This is the eight and last part of a series taking a historian’s look at the Battle of Helm’s Deep (I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII) from both J.R.R. Tolkien’s The Two Towers (1954) and Peter Jackson’s 2002 film of the same name. Last time we looked at the overall impact of morale and cohesion, as well as the ‘general’s speech.’ This time, we’re concluding with a look at how the battle fits in to the overall strategic situation.
In particular, we’re going to look at how the battle fits into Saruman’s strategic situation and assess the quality of his strategic thinking. Has Saruman effectively tailored his means to his ends? Can we chalk up the eventual failure of his plan to bad luck or unforeseen consequences, or was this entire plan broken from the beginning?
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I think those of you who have been reading this series from the beginning already know my verdict on Saruman: Saruman is a dummy-wummy whose plans failed because they were bad. And don’t take my word for it! Gandalf says of Saruman, “You have become a fool…and yet pitiable,” one engaged in “folly and evil” who “gnaw[s] at the end of…old plots” (TT, 221-2). He “should have been the king’s jester” and Gandalf is “beyond [his] comprehension” (TT, 220). An “unhappy fool” (TT, 224).
Gandalf, to be clear, does not talk this way about everyone – note how quick he is to stop Frodo when he calls Barliman Butterbur stupid (FotR, 267). I pull that out because I’ve noticed in the comments a tendency to treat the dialogue of certain characters a bit more frivolously than Tolkien does; ‘wise’ characters are very careful with their words and functionally never lie (this is less true in the films; the point is drawn out explicitly and analyzed by Matthew Dickerson in Following Gandalf (2003)). Statements from Gandalf – the incarnation of Olórin, the wisest of the Maiar – may be taken as nearly true and reliable as statements by the narrator itself. When the quasi-divine spirit of wisdom tells you someone is a fool, it is because they are a fool.
And we could end the analysis there (who am I to argue with Gandalf?), but what fun would that be? So we’re going to dissect Saruman’s strategy. This post is essentially one giant book-note; as we discussed at the beginning, the film’s changes to the source material mostly serve to confuse this sort of upper-level reasoning. Moreover, the books simply have more detail and insight into Saruman’s strategy (which, I would argue, remains fundamentally the same in both works). So I’m not going to split out my book-notes, because they’re all book-notes.
I should also note that I am going to reference The Unfinished Tales here. I have generally avoided doing this; the Tales are, after all, unfinished. They sometimes offer multiple versions of events or conflict with each other. And, in any case, they are not apart of the core narrative. I don’t think they can be taken as a way to gainsay the primary text (read: the books). But here, they can help to fill in some of the gaps, explaining some of the events we cannot see and clearing up the timeline in important ways.
That’s enough preamble, onward!
What is Strategy?
We should start by returning to our three levels of military analysis: tactics, operations and strategy. We’ve dealt with tactics (how you fight) and operations (where you fight, and how you get there). Strategy is an often misunderstood term: most ‘strategy’ games (especially real-time strategy) are actually focused almost entirely on tactics and operations; as a rule, if ‘don’t have a war’ isn’t an option, you are not actually doing strategy. Likewise, a lot of basic planning in business is termed ‘strategy’ when it really is tactics; not a question of goals, but of means to achieve those goals. Because strategy is the level of analysis that concerns why we fight – and thus also why we might not fight. Let’s unpack that.
(Attentive readers who know their Clausewitz (drink!) will recognize that I am being both broader and narrower than he in how I use the term strategy. Clausewitz terms strategy as “the employment of battles to gain the end of war” which is more nearly what we today mean as operations. In contrast, strategy as it is used today in a technical sense corresponds more nearly to what Clausewitz terms policy, the third element of his ‘marvelous trinity.’ A full exegesis of Clausewitz’ trinity is beyond the scope of this essay, but I wanted to note the differing usages, because I’m going to quote Clausewitz below. And as always, every time Clausewitz gets quoted you must take a drink; it’s the eternal military history drinking game).
At the strategic level of analysis, the first question is ‘what are your policy objectives?’ (although I should note that grand strategy is sometimes conceived as an analytical level above strategy, in which case policy objectives may go there). There’s a compelling argument common in realist international relations theory that the basic policy of nearly all states is to survive, with the goal of survival then suggesting a policy of maximizing security, which in turn suggests a policy of maximizing the military power of the state (which ironically leads to lower the security of other states who then must further increase their military power, a reaction known as the ‘security dilemma’ or, more colorfully, the ‘Red Queen effect’). I think it is also possible for states to have policy goals beyond this: ideological projects, good and bad. But survival comes first.
From there, strategy concerns itself with the best way to achieve those policy objectives. Is peace and alliances the best way to achieve security (for a small state, the answer is often ‘yes’)? Would security be enhanced by, say, gaining a key chunk of territory that could be fortified to forestall invasion? Those, of course, are ends, but strategy also concerns itself with means: how do you acquire that defensible land? Buy it? Take it by force? And then – and only then, finally – do you come to the question of “what sort of war – and what sort of conduct in war – will achieve that objective?”
You may note that this is not the same kind of thinking that animates tactics or operations. Military theorists have noticed that for quite some time, often suggesting a sharp separation between the fellows who do operations and tactics (generals) and those who do strategy (typically kings or politicians). As Clausewitz says (drink!), “The political object is the goal, war is the means of reaching it, and means can never be considered in isolation from their purpose…war should never be thought of as something autonomous, but always as an instrument of policy [emphasis mine].” In short, Clausewitz stresses – and leaders have long ignored to their peril – that of all of the factors in war, policy ought to guide action (although no part of the trinity may be neglected).
This creates subordination between the three levels of analysis (to get technical, this is because operations and tactics are part of a side of the Clausewitzian trinity which ought to be subordinate to policy). Operations is subordinate to strategy; an operation which achieves something that isn’t a strategic goal accomplishes nothing. And tactics is likewise subordinate to operations. Thus the thinking pattern should always proceed from the highest questions of strategy down to the prioritization of ends (still strategy), to the means to accomplish those ends (still strategy); only then to the execution of those means (operations) and then to the on-the-ground details of that execution (tactics). Of course what this tripartite division is mean in part to signal is that all three of these stages are tremendously complex; just because tactics is the subordinate element does not mean it is simple!
There are three great strategic sins, and Saruman commits all three.
The first sin is the sin of of not having a strategy in the first place, what we might call ’emotive’ strategy. As Clausewitz notes, policy (again, note above how what we’re calling strategy is closest to policy in Clausewitz’ sense) is “subject to reason alone” whereas the “primordial violence, hatred and enmity” is provided for in another part of the trinity (‘will’ or ‘passion). To replace policy with passion is to invert their proper relationship and court destruction.
The second sin is the elevation of operational concerns over strategic ones, the usurpation of strategy with operations, which we have discussed before. This is, by the by, also an error in managing the relationship of the trinity, allowing the general’s role in managing friction to usurp the state’s role in managing politics.
Perhaps the greatest example of this is the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor; an operational consideration (the destruction of the US Pacific Fleet) and even the tactics necessary to achieve that operational objective, were elevated above the strategic consideration of “should Japan, in the midst of an endless, probably unwinnable war against a third-rate power (the Republic of China) also go to war with a first-rate power (the United States) in order to free up oil-supplies for the first war.” Hara Tadaichi’s pithy summary is always worth quoting, “We won a great tactical victory at Pearl Harbor and thereby lost the war.”
How does this error happen? It tends to come from two main sources. First, it usually occurs most dramatically in military systems where the military leadership – which has been trained for operations and tactics, not strategy, which you will recall is the province of kings, ministers and presidents – usurps the leadership of the state. Second, it tends to occur when those military leaders – influenced by their operational training – take the operational conditions of their planning as assumed constants. “What do we do if we go to war with the United States” becomes “What do we do when we go to war with the United States” which elides out the strategic question “should we go to war with the United States?” entirely – and catastrophically, as for Imperial Japan, the answer to that unasked question of should we do this was clearly Oh my, NO.
(Bibliography note: It would hardly be fitting for me to declare these errors common and not provide examples. Two of the best case-studies I have read in this kind of strategic-thinking-failure-as-organizational-culture-failure are I. Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany (2005) and Parshall and Tully, Shattered Sword: The Untold Story of the Battle of Midway (2005). Also worth checking out, Daddis, “Chasing the Austerlitz Ideal: The Enduring Quest for Decisive Battle” in Armed Forces Journal (2006): 38-41. The same themes naturally come up in Daddis, Withdrawal: Reassessing America’s Final Years in Vietnam (2017)).
