic militias, like the aforementioned <em>schuttersgilde<\/em>.  If the latter, we should expect those military guilds to be <em>major<\/em> political actors in the city&#8217;s governance, either <em>de iure<\/em> (they have fixed places on the ruling council or whatever) or <em>de facto<\/em> (their members just tend always to get elected).  Crucially, unlike the Flaming Fists, they wouldn&#8217;t be <em><strong>external<\/strong><\/em> to the city&#8217;s class system, but tightly integrated into it.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Conclusions<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This series has ended up rather a lot longer-winded than I intended, but what I hope it has served to demonstrate first is that not all societies have the <em>same<\/em> sorts of armies.  My critiques here have focused mostly on complex agrarian societies, because this was a series for worldbuilders and that is most of what fantasy worlds get made out of, but of course the armies of <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2021\/01\/08\/collections-that-dothraki-horde-part-iv-screamers-and-howlers\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"5675\">nomadic pastoral peoples <\/a>or hunter gatherers are <em>really different<\/em> as well.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Importantly, <strong>societies do not pick their military structures at random<\/strong>, nor are they necessarily free to pick and choose whatever military system they like.  Instead, <strong>military systems<\/strong>, which are defined by the <em><strong>interaction <\/strong><\/em>of principles of recruitment, methods of mobilization, systems of equipment, payment and supply and sources of cohesion <strong>are generally long-standing legacy institutions that emerge alongside larger social structures<\/strong>.  Individual leaders are rarely at leisure to change or redefine these systems (though it does happen sometimes).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Perhaps most importantly, these systems are invariably tightly connected to the structure of a society and its political organization.  <strong>No army can help but recreate its civilian social structures on the battlefield<\/strong>.  So a society in which the dominant political and economic force is a mass of middling farmers who elect their leaders are likely to form armies composed of a mass of infantrymen who elect their generals.  A society in which a handful of elites lord over the disenfranchised and largely impoverished peasantry is likely to have armies centered on mounted elites, with infantry that is limited and unreliable at best.  More complex forms of organization, like private enterprise war with military contractors or standing, long-service professional armies, demand states with matching levels of revenues and complexity as well as a set of security needs which demand these expensive, complex and difficult solutions to the problem of raising military force.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">While those rules may feel constraining, I think &#8211; and I hope in this post and the last, I&#8217;ve shown &#8211; they can also, for the worldbuilder, offer storytelling opportunities.  After all, if armies reproduce their society&#8217;s social structures &#8211; often more explicitly than the civilian society itself &#8211; that means any time an army is &#8216;on screen,&#8217; it provides an opportunity to say something about the underlying society.  An observer who noticed, for instance that British military leadership in the early 1900s was generally drawn from the same handful of schools would have learned something about the structure of power in British society.  The same might be said if the person glanced at Europe and noticed that despite its modern industrial economy, most of the high military command of early 1900s Germany in the first World War continued to be drawn from the old Junker class (visible because of the &#8216;von&#8217; in their names), a trend which continued into the second.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And indeed, someone who glanced at the modern American military and noticed that American officers functionally always have college degrees, that high ranking officers generally have advanced degrees and that American enlisted personnel generally do not have either will have learned something about the structure of class, power and wealth in the United States: our ruling class is defined more by <em>where you went to school<\/em> and <em>for how long<\/em> than by your last name or hereditary titles (which we do not have).  And the military cannot help but replicate that structure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The same is equally true in fictional worlds.  Of course one shortcut to producing these kinds of interesting linkages is to adopt a historical pattern wholesale by imitating a real polity and making modest changes.  That said, it can be equally interesting to think about the implications of odd combinations, especially for societies in transition.  Because, of course, societies are never static things and as they change &#8211; be that change swift or slow &#8211; their military structures will be forced to change with them, or else will be bent and deformed by the attempt not to change.  In fiction, civil-military <em>failure<\/em> can be as interesting as success.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And in the end, a society whose institutions are interwoven and interlinked &#8211; as all real societies are &#8211; is just more interesting to read about than a fictional society which is a mere jumble of tropes.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This is the second half of the final part (I, IIa, IIb, III, IVa, IVb, Va, Vb) of our apparently five-part series laying out some general guidelines for how pre-modern armies are organized, with fictional worldbuilding and historical patterns in mind. Last time we started checking some fictional militaries against the general patterns we&#8217;ve laid &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/21\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-vb-pixel-armies-for-pixel-societies\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Collections: Pre-Modern Armies for Worldbuilders, Part Vb: Pixel Armies for Pixel Societies<\/span> <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":156979701,"featured_media":36770,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"advanced_seo_description":"","jetpack_seo_html_title":"","jetpack_seo_noindex":false,"jetpack_seo_schema_type":"","_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_wpcom_ai_launchpad_first_post":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"{title}\n\n{excerpt}\n\n{url}","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"_wpas_customize_per_network":false,"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[12763,716950168],"tags":[716950581,716950580,716950575,716949896,716950582,716950578,716950577,151916,716950579,716950576,1914],"class_list":["post-36676","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-collections","category-how-to-civic-governance","tag-baldurs-gate","tag-deadfire","tag-elder-scrolls","tag-military-history","tag-military-organizations","tag-morrowind","tag-oblivion","tag-oh-no","tag-pillars-of-eternity","tag-skyrim","tag-video-games"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/paWMNs-9xy","jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/Morrowind-Imperial-Legion1.png?fit=1607%2C716&ssl=1","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/36676","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/156979701"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=36676"}],"version-history":[{"count":100,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/36676\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":36813,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/36676\/revisions\/36813"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/36770"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=36676"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=36676"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=36676"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}},{"id":36632,"date":"2026-08-14T11:29:32","date_gmt":"2026-08-14T15:29:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/?p=36632"},"modified":"2026-08-14T11:29:32","modified_gmt":"2026-08-14T15:29:32","slug":"fireside-friday-august-14-2026-on-financing-pre-modern-navies","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/14\/fireside-friday-august-14-2026-on-financing-pre-modern-navies\/","title":{"rendered":"Fireside Friday, August 14, 2026 (On Financing Pre-Modern Navies)"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Hey folks, fireside this week as I get ready for the start of a new semester!  For this week, I wanted to talk briefly about the wrinkles that <strong>financing <em>navies<\/em> poses<\/strong> with regards to our worldbuilding primer on pre-modern armies.  &#8220;what about navies?&#8221; has been a frequent question in comments and from patrons.  Now a <em>full<\/em> answer to that question, I think, would require its own series &#8211; naval finance is complex &#8211; but I thought I would unspool a shorter &#8216;off the cuff&#8217; answer.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"471\" data-attachment-id=\"36665\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/14\/fireside-friday-august-14-2026-on-financing-pre-modern-navies\/pxl_20260811_040314292\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/PXL_20260811_040314292.jpg?fit=4080%2C1877&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"4080,1877\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"PXL_20260811_040314292\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/PXL_20260811_040314292.jpg?fit=1024%2C471&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/PXL_20260811_040314292.jpg?resize=1024%2C471&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36665\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/PXL_20260811_040314292.jpg?resize=1024%2C471&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/PXL_20260811_040314292.jpg?resize=300%2C138&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/PXL_20260811_040314292.jpg?resize=768%2C353&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/PXL_20260811_040314292.jpg?resize=1536%2C707&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/PXL_20260811_040314292.jpg?resize=2048%2C942&amp;ssl=1 2048w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/PXL_20260811_040314292.jpg?resize=1200%2C552&amp;ssl=1 1200w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/PXL_20260811_040314292.jpg?resize=1100%2C506&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/PXL_20260811_040314292.jpg?w=2200&amp;ssl=1 2200w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/PXL_20260811_040314292.jpg?w=3300&amp;ssl=1 3300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Nap time after a day of hard catwork (Ollie on the left, Percy on the right).  One amusing cat fact is that Ollie and Percy are not litter-mates (Ollie is about a month older), despite their similar appearance.  However, they were raised at the same shelter together as kittens, so they <strong>don&#8217;t know they&#8217;re not litter-mates<\/strong> and instead behave very much like they are (such as napping together).<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The first distinction we need to draw really clearly for this question is the difference between <strong>purpose-built<\/strong> warships and <strong>multi-purpose <\/strong>ships turned to war.  For substantial chunks of human history, it has been possible to be competitive in naval warfare using mostly the same sort of ships one would use for commerce.  In the Mediterranean and Atlantic worlds (where my knowledge is best), this was broadly the case through the bronze age into the early iron age (so to c. 700 BC or so), then stopped being the case for classical antiquity.  For much of the Middle Ages, multi-purpose fleets are more common but we still have some purpose-built warships in the Mediterranean.  Coming into the Age of Sail (c. 1450-c. 1850), multi-purpose sailing ships make up the bulk of military ships early on; starting in the late 1600s those multi-purpose ships start getting pushed out of the line-of-battle for major actions, leading to the primarily purpose-built navies of the 1700s.  Modern navies are, of course, functionally entirely purpose built.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This distinction matters because purpose-built warships are <em><strong>really expensive<\/strong><\/em>.  As a general rule <strong>only states can build purpose-built navies<\/strong>, so in periods where purpose-built warships dominate, non-state polities are often broadly incapable of challenging state societies at sea.  By contrast, periods where, for technological reasons, multi-purpose ships dominate warfare, non-state societies can be major players at sea (e.g. vikings), because the cost of ships can be effectively devolved by simply repurposing privately held commercial ships.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What most folks, I imagine, have already sussed out is that what makes naval warfare different is that <strong>capital costs<\/strong> (something we were able to largely talk <em>around<\/em> with armies) suddenly become very important. And that is certainly <em>true<\/em>, although here there are some pretty substantial differences based on the style of ships and the era of naval technology we&#8217;re dealing with.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">To draw the point, let&#8217;s compare a purpose-built warship from antiquity (a trireme) with a purpose-built warship from the Age of Sail (a frigate, say). A classical Greek trireme displaced around 45 tons and had a crew of 200. The cost of building a trireme from scratch was probably just shy of a <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2025\/01\/03\/collections-coinage-and-the-tyranny-of-fantasy-gold\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"27233\">talent in silver<\/a><span id='easy-footnote-40-36632' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/14\/fireside-friday-august-14-2026-on-financing-pre-modern-navies\/#easy-footnote-bottom-40-36632' title='D. Pritchard, &lt;em&gt;Public Spending and Democracy in Classical Athens&lt;\/em&gt; (2015) figures 5,000 drachma (a talent is 6,000) which I think is roughly right.'><sup>40<\/sup><\/a><\/span> which is a <em>lot of money<\/em> (a talent might represent about 20 years of work for an unskilled laborer, assuming ~300 working days a year). Sails and fittings probably added around 2,000 more drachmae (1\/3rd a talent). <em>Expensive<\/em>. And the minimum useful fleets of even small <em>poleis<\/em> would have a few dozen of these ships (big fleets with 100+ triremes for major wars appear frequently). So the &#8216;minimum expenditure&#8217; to even <em>play the game<\/em> of naval power in the junior varsity league probably approaches something like 50 talents of silver or more.  A state (or coalition of states) that wanted to really push for naval dominance needed to be able to drop hundreds of talents on ship construction, sums just wildly beyond the financial resources of most city-states.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">You can start to see why only states play this game.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But &#8211; and here is the wild comparison &#8211; <strong>shipbuilding was not the major cost of ancient naval warfare<\/strong>. <em>Crews<\/em> were. A trireme has a crew of around 200 men, a mix of a handful of trained specialists (the <em>hyperesia<\/em>) and a bunch of rowers, often drawn from poorer households. These fellows need to be paid in order to support themselves and you need to pay <em>a lot of them<\/em>. The maximum field army that a <em>poleis<\/em> could field, for the largest <em>poleis<\/em>, was rarely much more than 10,000 men. But the 155 ships the Athenians deployed to the Battle of Arginusae (406) would have required 31,000 rowers! The <em>330<\/em> ships that the Romans deployed to the Battle of Ecnomus (256), the largest naval battle the Mediterranean has ever seen (to the present!) probably demanded something like 140,000 crew. Thucydides straight up tells us that the cost of crew wages for a trireme was one talent per ship per month (Thuc. 3.17; 6.8; 6.31; 8.29). <strong>At that price, the cost of the crew would exceed the cost of the <em>ship<\/em> in just two months<\/strong>.<span id='easy-footnote-41-36632' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/14\/fireside-friday-august-14-2026-on-financing-pre-modern-navies\/#easy-footnote-bottom-41-36632' title='At that rate, the pay for a rower was a drachma a day.  I don&amp;#8217;t think anyone believes Roman rowers were paid this much (it would have been higher pay than for the higher-status marines on the ships!), but the cost of naval warfare in the First Punic War still bankrupted both Rome and Carthage (the latter a &lt;em&gt;famously&lt;\/em&gt; wealthy city).'><sup>41<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So the really crushing cost of ancient fleets is not the ships, but the rowers: only large, well-financed states were able to support the cost of <em>so many rowers<\/em>.<span id='easy-footnote-42-36632' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/14\/fireside-friday-august-14-2026-on-financing-pre-modern-navies\/#easy-footnote-bottom-42-36632' title='For more on this, see, uh, me, &amp;#8220;Strategy and Cost: Carthaginian Naval Strategy in the First Punic War Reappraised&amp;#8221; &lt;em&gt;Historia&lt;\/em&gt; 69.4 (2020).'><sup>42<\/sup><\/a><\/span><\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But that cost structure is not universal &#8211; it changes over time.  To get to our comparison, we can use hull displacement (the weight of the ship) as a lazy proxy for the capital cost of the ship as compared to the crew cost of the ship.  Our trireme displaces c. 45 tons and has ~200 crew, so about 4.5 men per each ton of ship.  By contrast, the USS Constitution (1797), an Age of Sail heavy frigate, displaces 2,200 tons and had an ideal maximum crew of 475, roughly 4.5 tons of ship per man (please note the reversal!).  In short there&#8217;s something like <em>twenty times<\/em> more <em>ship<\/em> per sailor in an age of sail frigate than in a classical trireme.  <strong>Capital costs follow suit<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In fact, of course, this understates the point because not every ton of displacement is made the same. A trireme&#8217;s displacement comes to about 40,000kg of which roughly 150kg or so would be the big metal part: the bronze ram. So that displacement is 0.375% super-expensive bronze, with the rest being cheaper (note: cheap<em>er<\/em>; not cheap) wood, sail-cloth, rope and so on. USS Constitution was a 44-gun (often &#8216;over-gunned&#8217; above that number) frigate. <a href=\"https:\/\/www.google.com\/url?sa=t&amp;source=web&amp;rct=j&amp;opi=89978449&amp;url=https:\/\/ussconstitutionmuseum.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/12\/18-20thC-USSC-Guns.pdf&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjZl8X0hpmWAxVOFVkFHQ4iNRcQFnoECCQQAQ&amp;usg=AOvVaw2-rc01oA8z_-uM0TW9QqhD\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/www.google.com\/url?sa=t&amp;source=web&amp;rct=j&amp;opi=89978449&amp;url=https:\/\/ussconstitutionmuseum.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/2015\/12\/18-20thC-USSC-Guns.pdf&amp;ved=2ahUKEwjZl8X0hpmWAxVOFVkFHQ4iNRcQFnoECCQQAQ&amp;usg=AOvVaw2-rc01oA8z_-uM0TW9QqhD\">In her initial loadout<\/a>, that was thirty 24-pounder long guns (barrels at 5,556lbs per) and twenty 32-pound carronades (barrels at 2,222lbs per; carronades are the &#8216;sawed off shotgun&#8217; version of a naval gun), so that&#8217;s 211,120lbs (95,762kg) of gun. Constitution has more <em>gun<\/em> than a trireme had <em>ship<\/em>. But critically, her gun complement represents close to 5% of her total displacement. So not only is there a lot more <em>ship<\/em> to Constitution, overall by percentage a lot more of that ship is <em>expensive metal<\/em> rather than cheap timber.<span id='easy-footnote-43-36632' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/14\/fireside-friday-august-14-2026-on-financing-pre-modern-navies\/#easy-footnote-bottom-43-36632' title='Terminology notes: Ships do not have cannon, they have guns &amp;#8211; what is a cannon on land is magically and instantly transmogrified into a gun the moment it is placed on a ship. I don&amp;#8217;t make the rules. And yes, I am sufficiently old-fashioned that I still refer to ships as &amp;#8216;she&amp;#8217; &amp;#8211; I taught US Naval History for a few years in classes that had a fair number of NROTC cadets and so it made sense to adopt the US Navy&amp;#8217;s preferred form here and in the Navy ships are still she\/her rather than it. Although no one tell Pete Hegseth that his navy has &lt;em&gt;pronouns&lt;\/em&gt; or he might try to take those away too.'><sup>43<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  <strong>So capital costs end up as a <em>much larger<\/em> part of an early modern navy&#8217;s expenses compared to an ancient one<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">You can start to see why the question of naval finance would require its own series, perhaps written by someone deeper into naval matters (especially medieval and early modern) than I.  I can do a decent job with <em>ancient<\/em> navies, though, and we may do that at some point.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In any event, to summarize: <strong>capital costs<\/strong> are much more important for navies than armies in the pre-modern, but <em>how much<\/em> more important varies a lot depending on the period and the kind of navy in question.  For navies that use multi-purpose ships, those capital costs can be devolved onto civilian ship owners, enabling weak states and non-state polities to be naval players, but for periods where purpose-built warships are the rule, the shattering expensive of having to build large navies <em>that do nothing but fight<\/em> (and so the costs cannot easily be devolved onto their civilian owners because they do not have any) basically demands a large, complex and relatively financially sophisticated state.  Naval warfare thus often ends up as a game that only the largest or most efficient states can play at scale, in contrast to armies.  Everybody has an army, but not everyone can afford a navy.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That&#8217;s going to come up again in another post I am planning, a military theory primer looking at the role the US Navy plays in making the global economy work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">On to <strong>Recommendations<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">First off, my own stuff: I was on a slew of podcasts lately.  I talked about Christopher Nolan&#8217;s <em>The Odyssey<\/em> on<a href=\"https:\/\/normalmen.podbean.com\/e\/episode-68-i-see-sea-people\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/normalmen.podbean.com\/e\/episode-68-i-see-sea-people\/\"> the <em>Normal Men<\/em> podcast<\/a> and I talked about the right-wing authoritarian obsession with J.R.R. Tolkien (and how he would have despised them)<a href=\"https:\/\/podcasts.apple.com\/us\/podcast\/chud-of-the-rings-w-bret-devereaux\/id1888647397?i=1000781945221\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/podcasts.apple.com\/us\/podcast\/chud-of-the-rings-w-bret-devereaux\/id1888647397?i=1000781945221\"> on the <em>Fighting Fascism<\/em> podcast<\/a>.  I also had a<a href=\"https:\/\/podcasts.apple.com\/us\/podcast\/blah-226-the-rise-and-fall-of-the\/id493837433?i=1000783005300\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/podcasts.apple.com\/us\/podcast\/blah-226-the-rise-and-fall-of-the\/id493837433?i=1000783005300\"> grand talk with Stefan Sasse over at the <em>Boiled Leather Audio Hour<\/em><\/a> talking about the <em>Rise and Fall of the Galatic Empire<\/em> (from Star Wars) and how Star Wars imagines totlitarian regimes.  Finally, as I write this, I <em><strong>just<\/strong><\/em> recorded an episode of <em>The Rest is History<\/em> with Tom Holland on the (lack of any) Marian reforms, which is set to come out in early September, so keep an eye out for that.  On to better stuff that isn&#8217;t mine.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This week also brings a <a href=\"https:\/\/pasts-imperfect.ghost.io\/pasts-imperfect-8-13-26\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/pasts-imperfect.ghost.io\/pasts-imperfect-8-13-26\/\">new issue of <em>Pasts Imperfect<\/em> <\/a>with a wide range of interesting bits, including a discussion of famed novelist Zora Neale Hurston&#8217;s idiosyncratic take on Herod the Great, now published eighty odd years after her passing.  It also features links to a wide range of neat history stuff, from the possibility to polar bears in the Colosseum, a new exhibit on medieval manuscripts at the Getty Center, isotopic testing on an Archaic mass grave in Attica, the difficulties of UNESCO World Heritage sites caught in geopolitical power struggles and more.  If you are not regularly checking in to <em>Pasts Imperfect<\/em>, you should be!