The third and final sin is easy to understand: a failure to update the strategy as conditions change. Quite often this happens in conjunction with the second sin, as once those operational concerns take over the place of strategy, it becomes difficult for leaders to consider new strategy as opposed to simply new operations in the pursuit of strategic goals which are often already lost beyond all retrieval. But this can happen without a subordination failure, due to sunk-costs and the different incentives faced by the state and its leaders. The classic example being functionally every major power in the First World War: by 1915 or 1916, it ought to have been obvious that no gains made as a result of the war could possibly be worth its continuance. Yet it was continued, both because having lost so much it seemed wrong to give up without ‘victory’ and also because, for the politicians who had initially supported the war, to admit it was a useless waste was political suicide.
We should start with Saruman’s plan, sketching it out as far into the future as we can. The key period is actually going to be February 3019, particularly February 23-28th. The events of these days should have caused radical reconsideration in Saruman’s plans as the conditions – as he knew them – changed. Instead, Saruman sticks to the strategy he had conceived of before February, creating a situation by March where even if he achieved operational and tactical success, he was still effectively doomed. But we want a sense of what the plan was before it began to go wrong.
First, what are Saruman’s objectives? The ideological project is painfully direct: Saruman aims to “have power, power to order all things as we will, for that good which only the Wise can see” to achieve “the high and ultimate purpose: Knowledge, Rule, Order; all the things that we have so far striven in vain to accomplish, hindered rather than helped by our weak or idle friends” (FotR, 311). While Saruman clearly imagines reordering quite a large amount of Middle Earth, he is clearly willing to accept lesser areas of control for the time being. Of course, for any of this to happen, the state Saruman controls – Isengard – must first survive. So we have a first-order aim (the survival of Isengard as a state and Saruman as a being) and then a second-order aim (the ordering of as large a territory as possible).
In pursuit of those goals, Saruman essentially opens his operations against Rohan simultaneously with his effort to obtain the ring: the first attack on the Isen Ford happens on the 25th and Uglúk’s forces reach the Fellowship and attack them at Emyn Muil on the 26th. Both forces must have been en route at the same time and it doesn’t seem like the success or failure of either was likely to have impacted the other. Saruman is thus running two operations in parallel: the effort to defeat Rohan and the effort to capture the ring.
The structure of the assault against Rohan is one thing Saruman does well, going to his strength in spying and PSYOP (psychological operations). Saruman’s spy network clearly stretches through Rohan and all the way to the Shire. In a strange way, these make his strategic failures all the more glaring, because he often cannot plead ignorance of the key conditions necessary to make better decisions.
But Saruman’s PSYOP efforts are the more influential. Through Wormtongue, he is able to effectively paralyze Rohan’s leadership as he prepares for a strike and it has to be remarked on how effective this is (if you are wondering why I give him little credit for this, it is because – as we’ll discuss – even if he succeeds at this, the rest of the plan is so poorly structured that he still looses). As the Unfinished Tales notes, he recognized that the key threats to this PSYOP operation were Théodred and Éomer (which seems about right, from the leadership we see the latter show). But here we run into trouble: the initial assault on the Ford of the Isen had the primary objective of removing Théodred (again, made clear in the Unfinished Tales). But this is putting the operation before the strategy: killing Théodred to enhance the PSYOP operation means making a strategic decision: war with Rohan. I should note that this is clearer in the book, where Théoden is merely tied down by bad counsel, not by obvious magic. By openly attacking the heir to the throne of Rohan, Saruman effectively guarantees there will be a war, even if Théoden remains effectively neutralized by Wormtongue.
Saruman has committed the second sin: asking how to go to war with Rohan, not if he should go to war with Rohan. His operational plan to neutralize Théoden has usurped the place of a strategic plan and dictated a strategic decision (war with Rohan) just to make an operation easier; as we’ll see, in doing this he’s closed down one of his most important opportunities for decision.
Saruman’s plan then is a very complicated three-pronged (technically four-pronged, given his operations in the Shire) effort where each prong operates on an independent time-table from the others (that is, the success or failure of each branch doesn’t influence the others). First he is sending out a party to get the ring and return, and he is using Wormtongue to disable Rohan and he is preparing open war against Rohan with the aim of capturing the kingdom. Ideally, he expects to have Rohan and the One Ring at the end of all of this. What he has actually done is created a clockwork system whereby the failure of any one part means the failure of the whole.
In practice, it ought to be conceded that every part of this plan was high risk, given that they all fail – but while the complete failure of Saruman’s plan was necessary for our heroes’ hail-mary pass to defeat the larger threat of Sauron, as we’ll see, the failure of any part would doom Saruman.
Certainty of Death? Small Chance of Success? What Are We Waiting For?
Let’s start with the effort by Uglúk’s force to capture the One Ring. The potential for failure here is immense but the strategic implications of even trying are huge. Much like the killing of Théodred, Saruman has crafted an operation that, succeed or failure, will dictate a strategic reality. Saruman ought to know that making a direct rush on the Fellowship would alert Mordor (in practice, his orcs end up grouped up with those loyal to Mordor); the very attempt will guarantee Sauron’s hostility.
And we don’t need to theorize very much, because Gandalf himself – being an immortal spirit of wisdom – figures this out and says it, noting to Saruman at Orthanc, “you have cheated your new master…when his eye turns hither, it will be the red eye of wrath” (TT, 221) and truth which is clearly confirmed by the Mouth of Sauron (RotK, 184). In fact (again, from Unfinished Tales) Sauron was already aware of Saruman’s duplicity, either due to Wormtongue or a stolen map letting out the secret of his search for the One Ring in the Shire (these conflicting stories are part of why I try to avoid relying too much on the Unfinished Tales – they are, after all, unfinished). But even had that not happened, succeed or fail, Uglúk’s mission was almost certain to disclose Saruman’s true intent – to gain the One Ring and use it against Sauron. Saruman ought to know this and it ought to factor into his plans.
Given that such operation carried huge, almost entirely locked in risks which couldn’t be mitigated, what were the chances of success? Fairly poor, by my reckoning. The Uruk-Hai are sent to collect a high-value target they cannot recognize from among four possible decoys, facing significant opposition. They’re doing this over a very large geographic area and while Saruman clearly has good intelligence of the Fellowship’s route, there is hardly room for confidence here. Had the Mordor orcs not attacked from the eastern shore of the Anduin two days before (FotR, 455-6), Uglúk may well have arrived to find an impassable river between him and his quarry. Emyn Muil is not small and relatively easy to hide it (it is mountainous, rough-country split by an impassable river).
And that’s not even the end of the potential for failure. Of course there is the failure that did happen, which was grabbing the wrong hobbits. But Saruman can’t even know that the ring will be on one of the hobbits by this point – it was very nearly on Boromir. Since Uglúk and his minions have no idea what they are chasing, had Boromir taken the ring, Uglúk would have killed him, grabbed Merry and Pippin and then run off leaving the mission-critical item behind presumably to be recovered by what remained of the Fellowship. And of course, there is also the threat of the ring being commandeered by Mordor orcs (which doesn’t happen, but clearly could have) or the whole party being intercepted crossing Rohan, which obviously is a major risk, given that it happens.
In short, we can conclude that Uglúk’s mission had a high chance of failure. There are so many things that can go wrong. This is compounded by Saruman’s decision to send a small force, raising the risk that the Fellowship might escape, that Uglúk might simply get intercepted by the Rohirrim, or other failures. This is striking, because once Uglúk fails, Saruman has put himself in a situation where even if he wins, he loses.
Wizard Needs New Strategy, Badly
Now the argument I have seen in the comments is that Saruman isn’t really a dunderhead, he has merely been overcome by strategic complications outside of his control (wizards! Ents!). What I want to show here is that even if everything goes to plan, Saruman still loses. We can see this quite clearly if we ‘game out’ all of the possibilities.
Let’s start by completely removing the Ents and their Huorns. I am going to argue that it was unpardonably stupid for the Ents not to have factored into Saruman’s plans, but for now, let’s remove them from the table.
Once Saruman attacks the Ford and kills Théodred, he is essentially locked into a strategy of war with Rohan (and thus Gondor) and also because of Uglúk’s mission, hostility to Sauron and Mordor. Removing the Ents means that likely a major portion of Saruman’s army survives to defeat at Helm’s Deep. His diminished force might regroup and be able to hold the Ford in the near-term, prohibiting an immediate Rohirrim attack on Isengard. In the slightly longer term, the Muster of the Rohirrim still happens, leaving Théoden with at least six thousand cavalry and some number of infantry (presumably no less than the nearly two thousand he has from the Hornburg, RotK, 79). We’re actually under-counting here, because Théoden is clear when speaking to Gondor’s messengers that his army is quite reduced in size because he still has to garrison his own fortresses and that normally he might be able to ride to Gondor with 10,000 effectives, all apparently cavalry. But there’s no reason he couldn’t apply all of that force against Isengard, which is a more direct and immediate threat.