<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In security\/defense news, I wanted to <a href=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/us-news\/2026\/aug\/12\/uss-abraham-lincoln-overboard-extended-deployment\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/www.theguardian.com\/us-news\/2026\/aug\/12\/uss-abraham-lincoln-overboard-extended-deployment\">highlight recent reporting<\/a> about the USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72), deployed in the Indian Ocean in support of the operations against Iran.  It is all too easy sometimes, when presidents launch wars far away, to forget that those wars must be waged by people who do not have a choice if they go or not when ordered.  As a result of political decisions, the Lincoln ended up deployed at sea for over 260 days with just <em>two days<\/em> in port &#8211; the sort of deployment one might expect in a major, existential war.  My views on <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/03\/25\/miscellanea-the-war-in-iran\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"34358\">the abject stupidity of the Iran War are well known<\/a>, but the absolutely appalling conditions on the Abraham Lincoln equally speak to poor planning, logistics and strategic incoherence of a war that we are told will either result in civilization destruction or world peace on any given Friday (and one imagines that whiplash is part of why the Abe Lincoln has remained deployed for so long, since without a plan the ship couldn&#8217;t be recalled nor replaced).  The Lincoln is now set to be relieved by the USS George Washington (CVN-73), but the debacle speaks to the deep readiness &#8216;hole&#8217; developing as a result of this war (alongside similarly<a href=\"https:\/\/thehill.com\/policy\/defense\/6018878-trump-us-munitions-stockpile-iran\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/thehill.com\/policy\/defense\/6018878-trump-us-munitions-stockpile-iran\/\"> dire reporting concerning munitions levels<\/a>).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This week&#8217;s <strong>book recommendation<\/strong> was a pretty easy choice: Kori Schake, <em><a href=\"https:\/\/amzn.to\/4gwaF2U\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/amzn.to\/4gwaF2U\">The State and the Soldier: A History of Civil-Military Relations in the United States<\/a> <\/em>(2025).  The title, of course, recalls Samuel Huntington&#8217;s famous <em>The Soldier and the State<\/em> (1957), which has long been essentially the Bible of American civil-military relations despite being <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2025\/07\/04\/collections-the-american-civil-military-relationship\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2025\/07\/04\/collections-the-american-civil-military-relationship\/\">quite substantially flawed<\/a>.  Schake is invoking Huntington but neither reprising him nor attempting merely to repair him &#8211; indeed, Schake spends half a chapter illuminating and rejecting the fundamental errors in Huntington&#8217;s vision of civil-military relations, a part of the book that I now wish would be appended to the end of every copy of <em>The Soldier and the State<\/em> sold or issued.  Instead, Schake is embarking on a ground-up analysis of the history of American civil-military relations and the unique structures and strains it experienced.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The resulting book is a lot thinner and more readable than Huntington and also frankly a lot better reasoned.  Schake&#8217;s narrative is a chronological walkthrough of American civil-military relations, reviewing both the crises that happened (the Newburgh conspiracy, Jefferson&#8217;s creation of a small, clqiuish and politicized officer corps, Grant&#8217;s hard decisions in the constitutional crisis of 1866-7, <em>everything<\/em> about Douglas &#8220;Dugout Doug&#8221; MacArthur, etc)<span id='easy-footnote-44-36632' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/14\/fireside-friday-august-14-2026-on-financing-pre-modern-navies\/#easy-footnote-bottom-44-36632' title='To be blunt, the problem with Dugout Doug &amp;#8211; for both his actual military leadership (his defense of the Philippines was&amp;#8230;not good) and his messy civil-military issues &amp;#8211; is not that Truman fired him (Truman was right to fire him) but that no one had fired him far earlier than that.'><sup>44<\/sup><\/a><\/span> as well as (as Schake puts it), &#8220;the dogs that mostly didn&#8217;t bark.&#8221;  Schake ends up a chapter appropriately titled, &#8220;How Worried Should We Be?&#8221; which both lays out the considerable grounds for concern as well as the steps that might be taken to reduce the strain.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Fundamentally, Schake&#8217;s view, which I am largely persuaded of, is that both now and historically, most of the danger in the American civil-military relationship has come from the &#8216;civil&#8217; side, particularly political leadership.  The military often maintains very high public trust because the public understands it as a &#8220;disciplined, merit-based organization obedient to the Constitution.&#8221;  But precisely <em>because<\/em> it maintains very high public trust, &#8220;It is a truth universally acknowledge that politicians will hide behind the military for as long as the military is more popular than are the politicians.&#8221;  In short, the core problem the military faces in its civil-military relation is an old one: the effort by politicians to pull the military more completely into the realm of politics, to use it for political gain, against political rivals either rhetorically and symbolically or &#8211; more darkly &#8211; directly and kinetically.  As Schake notes, in both scholarship and public discourse, this is treated as the military&#8217;s problem, but most of the solution for a problem <em>created by civilian leadership<\/em> cannot lie within the military.  The public needs to take more ownership of their half of the civil-military relationship (somewhat ironically, this book was coming out at almost the exact time I wrote my essay on the American civil-military relationship and so neither Schake nor I was aware what the other was writing, yet I think Schake ends up fairly close &#8211; with greater detail, skill and vision &#8211; <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2025\/07\/04\/collections-the-american-civil-military-relationship\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2025\/07\/04\/collections-the-american-civil-military-relationship\/\">to my concept of the &#8216;civil-military bargain.&#8217;<\/a>)<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Perhaps most importantly (and in some contrast to Huntington and the other scholarship she cites), Schake&#8217;s book is very readable and very accessible, making it a perfect device for educating the public about this issue.  And precisely <em>because<\/em> the public needs to take more ownership over the civil-military relationship, needs to think harder about how to maintain the military as defenders of the constitutional order and the rule of law, rather than tyrants over it, or bystanders as it crumbles, this is a book that is easy to recommend.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>Hey folks, fireside this week as I get ready for the start of a new semester! For this week, I wanted to talk briefly about the wrinkles that financing navies poses with regards to our worldbuilding primer on pre-modern armies. &#8220;what about navies?&#8221; has been a frequent question in comments and from patrons. Now a &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/14\/fireside-friday-august-14-2026-on-financing-pre-modern-navies\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Fireside Friday, August 14, 2026 (On Financing Pre-Modern Navies)<\/span> <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":156979701,"featured_media":36665,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"advanced_seo_description":"","jetpack_seo_html_title":"","jetpack_seo_noindex":false,"jetpack_seo_schema_type":"","_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_wpcom_ai_launchpad_first_post":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"{title}\n\n{excerpt}\n\n{url}","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"_wpas_customize_per_network":false,"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[1319178],"tags":[716950431,716950082,716950572,716950574,716950573],"class_list":["post-36632","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-fireside","tag-civil-military-relations-2","tag-fireside","tag-navies","tag-ship-costs","tag-ships"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/paWMNs-9wQ","jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/PXL_20260811_040314292.jpg?fit=4080%2C1877&ssl=1","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/36632","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/156979701"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=36632"}],"version-history":[{"count":31,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/36632\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":36675,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/36632\/revisions\/36675"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/36665"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=36632"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=36632"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=36632"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}},{"id":36425,"date":"2026-08-07T22:53:47","date_gmt":"2026-08-08T02:53:47","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/?p=36425"},"modified":"2026-08-07T22:53:47","modified_gmt":"2026-08-08T02:53:47","slug":"collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-va-putting-it-together","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/07\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-va-putting-it-together\/","title":{"rendered":"Collections: Pre-Modern Armies for Worldbuilders, Part Va: Putting It Together"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">This is the first half of the final part (<a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/06\/05\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-i-why-they-fight\/\">I<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/06\/12\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-iia-mobilization-without-administration\/\">IIa<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/06\/19\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-iib-officials-contractors-and-professionals\/\">IIb<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/06\/26\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-iii-paying-for-it\/\">III<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/07\/18\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-iva-leadership\/\">IVa<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/07\/24\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-ivb-cohesion\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/07\/24\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-ivb-cohesion\/\">IVb<\/a>, Va) of our apparently five-part series laying out some general guidelines for how pre-modern armies are organized, in particular exploring the principle that <strong>armies cannot help but recreate their civilian social structures<\/strong> <strong>on the battlefield<\/strong>. Last time we looked at the importance of generating <em>cohesion<\/em> in these armies and the ways cohesion could come either organically from the underlying society or be manufactured as part of training (or not be produced at all, resulting in less effective armies).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">To close out this week, I wanted to provide some examples &#8211; each relatively brief &#8211; pulling the factors we&#8217;ve discussed (recruitment principles, mobilization methods, dealing with costs, leadership and cohesion sources) into coherent military systems that emerge organically from their underlying civilian society.  And since this series was always intended as &#8216;one for the world-builders,&#8217; I figured the best way to do this would be to take some <em>fictional<\/em> militaries, examine them along the lines above and see what (if anything) is necessary to fix them so that the underlying civilian society and the military it generates &#8216;matches.&#8217;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In a lot of cases, these are going to be fictional militaries we&#8217;ve looked at before, so a lot of this will be overlapping with more detailed treatments (which I&#8217;ll link) but also we&#8217;ll get some new stuff.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In the end, I had enough examples I wanted to work through that I opted to split this last part in two.  