We can chart the branching possibilities, all of which are pretty good for Sauron and very bad for Saruman. Option 1: Rohan rides against Isengard; Saruman’s host is now badly outnumbered by a force it couldn’t defeat with 3-to-1 odds in its favor and demoralized by recent defeat. This could happen within a matter of days or weeks, so Saruman has no time to really prepare for the attack. Probably his host loses in the field, or else falls back to Isengard for a siege. Weeks later (with that siege perhaps still ongoing), the Witch King’s massive army – having taken Minas Tirith on the morning of the 15th of March – rolls up through Anorien and either conquerors or vassalizes Rohan and then crushes Saruman, if the Rohirrim haven’t already put his head on a pike.
Option 2: Rohan rides against Sauron. If they win, then Saruman holds out in Isengard with his few thousand remaining orcs for a couple of months, perhaps making a nuisance of himself (but probably being largely contained by Erkenbrand’s infantry force – remember, all of Rohan’s infantry is left behind in the ride to Gondor, so Rohan is not denuded of troops). A month or two later, the victorious combined armies of Aragorn II Elessar and Éomer King return from Mordor, the quest have succeeded, and smash Saruman flat. If they lose, then we’re back to the Witch king rolling out over Rohan was an unstoppable army.
But what if everything goes right? Saruman wins at Helm’s Deep. The immediate result is that he is…almost immediately crushed flat by Treebeard and the Ents, who blindside his army and his one fortress, because Saruman has failed to scout out the ‘nation’ of trees that he has been actively provoking for the better part of a year at least – but of course we’re not considering the Ents here (because Saruman sure didn’t). So let’s assume that, as per Saruman’s original plan, the Ents don’t intervene and Saruman wins at the Hornburg. Rohan is effectively removed as a military power; even if the Rohirrim retain military potential, it will take weeks for that potential to regroup around a new leader, since the king and all possible male heirs are dead (resistance might center around Éowyn, who we – having read the next book – might well know would be a far more dangerous opponent than Saruman might suppose).
Saruman will want to move quickly to make sure he can get control of as much territory as possible before that happens. Saruman’s host might reach Edoras, the political center, by the 6th or 7th of March. Minas Tirith, unaided, falls on the 15th. Remember from the Siege of Gondor that there was an entire column of Mordor’s troops in Anorien aiming to interdict the Rohirrim (because the Witch King seems to have planned on the assumption that Saruman would fail, because strategy recognizes lack of strategy, I suppose). Meaning that Saruman might be facing the advance guard of Mordor’s army rolling up through Anorien and into Rohan before the end of the month, with a main force an order of magnitude larger than his own.
The capabilities gap between Saruman’s vaunted ‘Uruk-hai’ and Sauron’s work-a-day army are just massive and deserve to be fully drawn out. Unlike Saruman, the Witch King has a cavalry force nearly the equal of Rohan’s, supported by elephants. He has several kinds of infantry (light corsairs, heavier Haradrim and Orcs) supported by trolls. He has siege artillery and the complex organization needed to dig works rapidly. He has nine magical, despair-and-fear-spreading wraiths. Saruman couldn’t beat 3,000 Rohirrim, while the Witch King’s army was on the verge of crushing 6,000 of them, while also engaging Minas Tirith. Saruman has no hope of doing this army meaningful damage, even with it depleted after a successful attack on Minas Tirith; I don’t think he even has enough forces to meet it in the field, especially with a force depleted by the losses at the Hornburg and the need to pacify Rohan. There’s simply no reason for Sauron to leave his treacherous underling in charge, so it seems fairly safe to assume that Saruman’s head ends up on a pike – probably presented to the remaining Rohirrim nobles as a way to incorporate them into Sauron’s new power-structure as obedient servants.
The only scenario in which Saruman survives, much less wins, is one in which he both defeats Rohan and captures the One Ring (it can hardly do Saruman much good if Uglúk returns with the Ring to a defeated or besieged Isengard, or if Saruman has the ring but no army), and that the ring does everything Saruman hopes it will do. Here
And here I have to note that last assumption: that the ring does everything Saruman hopes it will do. I am not convinced. I actually rather doubt that the One Ring works the way Saruman (or Denethor, or Boromir) imagine. Of these, only Saruman has any notable ring lore, and Saruman’s boast that he is a ‘ring-maker’ (FotR, 310) seems hollow. I tend to share CGP Grey’s understanding of how the ring works: the promises that it can be used to overthrow or replace Sauron are just lies, meant to lure a ring-bearer out of hiding to allow the ring to be recovered by Sauron. Saruman was a Maia of Aulë, like Sauron, so he may understand the ring better than most, but as I think we’ll see pretty clearly here, Saruman is deeply blinded by his pride and the real gap between his power and Sauron’s (ringless power, I might note) is enormous. Moreover, the one thing we do know is that having the One Ring does not render you unbeatable, because Sauron was – with tremendous effort – defeated while wearing it.
Indeed, in the final act of the War of the Ring, Sauron springs his army on Aragorn’s force of roughly 7,000 men assuming Aragorn has taken the ring and means to challenge him. Sauron plays with his prey before doing this. He is entirely confident of victory in this moment and but for Frodo he would have been right. There is one person in this entire story who actually knows how the One Ring works, and he does not think that the One Ring + 7,000 troops (higher quality and more cohesive troops, I might add, than Saruman’s forces, who even after a victory at Helm’s Deep, are unlikely to be much stronger than this) is actually a threat. I am inclined to believe that Sauron is right here and that even with the ring, Saruman is doomed.
Which in turn means that even if Saruman obtained the One Ring and defeated Rohan, he still loses, being smashed flat by the armies of Mordor only months later. And all of that is still without the intervention of Ents or wizards, but merely the conventional military assets already on the board. This is a terrible strategic plan.
Gnawing at Old Plots
Another way of demonstrating the weakness of the plan is to see how it could have been improved. The main problem of the plan is not that it can fail, but that it cannot barely succeed – a failure at any point causes a failure at all points in a plan where success is very often a low probability event. It is one thing if victory requires a hail Mary pass – that is Gandalf’s plan, after all. Desperate times sometimes call for desperate risks. It is quite another if success requires three hail Mary passes joined together by successful onside kicks. We may here again assume the first hail Mary: that the ring works as advertised and should Saruman get it, he would be in a position to ‘win’ so long as he could survive long enough to use it.
The main problem is actually the interaction of the two operations, because the results of the attack on the Fellowship fundamentally change the answer to the strategic question of attacking or not attacking Rohan. If Uglúk succeeds, the attack against Rohan makes sense: the Rohirrim represent the only uncommitted military force who might get to Saruman before he can use the ring to build his power. At the same time, he needs to broaden his resource-base so that he can utilize whatever powers of domination the ring give him to rapidly assemble enough force to oppose Sauron’s inevitable rush to defeat him.
If Uglúk fails but is not detected by Sauron, attacking Rohan still makes sense, as Saruman will both need a base of power but also a demonstrating of his loyalty and usefulness to Sauron. His goal at this point is mere survival as a vassal of Sauron in the near-term.
On the flip side, if Uglúk fails and is detected (the case in fact), Rohan suddenly becomes more valuable alive than dead to Saruman: he needs it (and Gondor) as buffers between him and Sauron. In this case, it is in his best interests to continue to be able to pretend to be a loyal ally of Rohan (using his agent, Wormtongue), a task which is fatally hindered by killing Théodred.
What ought Saruman do (assuming he’s still playing the bad guy)? It seems to me that Uglúk’s force needs to be both larger and also not carrying any distinctive markings indicating that they serve Saruman (whereas Uglúk’s force is liveried with Saruman’s insignia, TT, 20) and crucially it needs some way of signalling success or failure. Saruman can spy with birds and beasts, which might give him a way of having Uglúk signal. In order to signal, Uglúk of course needs to actually know what he is looking for – it does no good if Uglúk signals success on capturing only Merry and Pippin! If Saruman has no agents sufficiently trustworthy to be told what they seek, well then that speaks further to his errors of organization and training.
Saruman should then delay the action against Rohan until he knows with some confidence whether Uglúk has succeeded or failed. By holding off for a few more days, Saruman preserves his freedom of action; his force of 10,000 infantry is valuable/dangerous enough that should he suddenly declare neutrality or even throw in with Rohan and Gondor, no one is likely to look the gift-horse in the mouth. By retaining optionality, Saruman can continue to build strength and bide his time, rather than prematurely committing himself to a side in the conflict.