So in this part we&#8217;re going to be taking apart some examples of matching up (or struggling to do so) army and society in literature (namely<em> <\/em>my perennials, <em>A Song of Ice and Fire<\/em> and <em>The Lord of the Rings<\/em>).  Then in the second half, we&#8217;ll break some new ground and look at some examples out of video games that deviate from some of the classic &#8216;medieval fantasy&#8217; patterns: the standing legions of the Empire of Cyrodiil, the oddly (but interestingly) bifurcated urban defense force of Baldur&#8217;s Gate and finally some private enterprise war in the Deadfire Archipelago.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I want to be clear, the goal here is not to praise or tear down any of these examples, but to <em>explore<\/em> them, to practice thinking about how the fiction armies and societies do and don&#8217;t match.  I&#8217;ve tried to avoid here picking any example that is actively <em>really bad<\/em> (thus a preference for <em>A Song of Ice and Fire<\/em> (the books), for instance, over <em>Game of Thrones<\/em> (the show)).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But first, as always, recruiting and maintaining large pre-modern armies is expensive! Much like many of those pre-modern armies, this project is supported by devolving the costs of my ruinous book-buying habit on to <s>recruits<\/s> readers. You can help by spreading the word to new readers and by supporting this project over at <a href=\"https:\/\/www.patreon.com\/user?u=20122096\">Patreon<\/a>. If you want updates whenever a new post appears or want to hear my more bite-sized musings on history, security affairs and current events, you can follow me on Bluesky (@bretdevereaux.bsky.social). I am also active on Threads (bretdevereaux) and maintain a <em>de minimis<\/em> presence on Twitter (@bretdevereaux).<\/p>\n\n\n<div class=\"jetpack_subscription_widget\"><h2 class=\"widgettitle\"><\/h2>\n\t\t\t<div class=\"wp-block-jetpack-subscriptions__container\">\n\t\t\t<form action=\"#\" method=\"post\" accept-charset=\"utf-8\" id=\"subscribe-blog-5\"\n\t\t\t\tdata-blog=\"161773962\"\n\t\t\t\tdata-post_access_level=\"everybody\" >\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<p id=\"subscribe-email\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<label id=\"jetpack-subscribe-label\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tclass=\"screen-reader-text\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tfor=\"subscribe-field-5\">\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tEmail Address\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/label>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"email\" name=\"email\" autocomplete=\"email\" required=\"required\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tvalue=\"\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tid=\"subscribe-field-5\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tplaceholder=\"Email Address\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n\n\t\t\t\t\t<p id=\"subscribe-submit\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"action\" value=\"subscribe\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"source\" value=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/?after=2026-08-06T00%3A00%3A00&#038;page=1&#038;rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fposts\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"sub-type\" value=\"widget\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" name=\"redirect_fragment\" value=\"subscribe-blog-5\"\/>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<input type=\"hidden\" id=\"_wpnonce\" name=\"_wpnonce\" value=\"fd76a9d5bb\" \/><input type=\"hidden\" name=\"_wp_http_referer\" value=\"\/?after=2026-08-06T00%3A00%3A00&#038;page=1&#038;rest_route=%2Fwp%2Fv2%2Fposts\" \/>\t\t\t\t\t\t<button type=\"submit\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tclass=\"wp-block-button__link\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tstyle=\"margin: 0; margin-left: 0px;\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tname=\"jetpack_subscriptions_widget\"\n\t\t\t\t\t\t>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\tSubscribe!\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/button>\n\t\t\t\t\t<\/p>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/form>\n\t\t\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\n<\/div>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Westeros and Fragmented Vassalage-Based Polities<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So my critiques of some of the &#8216;realistic&#8217; worldbuilding of <em>A Song of Ice and Fire<\/em> and <em>Game of Thrones<\/em> (and spinoffs) <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2019\/05\/28\/new-acquisitions-not-how-it-was-game-of-thrones-and-the-middle-ages-part-i\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"209\">are not new<\/a>. To be clear, I don&#8217;t think there is anything wrong with enjoying these stories; rather my critiques emerged in a period &#8211; now largely passed, thankfully &#8211; where it was common to claim that George R.R. Martin&#8217;s work represented a truer or more faithful vision of medieval vassalage-based polities. But that era is largely passed and my sense is that the <em>ASoIaF<\/em>\/<em>GoT<\/em> community largely now understands that Westeros is not necessarily the gold-standard for &#8216;realistic&#8217; medieval fantasy societies. So I don&#8217;t bring this up first to bash GRRM, but rather because (unlike Middle Earth, as we&#8217;ll see) it represents close to a &#8216;pure&#8217; example (notionally) of a fragmented, vassalage-based polity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1100\" height=\"469\" data-attachment-id=\"112\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/lannisters\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/lannisters.png?fit=1134%2C483&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1134,483\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"lannisters\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/lannisters.png?fit=1024%2C436&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2019\/05\/lannisters.png?resize=1100%2C469&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-112\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">The Lannister army from the show in the field.  If the books are a little off the mark, this depiction is <em><strong>wildly<\/strong><\/em> off the mark: this army, with neat regular blocks of men in uniform equipment marching in neat order with a heavy emphasis on heavy infantry over cavalry or light infantry, <strong>this is the army of a wealthy, well-administered, urban state<\/strong>: all things we are <strong>explicitly<\/strong> told Westeros in general and the Lannister westerlands in particular are not (remember: in the show, at least, Lannister gold ran out some time ago).<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So first we should begin with the underlying society. Westeros as we see it is a complex agrarian society &#8211; that is there is quite a lot of specialization, but this is a distinctly pre-modern society in which the vast majority of the population is still engaged in agriculture or pastoralism. Now I find that Martin&#8217;s depiction of the &#8216;smallfolk&#8217; &#8211; <a href=\"https:\/\/awoiaf.westeros.org\/index.php\/Smallfolk\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/awoiaf.westeros.org\/index.php\/Smallfolk\">ably summed up by the Wiki<\/a> &#8211; is a bit frustrating as it is mostly a collection of aristocratic <em>stereotypes<\/em> about peasants, but nevertheless this is clearly a society where the bulk of the population is a largely demilitarized peasantry. In short, it is supposed to resemble high or late medieval Europe. Above the smallfolk is a hereditary landed aristocracy which fashions itself a &#8216;knightly&#8217; (mounted military) warrior aristocracy, structured through <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2022\/09\/23\/collections-teaching-paradox-crusader-kings-iii-part-iia-rascally-vassals\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"15251\">vassalage<\/a>.  The social distance between these two groups is <em>yawning<\/em>: Westerosi aristocrats have more in common with other aristocrats half a continent away than they do with the peasants out of their front door.<span id='easy-footnote-45-36425' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/07\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-va-putting-it-together\/#easy-footnote-bottom-45-36425' title='Except, arguably, the North, but we&amp;#8217;re mostly going to leave the North out here and focus on the southern Six Kingdoms, for the sake of simplicity.'><sup>45<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  That social distance is not a worldbuilding problem, mind you; we see that kind of &#8216;trans-national&#8217; elite (keeping in mind these aren&#8217;t nation-states so we&#8217;re using the word &#8216;national&#8217; rather loosely) in a number of pre-modern societies.  A French nobleman often did have more culturally in common with an English nobleman than he did with his own peasants and indeed in some cases a mounted Christian European military aristocrat might find he had more in common with a mounted Muslim military aristocrat from the Middle East than either had with their own peasants too.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So far, so good.  But &#8211; as I&#8217;ve noted a few times before &#8211; when we see the armies of these polities, <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2019\/05\/12\/new-acquisitions-lannister-infantry-kit-review\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"106\">both in the books and in the show<\/a>, they do not derive organically from this society at all.  Westeros produces very large, surprisingly uniform armies which are not obviously organized into the retinues of smaller lords but rather function as large field armies tied explicitly to the largest vassals of the crown.  Moreover, very large proportions of these armies are infantry (<em>especially<\/em> in the show, where the Lannister, Tyrell and Stark armies are almost entirely infantry!), composed of massed peasant soldiers.  They&#8217;re also broadly uniformly equipped, often with recognizable liveries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"567\" data-attachment-id=\"36545\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/07\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-va-putting-it-together\/image-181\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image.png?fit=1292%2C716&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1292,716\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image.png?fit=1024%2C567&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image.png?resize=1024%2C567&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36545\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image.png?resize=1024%2C567&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image.png?resize=300%2C166&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image.png?resize=768%2C426&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image.png?resize=1200%2C665&amp;ssl=1 1200w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image.png?resize=1100%2C610&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image.png?w=1292&amp;ssl=1 1292w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Likewise from the show, the Tyrell house guard.  This (except for the very silly helmets) is a bit easier to talk around because the unit we see is so small, one might explain it as a small standing unit of retainers or mercenaries (but then why use that instead of the large numbers of military aristocrats one spends so much time retaining?).  But I think we&#8217;re meant to take this too as indicative of what House Tyrell&#8217;s army looks like &#8211; neatly identical soldiers in identical equipment (and <strong>heavy<\/strong> armor).  Again, at scale this is a kind of army House Tyrell is structurally incapable of producing: it doesn&#8217;t have the administration or revenues to build or buy it and it doesn&#8217;t have a large wealthy yeoman freeholder class to <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2023\/06\/16\/collections-how-to-raise-a-roman-army-the-dilectus\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"19439\">devolve the cost onto Roman-Republic-style<\/a>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\"><strong>In short, these resemble the armies we would expect of large, extensively administered <em>state-based <\/em>societies<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">But, and I have to stress this extremely strongly, <em><strong>Westeros does not have a state<\/strong><\/em>.  It was not a state under the Targaryens (they make no effort to consolidate control of the various House armies) and it sure as heck isn&#8217;t a state under the Baratheons who are <em>even weaker<\/em> in terms of central power.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So what ought we see?  Well, let&#8217;s return to that underlying society.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The core of these armies are going to be that mounted military aristocracy.  It&#8217;s possible in some regions (the north, perhaps?) the aristocrats might also fight on foot, but we&#8217;re still looking at the aristocracy.  Now the core landed aristocracy is going to be really small, but what is going to expand out this class are two kinds of soldier that GRRM has largely neglected: unlanded knights bachelor and non-aristocratic &#8216;men at arms&#8217; (men who fight like knights but do not have the social status of knights).  GRRM has <em>some<\/em> unlanded knights, but not many &#8211; but in this sort of society, such men are going to be ubiquitous in the households of those landed elites.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">After all, most of the wealth in this society is held by a landed military aristocracy (the lords) who want to develop private military force and lack a state, so they&#8217;re going to do so <em>in their household<\/em>, by retaining (as <em>retainers<\/em>) full time warriors.  And in this society, we see very clearly that full time warriors are almost invariably mounted heavy cavalrymen.  So while the number of lords and their families is small, they can retain a bunch of non-noble heavy cavalrymen as part of the retinues, though we&#8217;re still dealing with armies that are likely <em><strong>much smaller<\/strong><\/em> than the massive armies Martin reports: whereas Martin has armies reaching the upper tens of thousands, we might instead expect the armies of the most powerful houses to at best be fielding a few thousand to perhaps 10,000 or so mounted men at arms.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"486\" data-attachment-id=\"36548\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/07\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-va-putting-it-together\/image-182\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-1.png?fit=1065%2C505&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1065,505\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-1.png?fit=1024%2C486&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-1.png?resize=1024%2C486&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36548\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-1.png?resize=1024%2C486&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-1.png?resize=300%2C142&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-1.png?resize=768%2C364&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-1.png?w=1065&amp;ssl=1 1065w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">The new House of the Dragon series <strong>keeps doing this<\/strong>: here is the Hightower Army and again it is a long line of uniformly equipped heavy infantry, a kind of army this society is incapable of producing.  <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2020\/12\/04\/collections-that-dothraki-horde-part-i-barbarian-couture\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"5253\">While the books are not always better than the show<\/a>, when it comes to understanding what kinds of armies can exist in this world&#8230;the books are generally better than the show.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In short, to use our typology, our first component here is a <strong>retainer-based<\/strong> army composed of a <strong>warrior class<\/strong>, recruited on a <strong>vocational principle<\/strong>, with military costs largely <strong>devolved<\/strong> (these guys or their lords purchase their horses and armor as a private expense).  Cohesion is provided through a mix of warrior-class cohesion, probably combined with collective training in small cavalry units within those noble households.  We probably ought to expect these men to perform quite well on the battlefield, given how strong that cohesive bond is likely to be.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now, below this, every army needs infantry, especially because &#8211; as noted above &#8211; the cavalry components of these armies are still small.  But those major Houses didn&#8217;t just become states when it was time to equip their infantry, so the infantry &#8211; drawn from the commons &#8211; is going to be recruited <em><strong>also using non-state structures<\/strong>.  <\/em>That means that <strong>equipment and wage costs also have to be substantially devolved<\/strong>, because none of these polities has the administrative infrastructure to handle the <strong>complexity<\/strong> of these costs (note that this is as much or more a question of complexity as about raw revenues!).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">That leaves the warlords of Westeros essentially two options and we might expect them to use both: they can raise their own peasants or they can hire mercenaries.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">If they raise their own peasants, this is going to be <strong>clientage principle<\/strong> recruitment, because the administration isn&#8217;t there for an employment-based system and the smallfolk don&#8217;t have any political entitlements to tie to military service <em>anyway<\/em> (notably Westeros lacks enfranchised little urban republics to provide urban militias). We should thus expect costs to be <strong>devolved<\/strong>, probably using a <strong>brigaded household model<\/strong> simply because the smallfolk seem too poor to expect individual households to furnish a man with his equipment. Nevertheless, the equipment that results from this is going to be both poor and non-standard (it would be hard to tell a Tyrell peasant-soldier from a Lannister peasant-soldier if you saw one on the road). And the cohesion principle is pretty obviously weak: these guys don&#8217;t have a strong corporate identity and their masters cannot afford to keep them under arms long enough to drill them. They&#8217;ll get to the battlefield, but often perform poorly. And because we have to brigade a bunch of households to get a soldier, we should still expect the numbers here to be smaller: low tens of thousands, not mid- or high- tens of thousands.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"792\" height=\"619\" data-attachment-id=\"36552\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/07\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-va-putting-it-together\/image-183\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-2.png?fit=792%2C619&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"792,619\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-2.png?fit=792%2C619&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-2.png?resize=792%2C619&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36552\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-2.png?w=792&amp;ssl=1 792w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-2.png?resize=300%2C234&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-2.png?resize=768%2C600&amp;ssl=1 768w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 792px) 100vw, 792px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Ok, credit where due: <strong>I actually can buy that the North might produce an army that looks like this<\/strong>.  The North doesn&#8217;t seem to share the same martial culture as southern Westeros (though to judge by Ned Stark&#8217;s children, by <em>ASoIaF<\/em>, some of the mythology around that kind of warfare is filtering in) and so I can imagine that it might have a military aristocracy that fights on foot.  Notably <strong>their equipment is not uniform<\/strong> because we&#8217;re still devolving equipment costs and so each fellow has acquired his own armor, though that&#8217;s enough similarity between them that we get some sense that they are all thinking about the same heavy infantry tactical system.<br>The real problem is how <strong>drab<\/strong> they are.  These are men of importance and station! They&#8217;re wearing <strong>expensive<\/strong> equipment!  They would want to look nice!<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The alternative would be mercenary infantrymen, recruited <strong>en bloc<\/strong> (likely via <strong>contractors<\/strong>) using an <strong>employment principle<\/strong> and paid in cash.  Since these houses don&#8217;t have a lot of revenue because they have very limited state capacity, their ability to engage these fellows is also going to be quite limited, but it isn&#8217;t hard to imagine how valuable they&#8217;d be, especially for providing specific military skills that aren&#8217;t &#8216;mounted military aristocrat,&#8217; which obviously the peasant levies will also generally lack.  If there <em>were<\/em> polities in Westeros that produced good infantry &#8211; because they had tight civic militias or other strong communal structures &#8211; we should expect them to be in heavy demand as mercenaries, just as Greek hoplites or Swiss pikemen were in their day.  Good infantry, after all, is nice to have, but the Great Houses of Westeros are <strong>structurally largely incapable of producing good infantry at scale<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In short <strong>the military that flows from Westeros social organization is meaningfully different than the one Martin imagines<\/strong>.  It is much smaller (<a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2019\/05\/28\/new-acquisitions-not-how-it-was-game-of-thrones-and-the-middle-ages-part-i\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2019\/05\/28\/new-acquisitions-not-how-it-was-game-of-thrones-and-the-middle-ages-part-i\/\">no 100,000 man strong Tyrell armies!<\/a>), more fragmented and much less &#8216;regular.&#8217;  Not only does the king have to care what Tywin Lannister thinks, but Twyin Lannister has to care what <a href=\"https:\/\/awoiaf.westeros.org\/index.php\/House_Broom\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/awoiaf.westeros.org\/index.php\/House_Broom\">Lord Broom<\/a> thinks and Lord Broom has to care what <em>his<\/em> retainers think and so on.  Tywin&#8217;s Lannister army would likely be broken up into <em>dozens<\/em> of irregularly sized and structured retinues (of which his own would be the largest).  Notably, &#8216;landless knights&#8217; would be a key commodity in this system, an essential military resource that everyone with land and money is trying to attract (which in turn means those retainers have some bargaining power too), in part because none of these fellows will have a lot of faith in their poorly and irregularly equipped, weakly motivated infantry.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Crucially, this is a society <em>defined<\/em> by low state capacity (because it is, in fact <strong>a non-state society<\/strong>), which limits what the king and his lords can do at almost every turn.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Now to be clear, I don&#8217;t want to make it sound like Westeros &#8211; particularly the Westeros of the books &#8211; is a complete failure here.  I think we could actually bring the armies of Westeros into line with their underlying society with fairly modest changes: shrink both the world size and the armies to a scale that fits a personalistic, vassalage based mobilization system and acknowledge that these polities are going to really struggle to employ good infantry at scale (lacking the revenues to recruit mercenaries or the social systems to effectively mobilize their peasantry), so they&#8217;re going to rely on their cavalry, which is in turn going to put sharp limits on the kind of warfare they wage.  Finally, we&#8217;d want to flesh out the class of mounted man-at-arms and landless knight &#8211; <em>present<\/em> in Martin&#8217;s writing, but less common perhaps than they ought to be.<span id='easy-footnote-46-36425' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/07\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-va-putting-it-together\/#easy-footnote-bottom-46-36425' title='The alterations for &lt;em&gt;Game of Thrones&lt;\/em&gt; Westeros would be &lt;strong&gt;much&lt;\/strong&gt; more substantial, because the showrunners seemingly cannot resist having everyone fight with large infantry armies, often with uniform equipment, &lt;a href=&quot;https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2019\/05\/12\/new-acquisitions-lannister-infantry-kit-review\/&quot; data-type=&quot;post&quot; data-id=&quot;106&quot;&gt;which is a kind of army this society is simply incapable of producing at scale, for reasons we&amp;#8217;ve discussed before&lt;\/a&gt;.'