Instead, Saruman’s decision to simultaneously alienate both the Free Peoples and Sauron (within days of each other!) despite being the weakest local power is strategically catastrophic. It reminds me of Romania’s decision to enter the First World War on the side of the Allies, despite having only the weakest allied power (Russia) as a neighbor and otherwise being geographically beyond all help and far weaker than the Central Powers with which Romania shared a border. It’s not that Romania misjudged the ‘winning’ side (in the event, they didn’t!), but they charged aggressively into a room filled with enemies in hopes of securing the spoils before the war they were sure was ending ended. And to be fair, their war ended quite quickly, just not the way they intended – attacking in August, 1916, they were, by January 1917, effectively occupied and out of the war. To be fair to the Romanians, they lasted five full months; Saruman makes it only a handful of weeks.
What we can see here is the third sin: the failure to update a strategy as conditions change. Once Uglúk fails – and Tolkien tells us “So ended the raid, and no news of it came ever back either to Mordor or to Isengard; but the smoke of the burning rose high to heaven and was seen by many watchful eyes” (TT, 74), which I take to mean that a watchful Saruman would have known it had been destroyed – Saruman ought to have known he needed to change plans. Rohan, a candidate for conquest if Saruman has the ring, becomes a valuable buffer-state if he does not, something to be preserved so that the angry claw of Mordor is that much weaker when it arrives at the Isen. This isn’t my idle speculation either. Gandalf says as much after after Saruman refuses his mercy. Whereas in the film, Gandalf is soley interested in intelligence gathering, book!Gandalf hopes to lead Saruman back onto a good path (though he knows it is unlikely) and alludes to the “great service” he could have rendered (TT, 224). Gandalf’s description of Saruman’s refusal as “folly and evil” (TT, 222) is more than apt.
The Power of Magical Thinking
To this folly we must now add the Ents. I want to make a few things clear. First, the Ents are not an outside-context-problem for Saruman; he is aware of them, knows their secrets and ought to have taken them into consideration. Treebeard himself tells us that Saruman used to walk in his woods and converse with him, and learned his screts (TT, 90). Moreover, they’re not unstoppable either; Treebeard, not knowing that Isengard is nearly totally emptied, thinks it very likely the Ents will be soundly defeated (TT, 106). Saruman has systematically antagonized this important regional power and yet never plans for them becoming a belligerent; indeed, he doesn’t even leave scouts near them and thus only becomes aware of their attack as they breach his fortress. I struggle to communicate how awful this is, as a matter of intelligence gathering and strategic thinking.
How do we account for this? After all, for all of my humor at the beginning, Saruman is not stupid. Why does he end up so deeply in error?
Clearly, part of the answer is overconfidence and arrogance. Saruman, armed with the power of his voice, is likely very used to his schemes and deceptions working and seems to have come to view all of the world, even figures like Gandalf and Sauron, as rubes to be fooled and exploited. That hubris born from easy success is sometimes called ‘victory disease‘ in military contexts (it comes from Fuchida Mitsuo, writing about the Imperial Japanese Navy; on this note Parshall and Tully (2005), 398ff).
Saruman simply assumes everything will go his way. He is blissfully unaware that his ruse to delay Sauron was detected almost immediately (Unfinished Tales) and his clockwork plan demands that every component part – even those likely to be opposed by direct enemy action – go perfectly or the whole thing falls apart, as we’ve seen above. The failure of any element causes the failure of the whole plan. Moreover, these vast clockwork plans make crucial assumptions about the intentions of key players (Théoden, the Ents, Sauron, the Witch King) which both turn out to be wrong in the event, but also betray a dangerously arrogant assumption that (to quote Parshall and Tully on the IJN’s strategic thinking) his oafish enemies, “never failed to go lowing obediently to their choreographed slaughter.” The plans have no failsafes and no contingencies if something should go wrong despite the fact that – as demonstrated above – such contingencies could have been added without changing the overall plan very much.
If I keep coming back to the IJN in WWII, it is because Saruman’s mistakes remind me so much of faulty Japanese thinking in 1941 and 1942. They allowed an operational consideration (‘how best to engage the US Pacific fleet’) to dictate strategic considerations (‘if, when and how should war with the USA be commenced’), produced dangerously complex clockwork plans with extremely narrow and demanding timetables where the failure of any one part could lead to disaster and generally worked under the arrogant assumption of qualitative superiority, which in turn produced a blind inability to accurately gauge their opponent’s resolve and intentions.
And getting to the level of character, what I think informs all of this is our first strategic sin: Saruman is in the end guided not by his planning, but by his anger. What we see in “The Voice of Saruman” is a manipulator who is at best only thinly in control of a deep well of anger. Briefly we glimpse Saruman’s mind, “they saw through the mask the anguish of a mind in doubt, loathing to stay and dreading to leave…then he spoke and his voice was shrill and cold. Pride and hate were conquering him” (TT, 221). Gandalf has, by offering to let Saruman leave, opened one last strategic decision to him – one it is clearly in his interest to take, and yet Saruman cannot do it. He knows his situation is hopeless, and yet the costs are too sunk and he is too deep in his own emotions – the pride and hate – to take the obvious path.
I suspect these emotional concerns were likely working on Saruman from a much earlier date. He has been Rohan’s neighbor for a long time and his outburst shows what he really thinks about them “What is the house of Eorl but a thatched barn where brigands drink in the reek, and their brats roll on the floor among the dogs?” (TT, 219). That such ‘lesser’ beings had been given lordship, had been able to set the world to their sort of order, I think, gnawed at Saruman, for much the same reasons it clearly gnawed at Sauron. I have met a great many very intelligent people who imagine in their formidable mastery of a field that if they could just order the world to their whims, things would be so much better than the current system whereby regular people are allowed to make their own decisions; experience tells us it is not so.
When I discussed the Siege of Gondor, I ended the series by noting that, for all of the flaws of Peter Jackson’s adaptation, I still found it one of the most successful book adaptations in film history, and easily the best fantasy adaptation. In part, this was because while Jackson had missed many of the details, he had managed to capture some of the more fundamental themes of the work; he managed to grasp the spirit of Tolkien, even if he occasionally missed the letter.
I have much the same verdict here. For all of the mess that Jackson makes of the operational timetable, the equipment and the battle tactics, he retains some of the core themes. The temptation to ‘beef up’ Saruman as a second-film threat, to make Helm’s Deep the equal of the Siege of Gondor – especially since, as I understand it, Helm’s Deep was far more difficult and involved from a film-making perspective – must have been intense. And certainly Jackson’s “union of the two towers” title-drop line seeks to put Saruman on a par with Sauron (but of course, it is Saruman who is speaking, so it instead communicates his arrogance). As an aside, while Tolkien wavered initially on which ‘two towers’ are The Two Towers, he settled not on Orthanc and Barad-dur, but on Orthanc and Minas Morgul. Saruman, presumably, would have been upset by the choice.
For as much as gets changed or warps, the essential Saruman – the overconfident amateur, miles out of his depth, whose over-intricate clockwork plans are thwarted by the workman-like generaling of Théoden and Éomer – remains core to the text. Indeed, the visual medium gives Jackson opportunities to really show us that, and the contrast between the duel-of-masters of the Pelennor fields and Saruman’s bumbling incompetence still comes out (even if Jackson has done both Denethor and Théoden quite poorly, in my view).
Jackson has had to drop a great many of the details behind Saruman’s bumbling, although – as we’ve seen – traces of them remain. Saruman’s operations are sloppy, his attack is ill-considered and poorly prepared, his lack of scouting arrangements is unpardonable and the fact that his plan has no contingency for the army of trees he has patiently needled is nothing short of stunningly awful. Film is a compressed medium, as always, and much of this material simply couldn’t fit into a movie that is already incredibly long.
What I wish Jackson had retained more clearly is the conclusion of this sad story. “The Voice of Saruman” makes it into his films (as part of Return of the King in the extended edition), but it is a pale shadow of the book chapter; an uncharacteristically weak adaptation. Gandalf’s motivations are changed from attempting to save the soul of his fallen colleague to a crude effort to gain information – one in which is he is all too transparent (by contrast, the book is clear that Gandalf lets Saruman tempt Théoden, knowing he will fail and hoping that this failure will humble Saruman enough to get him to come down; quite the clever plan, even if he openly admits it has little chance of success – unlike Saruman, he has a backup plan).
What I think is encapsulated in the book version of that dialogue that does not quite make it into Peter Jackson’s telling is that more important than the decision how to fight is the decision if to fight. Jackson retains this message elsewhere in the films – Gandalf’s line in Fellowship about the perils of giving “death in judgement” is kept almost word-for-word – but it could have also appeared here. Gandalf, being wise, retains the ability to choose not to fight to the last, whereas Saruman, in his folly, throws that decision away far too early.