><sup>46<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  The resulting world would feel smaller (it would <em>be<\/em> smaller) but that makes sense: these sorts of polities and their military systems do not durably scale.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Infantry and Cavalry in Rohan<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I&#8217;d argue we can see a &#8216;heavy cavalry culture&#8217; done a bit better with<a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2020\/05\/22\/collections-the-battle-of-helms-deep-part-iv-men-of-rohan\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2020\/05\/22\/collections-the-battle-of-helms-deep-part-iv-men-of-rohan\/\"> the <em>Lord of the Rings<\/em>&#8216; Rohirrim<\/a>, although with the caveat that Tolkien is developing something closer to an early medieval society which still retains a relatively strong (perhaps fading) infantry tradition, as opposed to Westeros&#8217; distinctively late medieval (or really early modern) sense; these are as we&#8217;ll see fundamentally quite different societies and as a result they produce different armies (albeit I think the armies of Rohan are more tightly fitted to their society).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Once again, we should sketch out Rohan&#8217;s society first.  This is also a complex agrarian society, albeit less complex than Westeros and seemingly with a fair bit more pastoralism (in the form of ranching or <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2021\/03\/05\/collections-clothing-how-did-they-make-it-part-i-high-fiber\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"6351\">fairly short-range transhumance<\/a>, given that this society still lives in villages, rather than nomadic pastoralism).  Military power is still somewhat fragmented in this society &#8211; men like \u00c9omer and Erkenbrand appear to have some independent access to military force (they have their own retinues)<span id='easy-footnote-47-36425' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/07\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-va-putting-it-together\/#easy-footnote-bottom-47-36425' title='Note that \u00c9omer is able to sally out with his \u00c9ored in the movement that will bring him to destroy the orcs that seized Merry and Pippin, despite orders not to do so &amp;#8211; it&amp;#8217;s as much &lt;em&gt;his&lt;\/em&gt; \u00c9ored as it is Th\u00e9oden&amp;#8217;s.'><sup>47<\/sup><\/a><\/span> but this is both a smaller and ironically more centralized kingdom than Westeros, but what make sit similar in a lot of ways is that <strong>state capacity remains low<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What I mean by that is that while on the one hand Th\u00e9oden&#8217;s authority over his subordinates remains notionally higher (Tywin Lannister is a more independent figure than Erkenbrand, by custom and general understanding), Th\u00e9oden still lacks anything like an administrative apparatus or bureaucracy and instead has to rule through his aristocracy.  What&#8217;s different and thus what makes Rohan a bit more centralized in its structure is that Th\u00e9oden has more latitude to hand-pick the top level of that organization chart, the three Marshals of the Mark (he initially picks himself, his son and his nephew, with his son being replaced by Erkenbrand after Th\u00e9odred was killed), rather than being stuck with a specific local mega-aristocrat (like Tywin Lannister, Mace Tyrell, etc. etc.).  Those commands (which historically are what will evolve into the highest reaches of the &#8216;feudal&#8217; European nobility) are not yet <em>wholly <\/em>hereditary, though the fact that command in the Westmark immediately devolves to Erkenbrand <em>Lord of the Westfold<\/em> (the largest chunk of the Westmark)<span id='easy-footnote-48-36425' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/07\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-va-putting-it-together\/#easy-footnote-bottom-48-36425' title='&amp;#8216;West-Mark&amp;#8217; here denoting what is essentially a military district, the &amp;#8216;West March.&amp;#8217;'><sup>48<\/sup><\/a><\/span> may suggest that, in the absence of a suitable member of the royal house, there&#8217;s a strong expectation that overall leadership ought to fall to a major local aristocrat.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">As an aside, the fact that Rohan, resembling an <em>early<\/em> medieval kingdom is more effectively centralized than Westeros, which resembles a <em>late<\/em> medieval kingdom, should serve as a useful reminder that historical processes like centralization do not proceed only in one direction.  It is not always the case that later societies have more centralization or administrative capacity.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We also need to talk about the situation of common folk of the Rohirrim. We don&#8217;t see much of them, but there are some assumptions I think we can make (which largely conform to Tolkien&#8217;s own pretty obvious Anglo-Saxon inspiration for these fellows). First, the Rohirrim aristocracy strikingly present themselves as having more culturally in common with their commonfolk than with neighboring aristocrats: they have their own language (that is, the aristocracy has not abandoned Rohanese for Westron) and their own internal term for themselves (an endonym) as <em>Eorlingas<\/em>, &#8216;people of Eorl&#8217; which appears to include the commonfolk.  Notably, the aristocracy, while clearly large landowners, do not appear to be titled: apart from Th\u00e9oden King himself no one gets <em>hereditary<\/em> titles appended to their names (the Marshals being appointed positions). They also have a muster of all able-bodied men, implying a tradition of <strong>universal military service<\/strong> and thus <strong>a peasantry<\/strong> (I&#8217;m including their shepherds here) <strong>that hasn&#8217;t been entirely demilitarized.<\/strong>  That last point matters a lot and signals, I think, quite a different underlying social structure than the one we see in Westeros.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1024\" height=\"473\" data-attachment-id=\"36619\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/07\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-va-putting-it-together\/image-186\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-5.png?fit=1740%2C804&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1740,804\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-5.png?fit=1024%2C473&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-5.png?resize=1024%2C473&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36619\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-5.png?resize=1024%2C473&amp;ssl=1 1024w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-5.png?resize=300%2C139&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-5.png?resize=768%2C355&amp;ssl=1 768w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-5.png?resize=1536%2C710&amp;ssl=1 1536w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-5.png?resize=1200%2C554&amp;ssl=1 1200w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-5.png?resize=1100%2C508&amp;ssl=1 1100w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-5.png?w=1740&amp;ssl=1 1740w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 1024px) 100vw, 1024px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">This arming scene is a major emotional point in Peter Jackson&#8217;s film and it makes sense that in the context of a siege, the lord&#8217;s (in this case, the unseen Erkenbrand) armory is being emptied out to equip as many men as possible, but we ought probably to have seen a lot of these fellows show up with equipment.  We know that Rohirrim armies regularly include infantry (even if their strength is in cavalry) and that infantry must come from somewhere &#8211; given the limited administration, the only real option is a self-equipping yeomanry.<br>We might then, in a desperate moment like this, not only see the lord&#8217;s armory emptied out, but individual middling-peasant households passing around old or surplus equipment to friends and relatives (pulling old arms and armor out of temple storerooms where they had been dedicated for last-ditch defenses was a standard trope of ancient Greek and Roman warfare, for instance).<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Taken together, what I think we&#8217;re looking at is a landholder aristocracy governing a society mostly of free peasants rather than serfs. In something akin to the Carolingian system, there is probably a property line which makes a landowner liable for cavalry service (which thus defined the lower bound of the aristocracy), while landowners below that level are liable for infantry service (a &#8216;select levy&#8217;) and landowners much above that level are expected to furnish not only themselves but a larger retinue (thus we hear of the &#8216;knights of the king&#8217;s house&#8217; and Marshals of the Mark having an \u00c9ored (120 mounted men) as part of their household). We should probably also assume a substantial number of farmers or herders who are simply considered too poor to serve (possibly expected to supply men for garrison service on a brigaded household model or as part of a &#8216;general levy&#8217; in a local crisis).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1100\" height=\"412\" data-attachment-id=\"3283\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/men-of-rohan\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/05\/men-of-rohan.png?fit=1675%2C628&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1675,628\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"men-of-rohan\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/05\/men-of-rohan.png?fit=1024%2C384&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/05\/men-of-rohan.png?resize=1100%2C412&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-3283\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Now as with the example above, Peter Jackson&#8217;s adaptation is not a one-to-one reproduction of the armies of the books (as we&#8217;ll see with his use of plate armor for Gondor), but I think this shot actually captures the sense the books give of Rohan&#8217;s society really well because we have a mix of all three of our fighting social strata here.  In the back, around Th\u00e9oden we have some military aristocrats in quite fine armor &#8211; full time combatants who would normally be on horseback.  Farther forward, we see some fellows in less resplendent but still fairly heavy scale armor, with helmets and I would guess these are our &#8216;select levy&#8217; of well-to-do peasants who might have been infantry as part of a field army.  And then finally, towards the center, we have some fellows who lack cuirasses or helmets, who probably represent our &#8216;general levy&#8217; of all able-bodied men.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The military organization then flows that social structure.  The aristocracy fight at mounted heavy cavalry and are organized into retinues around the major magnates who on the one hand derive their wealth from large landholding but on the other hand owe their official positions to the king.<span id='easy-footnote-49-36425' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/07\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-va-putting-it-together\/#easy-footnote-bottom-49-36425' title='Indeed, \u00c9omer on becoming king is able to change the titles of the Second and Third Marshals, making them strictly geographic commands, which speaks to the degree to which these are offices in the gift of the king rather than hereditary titles.'><sup>49<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  We meet a fair number of these magnates (Erkenbrand, Grimbold, Elfhelm, along with of course \u00c9omer and Th\u00e9odred).  There is a clear preference in these appointments, when not granted to a man of the king&#8217;s family, to use someone local: Erkenbrand commands in the West-mark because he is <em>from<\/em> the West-mark.  \u00c9omer will end up making Elfhelm command in the East-mark and by all indications Elfhelm is from the East-mark as well, given that he was in \u00c9omer&#8217;s retinue as Third Marshal of the Riddermark with that geographic area of command.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full is-resized\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"516\" height=\"362\" data-attachment-id=\"36572\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/07\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-va-putting-it-together\/image-184\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-3.png?fit=516%2C362&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"516,362\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-3.png?fit=516%2C362&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-3.png?resize=516%2C362&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36572\" style=\"width:770px;height:auto\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-3.png?w=516&amp;ssl=1 516w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-3.png?resize=300%2C210&amp;ssl=1 300w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 516px) 100vw, 516px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Via the still amazing <a href=\"http:\/\/lotrproject.com\/map\/#zoom=3&amp;lat=-1315.5&amp;lon=1500&amp;layers=BTTTTT\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"http:\/\/lotrproject.com\/map\/#zoom=3&amp;lat=-1315.5&amp;lon=1500&amp;layers=BTTTTT\">LOTR Project&#8217;s Map of Middle Earth<\/a>, a map of Rohan.  Note that the Westfold is only a smaller subunit of the West-mark which seems to have included all of the lands west of the Entwash except those around Edoras itself (while the East-mark seems to have covered the eastern part of the kingdom).<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Meanwhile, as I noted back in the <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2020\/05\/22\/collections-the-battle-of-helms-deep-part-iv-men-of-rohan\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2020\/05\/22\/collections-the-battle-of-helms-deep-part-iv-men-of-rohan\/\">Helm&#8217;s Deep series<\/a>, we get a better sense of what we might term the &#8216;select levy&#8217; of Rohan (the infantry force kept in the field by Erkenbrand) as well as the &#8216;general levy&#8217; of all able-bodied men who have fled to Helm&#8217;s Deep.  We&#8217;re pretty clearly told that the levies of Rohan are raised geographically (Erkenbrand has the Westfold&#8217;s men, who have a distinct sub-regional identity <em>as &#8216;<\/em>Westfolders&#8217; and the &#8216;musters&#8217; are by region); we don&#8217;t see the lower levels of command but there&#8217;s no reason to assume they&#8217;re not like the higher levels: local magnates lead the levies from their home area.  That in turn explains the cohesive principle we see: when the Rohirrim get into trouble &#8211; common infantry and aristocratic cavalry alike &#8211; they invariably &#8216;clump up&#8217; around the magnates, which suggest pretty close civilian ties.  It makes sense: where do the regular infantrymen go when things are bad?  The men of their village clump up together around their village leader (the local Big Man) who is also their unit commander and who they know fairly well.  The comparative lack of social distance &#8211; implied by the common culture, language and lack of titles above &#8211; matters here for making this kind of cohesion work.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So my read on Rohan is that it is a complex, non-state agrarian\/pastoralist polity, with a freeholding farmer class (a yeomanry) recruited regionally under a cultural norm of <strong>universal military service<\/strong> (at least for landholders), with an elite class that understands itself as a <strong>mounted military aristocracy<\/strong> (recruited as a warrior class, defined by wealth), where the cohesive principle is probably tight clientage ties between the infantry and their magnates and then horizontal ties between the magnates and each other.  But that works because these fellows seem to actually know each other (in contrast, for instance, to the far more insulated noble class in Westeros).<span id='easy-footnote-50-36425' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/07\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-va-putting-it-together\/#easy-footnote-bottom-50-36425' title='To get what I am saying here, note how &lt;em&gt;culturally&lt;\/em&gt; the aristocracy in Westeros in, say, the Reach, the Riverlands, or the Westerlands all have more culturally in common with each other than they do with their smallfolk.  That&amp;#8217;s not a crazy thing either &amp;#8211; in, say, the 13th century, the aristocracies of France, England and Scotland shared a lot more literature, language (French) and culture with each other than they necessarily did with the peasants they ruled.  But it is &lt;em&gt;not true&lt;\/em&gt; for the Rohirrim, who &amp;#8211; commoners and elites alike &amp;#8211; are culturally distinct and have a shared cultural identity that forms the basis for their military participation.'><sup>50<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  In terms of cost, this is clearly a system <strong>where costs are devolved<\/strong>, but the sense we get, given the performance of Rohan&#8217;s infantry against Saruman, has to be that the infantry class has<a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2025\/09\/12\/collections-life-work-death-and-the-peasant-part-ivc-rent-and-extraction\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"31305\"> preserved a bit more of their wealth against the aristocracy<\/a>, again leading to somewhat better infantry, although it is worth noting that outside of the king&#8217;s immediate retinue, Rohan&#8217;s army is not uniform in its equipment.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<h2 class=\"wp-block-heading\">Men of Gondor<\/h2>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Unsurprisingly, I think that Gondor &#8211; particularly book!Gondor in <em>The Lord of the Rings<\/em> is also an effective example of matching a military to its underlying society, but it is particularly interesting here because it is a <em>composite<\/em> force: different components are recruited under different principles, equipped differently, probably paid differently and so on.  <strong>For large states, <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2024\/01\/26\/collections-phalanxs-twilight-legions-triumph-part-ib-subjects-of-the-successors\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"22583\">composite forces<\/a> were very common<\/strong>.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And Gondor (at least under the last steward, Denethor II), is a composite polity and has a composite army to match.  Gondor is <em>also<\/em> a complex, agrarian society, but a fair bit more complex than Rohan, with quite a few proper cities (Minas Tirith, of course, but also Pelargir, Dol Amroth and others) and evidently a fair bit of specialization.  If the model for Rohan seems to have been Anglo-Saxon England, the model for Gondor seems to me fairly clearly to be the Eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire, <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2019\/05\/17\/collections-the-siege-of-gondor-part-ii-these-beacons-are-liiiiiiit\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"132\">complete with a beacon system<\/a>, <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2019\/05\/17\/collections-the-siege-of-gondor-part-ii-these-beacons-are-liiiiiiit\/\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2019\/05\/17\/collections-the-siege-of-gondor-part-ii-these-beacons-are-liiiiiiit\/\">and something like the <em>tagmata<\/em> and <em>theme<\/em> systems<\/a>.  Given the level of organization we see &#8211; Denethor is capable of large-scale building projects (like the repair of the <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2019\/05\/17\/collections-the-siege-of-gondor-part-ii-these-beacons-are-liiiiiiit\/\" data-type=\"post\" data-id=\"132\">Rammas Echor<\/a>), substantial mobilizations (including the orderly evacuation of the Pelennor Fields) and maintaining a standing military force &#8211; I tend to conclude that Gondor is a state society, albeit that state power has frayed quite a bit around the edges (and of course part of the story is that it will be reasserted by Aragorn as king).  Though we never see them, I think we ought to safely assume Denethor has some bureaucracy in addition to his military command structure, which lets him direct Gondor&#8217;s efforts from his high hall.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">In particular, Gondor is split between the core territory around its capital and its subordinate regions, described as &#8216;fiefs&#8217; and evidently entrusted to the control of a particular lord.  Frustratingly, of these lords, the only one for which we can be sure we know how lordship is assigned is that of Belfalas, governed by the hereditary Prince of Dol Amroth (Prince Imrahil at the time of the War of the Ring), who has a <em>different title<\/em> from all of the other regional leaders but we do get references to these fellows equipping men out of their households, so I think we should understand them as local rulers who are vassals to Minas Tirith rather than appointed officials.  So we have a core state with autonomous vassals making up its periphery; in this case the core state is <em>geographically<\/em> fairly small but clearly makes up the bulk of the military power: despite Minas Tirith&#8217;s long decline, it is a major population and economic center.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And lo! the military system basically follows from that political structure.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Because Gondor has a state at the core of its polity with the resources to manage massive construction projects and the like, he has a substantially wider range of options for the kind of military it will have. And it ends up having <em>a bit of everything<\/em>: a standing military centered on Minas Tirith but also a mix of other military systems drawn from its constituent regions.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">First, the core of Gondor&#8217;s armies seem pretty clearly to be a <em>standing<\/em>, <em>professional<\/em> force, albeit perhaps not a very large one.  The two components we see very clearly are the Guards of the Citadel and the Rangers of Ithilien.  The Guards of the Citadel are pretty explicitly a professional force: Beregond is explicit that he is not any kind of aristocrat, but is still a full-time soldier in the Third Company of the Citadel (<em>RotK<\/em> 42).  Given the fact that they are left effectively permanently deployed, it seems like the Rangers of Ithilien are similarly a professional force.  To reach a little father, in <em>Unfinished Tales<\/em> (260 fn. 17) we get a title, &#8220;<em>ohtar<\/em>&#8221; for a &#8220;fully trained and experienced&#8221; footsoldier who was not, however, a knight, which also suggests to me (alongside Beregond&#8217;s use of the phrase &#8216;man at arms&#8217; to seemingly mean the same: a man for whom war was a profession) that Minas Tirith has a substantial body of professional infantry at the core of its armies.  We&#8217;re quite explicitly told that at least the Guards of the Citadel are equipped at state expensive, for they have a unique livery, but honestly it seems likely to me that the whole of this professional force was state-equipped, which is why we&#8217;re told that the livery is unique (in design and materials), rather than being told that these men were unique by having an issued livery at all.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Doubtless in an emergency this would be supplemented by drawing up the rest of the able-bodied male populace, but we&#8217;re not given a clear sense <em>for the city<\/em> of what that would look like.  I find myself wondering if under normal circumstances, since Gondor is almost always in some kind of low-intensity conflict with Mordor, if the professional core wasn&#8217;t always supplemented by rotating conscription or some kind of reserve among the men of the city.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-large\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"1100\" height=\"510\" data-attachment-id=\"2120\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/in-formation\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/in-formation.png?fit=1527%2C708&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"1527,708\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"in-formation\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/in-formation.png?fit=1024%2C475&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2020\/01\/in-formation.png?resize=1100%2C510&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-2120\"\/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Peter Jackson has taken some larger liberties with Gondor&#8217;s infantry.  For one, he&#8217;s made them almost entirely uniform (except for the Guards of the Citadel), when we&#8217;re told in the books quite explicitly they are not.  But he&#8217;s also put them in plate armor, which is effectively unknown in Middle Earth, as Tolkien resolutely sticks to an early medieval military material culture milieu where scale and mail represent the best available armor.