The opportunity to stress the limits of the utility of violence was also lost, I think, in the exclusion of the Dunlendings from the fighting at the Hornburg. While the orcs are presented as implacably hostile, Aragorn’s address gives the Dunlendings pause, while after the battle they are “amazed” by the kind treatment they receive from the Men of Rohan (TT, 177). Yet in the compression, Jackson has kept a bit of this spirit in the film too, in the form of Faramir’s lament for the fallen Haradrim. I am glad that Jackson has kept some of this in the story, though he has missed much more than I would like.
I am reminded of a critique of Game of Thrones I wanted, which blasts the show for indulging in the ‘cult of the badass’ as a deviation from the ‘spirit of Martin.’ I think this is a valid critique; you will not in some of my other writings, I have appropriated this term, the ‘cult of the badass’ because I think it so neatly sums up a set of broken ways of thinking. But I don’t think that, as a critique, it applies only to literary adaptations. I think it is a critique of our fiction, writ large, because it conceals the most important choices that we make; not how to fight, but when to fight. The ‘badass’ is always prepared to leap to violence, often eager to do so. But not Tolkien’s heroes; they enter violent only reluctantly, only having exhausted other opportunities. When an off-ramp from violence presents itself, they try to take it, every time.
I think that is part of the ‘spirit of Tolkien’ to be sure, but I also think it is simply good strategic thinking. Violence, especially modern violence, is so incredibly destructive that leaping to it is rarely the right choice. Part of what makes modern strategy so complex is the layers upon layers of violence avoidance built into it – credibility, deterrence, mutual dependence, and so on. Saruman’s leap to violence destroys him, and his unwillingness to give up violence as a means then dooms him. While Jackson has removed the most potent instance of this message in Tolkien’s work – the scourging of the Shire – he has retained this spirit, which is why I think that Jackson’s adaptations, for all of its flaws, is still a triumph of film-making. For all that was lost, the most important things were preserved.
I want to end on the same note I ended the previous series on, a sort of thesis statement for a lot of what we do here. Relatively few people are going to dig into operational histories, organizational culture studies, or deeply into the primary sources for other, wildly different cultures. What we often, as a culture, understand about these things is what our fiction teaches us. Popular culture is often how we, collectively, wrestle with these issues, so it is worthwhile to ask how much truth and meaning there is in it, and what that means for our discourse.
It is especially important when it comes to the topic of this last post: strategy. As Clausewitz notes (drink!) policy is the domain not of generals, but of the state. Clausewitz is writing in the Prussia of the 1830s and so he has in mind a state vested in a single king and his handful of elite ministers. But most of us, I’ll wager (I don’t actually have to wager, I can see my readership stats sorted by country) live in some sort of democracy. And so that policy – the choice not of how to fight, but when to fight and what is worth fighting for – is left not to a king but to us. We have to be prepared to make those decisions, or to select leaders who make them on our behalf.
Tolkien presents a world where it is often necessary to employ violence, but just as often necessary to restrain it. Jackson may miss some of the details and opportunities, but he captures this spirit – where most modern ‘war’ movies and certainly most adaptations (looking at you, Game of Thrones) miss it entirely. And that’s worth taking a deeper look at.
Next week, something different!
250 thoughts on “Collections: The Battle of Helm’s Deep, Part VIII: The Mind of Saruman”
“Saruman has no agents sufficiently trustworthy to be told what they seek”
Pippin and Merry play on his knowledge of the Ring. To good effect if not exactly in the manner expected.
Grishnakh is a Mordor orc, not an Isengarder.
Totally unclear if he was told about the Ring or information leaked somehow. The whole point of sending Nazgul to the Shire, despite terror-spirits being rather terrible at stealth missions, was that Sauron could trust only them to bring it back, having utterly enslaved them through their Rings.
Wel-l-l-l-l, they play on his knowledge that there is *something* valuable, and Pippin imitates Gollum because he assumes that Grishnakh knows it is the Ring they are looking for. But actually, it could be that Grishnakh doesn’t know . . . not until Pippin gives it away. Meanwhile, it remains true that it doesn’t seem as if Ugluk knows anything more than “capture hobbits, and bring them to me.”
Actually, Ugluk is aware that there is *something* valuable long before then, as he knows hobbits have some sort of “elvish plot”, “something that’s wanted for the War” (that “deep voice” in the discussion is him).
At the same time, Grishnakh clearly knows *a lot* about what is going on. Though as I describe here, even Mordor’s army is highly centralized, much more so than that of Gondor:
Well, it has to be. Orcish military structure mirrors the structure of the culture that supports it, and in turn the character of the two leaders that culture has truly known since the creation of the first orcs.
1. Morgoth’s hunger to consume everything in his path and remake it in his own image, even if it means vivisecting his own soul for raw materials to create the Uruks and Dragons. Grishnkh and Snagga literally inherited this trait from their ancestral creator, and it manifests in their compulsion to stomp out every single blade of grass in their path, even if it means stepping out of their way to do so, as well as their enthusiasm for infighting and cannibalism. Any structure that isn’t highly centralized and rigidly authoritarian invites and endless stream of mutiny, infighting and civil warfare.
2. Sauron’s compulsion to dominate and manipulate, through fear and deception. Sauron derives some of his *legitimacy* from his claim to his (much) bigger brother’s throne, but a lot of his control over Mordor comes from the fact that his armies are more afraid of the spooky wizard/ghost/deity haunting Barad-Dur, than they are of his enemies. Sauron and his wraiths can wield AoE fear magic freely, because it improves the cohesion of his own forces even as it degrades that of his foes.
One wonders how much Sauron resents the cultural and bio-psychological baggage that his inherited armies come bundled with. While less hasty than Saruman, Sauron clearly operate breeding programs to improve his followers, with such successes as sun-resistant sand trolls.
It’s worth mentioning how Saruman really does come off as a (First Order style) fanboy emulating the trappings of the Dark Lords without really understanding why they do the things that they do. As a consequence, he absorbs all the downsides of both leadership styles, while acquiring few of the advantages.
Yeah. I feel that Tolkien has actually intentionally had orcs mirror both organization and culture of modern, standing armies (to an extent at least) due to his experiences in World War I. The language orcs use is actually taken straight from there, whereas even Gondor feels somewhat less formal – but at the same time more humane.
One wonders how much Sauron resents the cultural and bio-psychological baggage that his inherited armies come bundled with… I must admit I’ve never wondered that, but expect resentment is very much in his evil psyche, so *a lot* ?
“One wonders how much Sauron resents the cultural and bio-psychological baggage that his inherited armies come bundled with”
Well, by one writing, Sauron did most of the work of realizing Morgoth’s concept, in which case orc design is mostly his fault anyway.
Howdy Bret, The strategic reasoning here is amazing. I am working on a PhD and part of my dissertation is a model for adaptive rangeland management. Clausewitzen strategic thinking fits perfectly in defending why strategic visioning is required for successful adaptive management. Are the three strategic sins be found directly within Clausewitz’s works? They fit rangeland management perfectly but I have never found any reference to Clausewitz within my disciples literature. Do you have a recommendation for a translation of Clausewitz to read?
Uh, wow. Ok.
1) The three strategic sins as a set are of my own minting, though they appear and are discussed in other works. But as you note, they derive from Clausewitz – in particular the ‘trinity.’ So Clausewitz doesn’t discuss them directly, but I do think they are necessary corollaries of his work (see (3))
2) My go to Clausewitz text is the Michael Howard/Peter Paret translation (here: https://www.amazon.com/War-Indexed-Carl-von-Clausewitz/dp/0691018545/ref=sr_1_1?dchild=1&keywords=howard+paret+clausewitz&qid=1593715056&sr=8-1 ). But…
3) Some caution with Clausewitz. On War (Vom Krieg), his great work, was unfinished at the time of his death. It is hard to read in English or in German and I don’t think anyone really ‘gets’ Clausewitz at first reading. The different sections are in very different phases of preparation – some are merely placeholder notes, others (particularly Book One) are effectively complete. The good news is that book 1 and book 3 are going to be the ones you want, and they’re the ones that are basically ‘done.’
The bad news is that completion doesn’t make them much more readable. The Howard/Paret volume has a good deal of additional essays that can help explain a bit of the mess to a degree.
I’ve jokingly compared learning Clausewitz to an introductory ritual into a mystery cult before, but it’s not far off for students of military history or modern strategy. You have that day where you read the sacred text of Clausewitz (are very confused) and then the professor reveals the multi-layered mysteries by which war, at once one is at the same time both two (ideal and real) and yet three (the marvelous trinity). So it may help, once you’ve read it, to see if you can’t sit down with a military historian at your institution to discuss and unfold it.