<br>That said, I can believe that Gondor does have some professional, state-equipped heavy infantry &#8211; indeed, we&#8217;re told they have at least three companies of it in the Guards of the Citadels and presumably more &#8216;regular&#8217; soldiers beyond those.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Then we have the forces of Gondor&#8217;s fiefs and here it is useful to just reproduce the passage in which they show up:<\/p>\n\n\n\n<blockquote class=\"wp-block-quote is-layout-flow wp-block-quote-is-layout-flow\">\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The men of Ringl\u00f3 Vale behind the son of their lord, Dervorin striding on foot: three hundreds.  From the uplands of Morthond, the great Blackroot Vale, tall Duinhir with his sons, Duilin and Derufin, and five hundred bowmen.  From the Anfalas, the Langstrand far away, a long line of men of many sorts, hunters and herdsmen and men of little villages, scantily equipped save for the household of Golasgil their lord.  From Lamedon, a few grim hillmen without a captain.  Fisher-folk of the Ethir, some hundred or more spared from the ships.  Hirluin the Fair of the Green Hills from Pinnath Gelin with three hundreds of gallant green-clad men.  And last a proudest, Imrahil, Prince of Dol Amroth, kinsman of the Lord, with [&#8230;] a company of knights in full harness riding grey horses; and behind them seven hundreds of men at arms, tall as lords, grey-eyed, dark-haired, singing as they came. (RotK, 46)<\/p>\n<\/blockquote>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">I should note that, in a slightly earlier passage, we also get Forlong the Fat, Lord of Lossarnach, with &#8220;a dusty line of men, well-armed and bearing great battle-axes.&#8221;<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">What I love about this passage is that it not only applies our principle of <strong>militaries reflecting their civilian societies<\/strong> to Gondor itself &#8211; a composite kingdom has a composite army &#8211; but it <strong>also applies it to the component parts!<\/strong>  One gets the sense that Belfalas (with its big city at Dol Amroth) are the most state-like of the fiefs and so they have an army that looks at lot like Minas Tirith&#8217;s army: a company (about a hundred) mounted knights, matched by seven hundred men-at-arms which &#8211; given their contrast between the other groups, I think we ought to understand as also being professionals, or at least well-trained in addition to well-equipped.  By contrast, from the hill country of Morthond, we get five hundred bowmen led by what is evidently a &#8216;family affair&#8217; of rule there, given that it is Duinhir with his two sons commanding them: a smaller, poorer community that fights in a way that fits with coming from a hard-scrabble kind of place.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n<figure class=\"wp-block-image size-full\"><img data-recalc-dims=\"1\" loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" width=\"927\" height=\"560\" data-attachment-id=\"36575\" data-permalink=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/07\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-va-putting-it-together\/image-185\/\" data-orig-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-4.png?fit=927%2C560&amp;ssl=1\" data-orig-size=\"927,560\" data-comments-opened=\"1\" data-image-meta=\"{&quot;aperture&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;credit&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;camera&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;caption&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;created_timestamp&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;copyright&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;focal_length&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;iso&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;shutter_speed&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;title&quot;:&quot;&quot;,&quot;orientation&quot;:&quot;0&quot;,&quot;alt&quot;:&quot;&quot;}\" data-image-title=\"image\" data-image-description=\"\" data-image-caption=\"\" data-large-file=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-4.png?fit=927%2C560&amp;ssl=1\" src=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-4.png?resize=927%2C560&#038;ssl=1\" alt=\"\" class=\"wp-image-36575\" srcset=\"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-4.png?w=927&amp;ssl=1 927w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-4.png?resize=300%2C181&amp;ssl=1 300w, https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-4.png?resize=768%2C464&amp;ssl=1 768w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 927px) 100vw, 927px\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-element-caption\">Via the still amazing <a href=\"http:\/\/lotrproject.com\/map\/#zoom=3&amp;lat=-1315.5&amp;lon=1500&amp;layers=BTTTTT\" data-type=\"link\" data-id=\"http:\/\/lotrproject.com\/map\/#zoom=3&amp;lat=-1315.5&amp;lon=1500&amp;layers=BTTTTT\">LOTR Project&#8217;s Map of Middle Earth<\/a>, a map of Gondor with many of the component &#8216;regions &#8216;fiefs&#8217; labeled.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">We get some class-divisions too, particularly from Anfalas, where the great mass of men &#8211; presumably a poor peasant levy &#8211; are poorly armed saved for the household guard of their lord.  Of course that strongly suggests that outside of Minas Tirith, Belfalas and perhaps Lossarnach (which seem to have fairly uniform equipment and perhaps represent the remains of the decaying Gondorian &#8216;state&#8217; with professional troops and state-issued arms), these fellows are equipping themselves and that most of the costs of their service have likely been devolved either onto the men themselves or their lords (and quite evidently Golasgil has opted to spend those resources on his household guard and <em>not<\/em> on the rest of his troops; one wonders how that decision will play with the newly crowned King Elessar).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Notably, this is very clearly an infantry-focused force.  That makes quite a bit of sense too, because Gondor is substantially more urban than Rohan or, for that matter, Westeros.<span id='easy-footnote-51-36425' class='easy-footnote-margin-adjust'><\/span><span class='easy-footnote'><a href='https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/07\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-va-putting-it-together\/#easy-footnote-bottom-51-36425' title='Yes, Westeros has big cities but also remember that Westeros, as a place, is absolutely &lt;em&gt;enormous&lt;\/em&gt; physically.  Gondor looks, by the map, to be around 100,000 square miles, very roughly, at the start of the War of the Ring; The Seven Kingdoms by contrast are &lt;a href=&quot;https:\/\/atlasoficeandfireblog.wordpress.com\/2020\/03\/28\/the-size-of-westeros-revisited\/&quot; data-type=&quot;link&quot; data-id=&quot;https:\/\/atlasoficeandfireblog.wordpress.com\/2020\/03\/28\/the-size-of-westeros-revisited\/&quot;&gt;somewhere on the order of &lt;em&gt;three million&lt;\/em&gt; square miles&lt;\/a&gt; &amp;#8211; which at that size makes them very rural and thinly peopled, with relatively few major cities (most regions just have castle towns!).'><sup>51<\/sup><\/a><\/span>  The more urban societies get, the more infantry-focused they tend to be, for the obvious reason that raising horses requires a lot of space.  Even though it is clear that Gondor&#8217;s population has declined, its military tradition still remains infantry focused (with cavalry support) and that too is a product of its economic and cultural structures (urban and state-based).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">And again, because the infantry <em>matter<\/em>, this society can develop cohesion in them: for the professional core, that is probably a professional cohesion.  One imagines the Guards of the Citadel are quite stubborn on the battlefield given that we see how intense their professional ethos of obedience to orders goes.  On the other-hand, for many of the men of the fiefs, they arrive at Minas Tirith in fairly small, relatively tight groups, organized around leaders that are quite evidently familiar to them.  One imagines that the bowmen of Morthond, for instance, probably all know each other and are tightly connected by bonds of clientage to their lord and his sons (notice that he doesn&#8217;t have a household guard &#8211; this militia <em>is<\/em> his army).<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">So we have a range of components, each with its own likely methods of recruitment and supply.  We have a core of <strong>professionals, equipped by the state, housed and presumably trained together, with an appropriately professional cohesive principle<\/strong>, supported by<strong> levies recruited locally, with their costs devolved onto local lords and<\/strong> <strong>relying on organic cohesion arising out of their common communal bonds<\/strong>.  <\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">The result is something of a messy composite army rather than a &#8216;cookie-cutter&#8217; army that is unrealistically uniform.  And that&#8217;s probably more or less right: even the Romans, close to the gold-standard for pre-modern military organization west of the Ganges were never <em>perfectly<\/em> uniform and always made use of the forces of allies, client kings and subject peoples, creating composite forces.<\/p>\n\n\n\n<p class=\"wp-block-paragraph\">Next time, we&#8217;ll keep this going by turning to look at some societies and armies from video games that, as noted, deviate a bit more from the &#8216;standard&#8217; medieval fantasy pattern and think a bit about standing professional armies, urban militias and military contractors in substantially more complex state societies.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This is the first half of the final part (I, IIa, IIb, III, IVa, IVb, Va) of our apparently five-part series laying out some general guidelines for how pre-modern armies are organized, in particular exploring the principle that armies cannot help but recreate their civilian social structures on the battlefield. Last time we looked at &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/2026\/08\/07\/collections-pre-modern-armies-for-worldbuilders-part-va-putting-it-together\/\" class=\"more-link\">Continue reading <span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Collections: Pre-Modern Armies for Worldbuilders, Part Va: Putting It Together<\/span> <span class=\"meta-nav\">&rarr;<\/span><\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":156979701,"featured_media":36619,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"inline_featured_image":false,"_monsterinsights_skip_tracking":false,"advanced_seo_description":"","jetpack_seo_html_title":"","jetpack_seo_noindex":false,"jetpack_seo_schema_type":"","_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_wpcom_ai_launchpad_first_post":false,"_jetpack_feature_clip_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_publicize_message":"{title}\n\n{excerpt}\n\n{url}","jetpack_publicize_feature_enabled":true,"jetpack_social_post_already_shared":true,"jetpack_social_options":{"image_generator_settings":{"template":"highway","default_image_id":0,"font":"","enabled":false},"version":2},"_wpas_customize_per_network":false,"jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[12763,716950168],"tags":[13544,716950569,97773,716950355,716949869,611090,716950570,716950571],"class_list":["post-36425","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","hentry","category-collections","category-how-to-civic-governance","tag-a-song-of-ice-and-fire","tag-gondor","tag-lord-of-the-rings","tag-military-systems","tag-mobilization","tag-political-systems","tag-rohan","tag-westeros"],"jetpack_publicize_connections":[],"jetpack_likes_enabled":true,"jetpack_sharing_enabled":true,"jetpack_shortlink":"https:\/\/wp.me\/paWMNs-9tv","jetpack_featured_media_url":"https:\/\/i0.wp.com\/acoup.blog\/wp-content\/uploads\/2026\/08\/image-5.png?fit=1740%2C804&ssl=1","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/36425","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/156979701"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=36425"}],"version-history":[{"count":99,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/36425\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":36625,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/36425\/revisions\/36625"}],"wp:featuredmedia":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media\/36619"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=36425"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=36425"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/acoup.blog\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=36425"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}]