So what would be best “introduction” to Clausewitz? Some of Byzantine military manuals?
I found your blog last week and have powered through three of your Collections already, taking feverish notes the entire time; your content is fantastic. I have to apologize in advance, since I can almost guarantee that you’ve gotten this question before. I can’t find it anywhere, so here we go.
What video game(s) do you believe offer the most complete picture of premodern or medieval warfare? Things like realistic logistics, complete sieges, and logical cavalry behavior come to mind as things you’ve mentioned video games frequently do poorly. I’m a Total War player; are those games just about as good as it gets?
To be fair Gandalf explicitly suggests that Aragorn lead venture not so much because the ring does not work, but because Sauron will feel he has not the time to master it (because he assumes Aragorn has it or maybe Gandalf). Big S plays because he is confident Aragorn is overplaying his hand, not so much that it would never work in the longer run Strategically the good guys were a in a pretty good situation when you add all the info in the appendixes. Realistically Aragorn or Gandalf could have sat back in Gondor made any number of moves that risked no key players (given the navy balance at the at point even attacked Umbar), they had a free seeing stone now. S was down one Nazgul and could not replace him (and the means to drop another). Really if Elrond showed up the River could have been made impassable. With Ents back in the game one assumes thay and Galadriel and the victorious wood elves could have cleaned up Mirkwood back to the Green Wood. No Balrog so really mithral is on the menu.
I know JRRT tried to walk back the book’s claim’s by Galadriel. But she was second only to Feanor in power and her brother was not completely defeated by S in a one on one. So I tend to agree with Gandalf getting the ring was not a game type power up but a process.
Overall I think the whole pray to Eru looks pretty doggy on Gandalf’s part strategically. Toss that thing in sea (not someplace S had much influence over) and the ‘west’ actually kinda looks like it had the power to win again without a uber risky plan that in fact more or less failed but for an odd bit of luck.
In the books, Sauron had control over unspecified but apparently vast dominions to the east, so even if his first assault failed, he could just keep raising army after army until the Free Peoples were eventually overwhelmed. Also, several of the things you cite (loss of the Umbar navy, loss of the Witch King, Ents back in the game, killing of the Balrog) hadn’t yet happened when Gandalf formed his plan, and so couldn’t have factored into it, even assuming that they were big factors in the first place. We don’t know, for example, what proportion of the Umbar navy was lost to Aragorn, nor is it clear that the Ents would have been willing to go and fight in Mirkwood, or that the orcs there couldn’t have defended themselves even if they had (Saruman was taken by surprise when his entire army was away on campaign, that wouldn’t be the case with Dol Guldur).
True but was Gandalf’s actual plan? It not like he left a check list. Than it is just a hail Eru pass.
On East who it was all that well inhabited? JRRT does not say but humans are not orcs.
Umbar navy. Not that big of a country. Using slaves. And all ships captured without damage and all crew destroyed and slaves free. Pretty hard to think Umbar had a plan B navy waiting around. This was after all the big push. I mean what 40 years earlier Aragorn was able to burn their docks and fleet in port, so its not like they had endless navy.
Dol Guder Lets see the second most power Nolder ever with a ring against what exactly?
The real question is why Elrond did not get his his lazy butt over to Gondor to use his ring to make the Anduin an impassible death trap and why Glorfindel was not killing some Nazgul [Or frankly why not 10 walkers because the plan looks a lot better with Glorfindel saying time go Gandalf don’t worry I got this been here done this before Balrogs and all, and now and tell Aragorn how you intend to get into Mordor and stop keeping it to yourself]- since S could not make any more ring slaves even though held some 9+ rings. Without the one he could not make more slaves.
Ents they did go and destroy the blocking force that could have still threatens Rohan so they seem to have been all in. Which of course also means Rohan was in a position to send more men.
Just saying really that JJRT set up a reasonably good situation to add final tension. If the ring was simply escorted to the deep of the sea (not Sauron’s milieu). The west looked to be having a good day and it could have been better. Still a cold war basically but one where things had not looked so good in a while.
Elrond has a ring, called the Ring of Air, and Elrond has control of the river of Rivendell. The text never connects the two facts. The text suggests Elrond has control over *that* river, not rivers in general. Perhaps there’s a magical dam he can open.
Glorfindel may have been committed to the defense of Rivendell.
On East who it was all that well inhabited? JRRT does not say but humans are not orcs.
Gandalf states in TTT that Sauron’s invasion is being launched prematurely, before he’s had the chance to build up his full strength, and after the Battle of the Pelennor Fields everyone seems to think that he’ll just send another, even bigger, army now that his first one’s been destroyed. So whatever the population under Sauron’s control, it’s apparently big enough to raise and support multiple huge armies.
Umbar navy. Not that big of a country. Using slaves. And all ships captured without damage and all crew destroyed and slaves free. Pretty hard to think Umbar had a plan B navy waiting around. This was after all the big push. I mean what 40 years earlier Aragorn was able to burn their docks and fleet in port, so its not like they had endless navy.
I don’t think we’re ever actually told how much territory is under Umbar’s control. Even if it’s not that big, relatively small countries can become naval powers if they focus on it — cf. Athens, Carthage, Venice.
As I said above, Sauron’s attack is launched prematurely, so the Umbarites might not have had time to gather a big navy. Even if they did, states very rarely sent their entire naval force even on a major campaign — due to logistical constraints, the unwieldiness of vast forces, other commitments, the desire to maintain a strategic reserve in case something goes wrong, etc. So it would be very surprising if the ships captured by Aragon represent the entirety, or even the vast majority, of Umbar’s fleet.
Finally, tere’s the issue of quality to consider. Umbar might use galley slaves, but judging by historical examples, their officers, marines, navigators, etc., would all be free men, who presumably won’t just turn round and enthusiastically embrace Aragorn’s cause. To launch a naval expedition, then, Aragorn would have to draft Gondorians or Rohirrim, and since neither people has a noted maritime tradition, they’d find themselves at a qualitative disadvantage against their enemies.
The real question is why Elrond did not get his his lazy butt over to Gondor to use his ring to make the Anduin an impassible death trap
I don’t think we’re given any indication that Elrond’s powers extend over rivers in general, as oppose to (that specific stretch of) that specific river. Even if they did, keeping an entire thousand-mile river indefinitely impassable is a much taller order than sweeping away nine individuals from a specific ford.
Ents they did go and destroy the blocking force that could have still threatens Rohan so they seem to have been all in. Which of course also means Rohan was in a position to send more men.
That blocking force was fighting for Saruman, whom the ents were angry at. Being willing to destroy Saruman’s army doesn’t equate to being all-in for the fight against evil in general. And even if they were, ents aren’t invincible. They were lucky in catching Saruman when his army had already left, and the orcs when they were already routing from Theoden. Had Saruman been forewarned of their attack, it’s quite possible that he could have beaten them off.
I think calling it a Hail Mary pass undersells things. We would consider praying to God or hoping that divine will makes things fall out in our favor to be a sign of bad leadership; for Gandalf, who has met with Eru Illuvatar in person (as much as a disembodied spirit can be said to have done anything “in person”) this is just trusting that his boss has his back, and that if Gandalf can do 90% of the work his boss is good for the last 10%.
Having finished both Siege of Gondor, and powered through the Battle of Helm’s Deep, I’ve really appreciated them.
Two things, though, about your conclusions. First, he COULD NOT TELL his Uruk about the Ring… because, given their outlook, on finding it, whichever found it would, immediately, put it on… and Sauron would know instantly, and there’s pteridactyl-riding air cavalry on the way.
Secondly, I think Saruman *did* understand how to use it, though full use would require actually having it, and he would be the worst person other than Sauron to get it, because it clearly allows the wearer to persuade, to warp someone’s mind, or many minds at once… just as he could with his (super)natural abilities.
> Sauron would know instantly
Maybe, if they put it on with the full intent of claiming it for what it was, like Frodo at Mount Doom. Normally wearing the One does not notify Sauron, let alone locate the wearer for him. Sam wore the One, knowing what it was, right on the edge of Mordor, without Sauron noticing a thing. Sauron almost located Frodo earlier but I think Frodo being on Amon Hen, the Hill of Seeing, must have played a big role in that.
The real problem wouldn’t be Sauron, it would be the orc running off with the One rather than bringing it to Saruman.
Yeah, but the fact remains that no matter how good your wizardly mind-control mojo is, orcs are treacherous little bastards with the Song of Morgoth playing on infinite loop in their heads.
The idea that they can be trusted with any degree of tactical independence falls apart in pretty much any situation where it’s been tried.
I have no problems with the fantasy part of the article, but my history autism is triggered by the RL analogies.
“The classic example being functionally every major power in the First World War: by 1915 or 1916, it ought to have been obvious that no gains made as a result of the war could possibly be worth its continuance. Yet it was continued, both because having lost so much it seemed wrong to give up without ‘victory’ and also because, for the politicians who had initially supported the war, to admit it was a useless waste was political suicide.”
There was exactly one power, which would have needed to concede occupied territories for the sake of a status quo peace, which utterly refused to even consider an idea of peace without territorial gains (even when attempting to divide the enemy coalition by putting feelers for a separate peace to individual members), and which, coincidentally, was approximately 90% responsible for the war. Germany.
even if the Rohirrim retain military potential, it will take weeks for that potential to regroup around a new leader, since the king and all possible male heirs are dead (resistance might center around Éowyn, who we – having read the next book – might well know would be a far more dangerous opponent than Saruman might suppose).
well now I want to read about that AU.
In Battle for Middle-Earth’s Evil campaign, winning at the Hornburg and killing all the Rohan heroes present results in Eowyn being the one to show up at the final battle of Pelennor Fields. She even gives most of Theoden’s famous speech… though tragically her heroism is usually undone by a balrog being summoned in the middle of her formation, because late-game Battle for Middle-Earth is pretty crazy.
>[The Romanians] were, by January 1917, effectively occupied and out of the war. To be fair to the Romanians, they lasted five full months
Not to detract from the overall point, but this might not be the best example here. Romania actually stayed in the war as long as Russia (after indeed losing most of their territory in months), re-entered one day before the Armistice, and eventually made off like bandits at Versailles/Trianon. Their entering the war might be a better example of an action that was terrible at the operational level but quite successful at the strategy/policy level.
Wikipedia says that the Entente demanded that Romania enter the war when they did to be rewarded in the peace. This seems to have been because the Entente overestimated both Romania’s military strength and how much of the German army was being tied up on the Western Front. One could argue that this made sense, the theory being that while the CP could crush Romania, the resources required to do so would weaken the CP enough for the Allies to achieve the ever-elusive “breakthrough” in the west, and that even if that didn’t work and Romania was occupied, it wouldn’t actually matter too much to the final outcome since if the Allies won they could just give Romania the land it wanted anyway (or not).
Though keep in mind, the demands to enter or not enter the war at specific junctures were always negotiating positions.
I agree with alot of what you say but I’m not sure Saruman had a huge number of other options. He’s convinced that Sauron is going to destroy Gondor and the west will fall, so he really only has two options.
If he defects to Saurons side then he needs some sort of bargaining chip to show his new master his loyalty, handing over the ring would be by far the best option, handing over a subjigated Rohan would be second choice, or at a pinch causing enough chaos to prevent Rohan riding to the aid of Gondor might do it as well.
Obviously the second option, get the ring and try to use its power himself, is even better. If the ring has the power to bend the other ring bearers to its will then that might be enough to turn the Nazgul to Saruman’s service. The Nazgul lead Sauron’s armies so Saruman gets those by proxy as well and could use them to march on Mordor, crush Sauron and take his place. Of course if he can’t use the ring then he goes back to plan 1 and gives it to Sauron in exchange for power as a subordinate with the excuse that “I was going to give it to you all along master, honestly…”
So by going for the ring and invading Rohan at the same time he hedges his bets well, and might have got away with it if it wasn’t for those pesky Ents, but they take weeks even to say hello, it will be years before they get organised enough to actually do anything. As long as no clever Hobbits trick them into acting hastily, obviously…
His plan may not be the best, and he’s certainly not a military genius (or even competent) but its hard to see any other options that have a better shot of survival for him.
He could have leaned into his strengths, i.e. his spy network and his compelling voice, to more fully subvert Theoden’s rule and presented Rohan as his de facto tributary state when Sauron came rolling up Anduin. He could have waited until Rohan marched to aid Gondor and then quickly assaulted Edoras. He could have openly declared for Sauron and sat his Uruks on the banks of the Isen River; holding the ford would keep them in supply range of Isengard and force Rohan to keep a good portion of its forces back in Rohan, thereby reducing what they could send to the fight at Minas Tirith. Moreover, if it was functionally impossible to take Rohan, then Sauruman could have sat in his tower and waited for Sauron to come up and then present him with this 10,000 Uruk-strong army as a signing-on bonus. But turning to evil made him overly ambitious and so he didn’t want to serve Sauron as a minion, he wanted his own kingdom to set himself up as some sort of co-equal Ring-ruler.
What an intellectually entertaining series! Thank you very much for everything you wrote (and will write!).
It is a rare pleasure to read!
I think it’s worth noting that, while modern war us far more destructive in “absolute” terms than anything before the twentieth century, ancient warfare could be just as destructive in relative terms—sometimes more so. While a war between small tribes won’t have the raw body count if a World War, nor as many bombed cities, it can absolutely result in the destruction of important economic resources and an even greater proportional death toll.
In my opinion, modern warfare is most distinguished from ancient warfare in how distant most people are from it. In the Roman Republic, much of the Roman population would have been soldiers (insufficient googling suggests that 10% of the entire population may have been in the army at some points), and most of its leaders would have seen (and often lead) battles.
In much of the modern world, fewer people personally experience war (thankfully!), modern technology means that soldiers might not even see the people they kill, and our political leaders are usually better versed in politics than combat. People need to actively try to learn if they are to understand what war is like, and few people have the time.
My nation has been at war for most of my lifetime, but the only way that’s directly affected me is news reports. The same is true, I think, for most Americans. That’s historically unusual, isn’t it?
Yes and no? Azar Gat discusses relative levels of violence in different periods of history in his War and Human Civilization (which you should read instead of Pinker’s The Better Angels of our Nature because Gat is better).
My nation has been at war for most of my lifetime, but the only way that’s directly affected me is news reports. The same is true, I think, for most Americans. That’s historically unusual, isn’t it?
Not necessarily. I think the main distinction isn’t between modern and pre-modern warfare, so much as between countries that rely on long-service professionals to fill their ranks — early imperial Rome, 18th- and 19th-century Britain, etc. — and countries that rely on some sort of mass levy — republican Rome, most combatants in WW1 and WW2, and so on.
I’m not saying that being at war is the unusual part, I’m saying that being unaffected by it is unusual. You only get that when states constantly project force outside their own borders without facing significant consequences or recruiting much of the population, which in practice seems to require a large state with plenty of buffer space. The only possible examples before the early modern period I can think of are the Roman Empire and China; Rome’s citizens were martial-focused enough that I’m not sure how unaffected the average citizen would be, and I just don’t know enough about Chinese history to say much about them.
And I’m saying that being unaffected by it is not that unusual. In fact, it’s probably been the case with most large and stable empires through history.
And Rome’s citizens — most of them, at any rate — weren’t really that martial-focused during the imperial period. After the first century AD, most of the army was recruited from frontier provinces, leaving the traditional heartlands of the empire quite demilitarised.
Well, as long as I’m sure you’re disagreeing with what I meant to say.
“the promises that it can be used to overthrow or replace Sauron are just lies, meant to lure a ring-bearer out of hiding to allow the ring to be recovered by Sauron”
I don’t think that argument is tenable. Saruman, Galadriel and Gandalf all seem to disagree. The LOTR is clear on that. JRRT indeed equivocates in his really bad late thankfully not published re write of Galadriel. But at the end she still clearly stated as the second greatest Noldor ever and does with her ring best admittedly indirectly Sauron in a dual of Power. Her bother does lose in a more direct battle but he not in the best circumstance and still is not fully broken. Sauron is strong but I mean he got beat by two men and a Nodler who did not even go to the west.
Frodo visions on seat of seeing are clearly beyond his ability and facilitated by the ring. Galadriel makes it clear he can see her ring only because he has the one. And if the ring is full of lies why would Sauron act over quick thinking Aragorn has it? He must have felt even Argorn could master some set of its power to his will. If nothing else it set up an interesting situation about who could master the Nazgul – Sauron holding their rings or a sufficient master of the One.
But critically Gandalf’s strategy at that last debate makes no sense or is a lie outright if both he and Suaron do not believe there are those in the West good guy side who could bend the ring to their will and (even if in the long run a path of corruption) in the short raise themselves up to strike him down.
“Sauron is strong but I mean he got beat by two men and a Nodler who did not even go to the west.”
That’s not really accurate. Tolkien doesn’t provide details regarding Sauron defeat, we know that he killed Gil-Galad and Elendil, he was overthrown (whatever that means) and then Isildur cut the Ring from his finger.
While the popular idea that Gil-Galad and Elendil fatally wounded Sauron is a possible interpretation of the above, is not the only one and Sauron could have just killed them easily and then be overwhelmed by the number of enemy soldiers.
Anyway, Sauron was defeated in battle and that shouldn’t be a surprise, as he was unable to beat Numenor previously. The ring doesn’t make one invincible and a lot of guys with pointy sticks are still the deciding factor on the battlefield.
Thus whatever Galadriel, Saruman or Gandalf think about using the ring to become the new Dark Lord, they are clearly wrong. It’s too late for that and the military balance has shifted too much in Sauron favour.
There’s no great military power in Middle Earth outside of Gondor (other than Sauron of course), and Gondor was going to fall.
Thus Gandalf plan of destroying the ring was the only possible path to victory.
Gandalf: “It was Gil-galad, Elven-king and Elendil of Westernesse who overthrew Sauron, though they themselves perished in the deed; and Isildur Elendil’s son cut the Ring from Sauron’s hand and took it for his own.”
Sounds more personal than getting ganked with spearmen saving the day.
“The ring doesn’t make one invincible and a lot of guys with pointy sticks are still the deciding factor on the battlefield.” — agreed
“Thus whatever Galadriel, Saruman or Gandalf think about using the ring to become the new Dark Lord, they are clearly wrong. It’s too late for that and the military balance has shifted too much in Sauron favour.” — disagree
It’s contradicted by the text. Sauron is afraid of Aragorn as a new Ringlord, and strikes earlier than planned to stop him from mastering the Ring. Granted, Sauron has been wrong before, so maybe he’s being overly paranoid but we can’t *know* that for certain. And while the balance favors Sauron at the moment, I can see how the Ring could change the odds. Tolkien’s vague about its powers, but some stuff we know or can infer:
* Intimidate and disrupt Sauron’s forces. Sam did this by accident to one goblin of Cirith Ungol, the Ring making him seem like a great menace. A Ringlord could presumably do this deliberately, creating a dread among Sauron’s troops. Enough to overcome Sauron’s own mental influence? Unclear, but proximity matters (Letter 246).
* Neutralize the Nazgul. Letter 246 says that Frodo, as new “Ringlord”, would be immune to direct assault by the Nazgul, even with Sauron having primary control of their wills by physically holding their Rings. A mature Ringlord still might not be able to seize control of them, but could probably complicate using them as nearby commanders, and neutralize their fear effect on his own army — which is their main power.
* Bolster the morale of his own troops, whether directly or by giving really impressive pre-battle speeches.
Gondor’s forces are outnumbered, but a second-worst case scenario (for Sauron) is Aragorn playing Alexander, leading his disciplined corps to carve through superior but disorganized masses.
The worst-case scenario is… Sauron’s forces are bolstered through his direct mental influence (as we see when he falls, and they’re left disorganized or even witless.) What if Ringlord Aragorn (or Galadriel, or Saruman who’s *already* good at this sort of thing) can replace Sauron’s influence with his own? Then every army Sauron throws at him goes over to him. :O And you can imagine more subtle versions of that, like bargaining with the various enemy commanders to bring them over to his side, more personally enhanced by the Ring and giving speeches like “I hold Sauron’s life and power in my hand”. You could get a snowball effect where Sauron is left with only his most disciplined or aligned forces (trolls? orcs? human sorcerers like the Mouth?) and Aragorn has taken over at least most of the humans.
Plus whatever perceptual advantages the Ring + palantir combination might give him.
Why couldn’t Sauron do all that to the Numenorean armies back in the Second Age? Because they were awesome. Most explicitly, they had mental powers of their own. If you think of the Ring as a massive Jedi mind trick, Sauron’s forces are weak of will and the Numenoreans were very much not. They were kind of like mass-produced (human breeding) elf-substitutes. They weren’t immune — Sauron wormed into them when taken to Numenor — but on the battlefield Ar-Pharazon’s grand army intimidated *Sauron’s* troops into running away despite the One.
Could Aragorn with the Ring actually have overthrown Sauron? ‘Mu’. But textually, Sauron was afraid of it, and there are at least some causal paths to victory, as above.
Galadriel wouldn’t start out with as much military power, but she would bring a much more powerful and experienced mind. Saruman even more so, with a mind particularly experienced in mental domination, and greater spiritual power as a Maia, and no qualms about dominating orcish troops. (Ignoring the chance of Saruman simply wrenching the Ring to himself, destroying Sauron at the source. — Letter 246 again.)
“It’s contradicted by the text. Sauron is afraid of Aragorn as a new Ringlord, and strikes earlier than planned to stop him from mastering the Ring.”
We never get to know Sauron’s thoughts, all we have are suppositions from other characters, and I don’t remember anyone saying that Sauron was afraid.
Attacking Minas Tirith before Aragorn and the Rohirrim can arrive to its help makes strategic sense, even without considering the Ring. And it would have worked, had not been for a series of unexpected events.
Furthermore, if mastering the Ring is the key to achieve victory as you are implying, the logical move for Aragorn or Gandalf would be to run to the extreme west of Middle Earth or in an elven stronghold, far from Sauron’s reach. They do the opposite, putting themselves in danger.
The attack on the Black Gate makes no sense if the Ring works like you say, as Sauron would think that something is off. But if the Ring is a trap… then the attack can work as a bait for Sauron.
“The worst-case scenario is… Sauron’s forces are bolstered through his direct mental influence (as we see when he falls, and they’re left disorganized or even witless.) What if Ringlord Aragorn (or Galadriel, or Saruman who’s *already* good at this sort of thing) can replace Sauron’s influence with his own? Then every army Sauron throws at him goes over to him.”
I’m sure Isildur would have loved to be able to do that. But he died in a stupid ambush organized by orcs after Sauron was defeated.
No, Sauron followers are not mind controlled by him, nor can they be mind controlled by the Ring master.
“Why couldn’t Sauron do all that to the Numenorean armies back in the Second Age? Because they were awesome. Most explicitly, they had mental powers of their own. If you think of the Ring as a massive Jedi mind trick, Sauron’s forces are weak of will and the Numenoreans were very much not. They were kind of like mass-produced (human breeding) elf-substitutes. They weren’t immune — Sauron wormed into them when taken to Numenor — but on the battlefield Ar-Pharazon’s grand army intimidated *Sauron’s* troops into running away despite the One.”
So the Ring can’t make an outmatched army win.
Now Aragorn army is outmatched (probably more than Sauron was by Numenor) and is composed by non Numenorean men (which would have been present in Sauron’s army too.)
Why should things go differently this time?
Like, the Ring has never worked in the way you describe. It has never brought great victories to its master. In fact, all its owners have suffered only failures and defeats, Sauron included.
Isildur didn’t try to use the Ring on those orcs.
Also, there is in fact no evidence that Sauron outmatched Aragorn’s army as the Numenorean army outmatched him, let alone by more. Especially since that would make hay of the “strategic sense” army. If he were that powerful, that would be unnecessary.
> all we have are suppositions from other characters
“And yet, Pippin, I feel from afar his haste and fear. He has begun sooner than he would. Something has happened to stir him.’”
Not clear if that’s Gandalf guessing or perceiving. Long-distance mental perception — telepathy, really — is subtle but present in this world.
Then in the Reader’s Companion, a manuscript is quoted:
“bethought him [Sauron] of the winged mounts; and yet withheld them, until things became almost desperate and he was forced to launch his war in haste.”
That’s not a character, that’s Tolkien the Author writing.
And as I’ve already quoted in the comments here, Hunt for the Ring (UT) has
“Now Sauron learning of the capture of Gollum by the chiefs of his enemies was in great haste and fear.” “At length they returned; but the summer was now far waned, and the wrath and fear of Sauron was mounting.” Again, that’s the Author speaking. Sauron is afraid of someone else getting the One.
> the logical move for Aragorn or Gandalf would be to run to the extreme west
I never said it was an I-win button, which is clearly wasn’t, I simply sketched a way in which it could amplify forces. It helps to still have some force to amplify. Also if you care about Gondor etc. it helps to not let it be overrun.
> The attack on the Black Gate makes no sense if the Ring works like you say, as Sauron would think that something is off.
This is addressed in the text.
“‘As Aragorn has begun, so we must go on. We must push Sauron to his last throw. We must call out his hidden strength, so that he shall empty his land. We must march out to meet him at once. We must make ourselves the bait, though his jaws should close on us. He will take that bait, in hope and in greed, for he will think that in such rashness he sees the pride of the new Ringlord: and he will say: “So! he pushes out his neck too soon and too far. Let him come on, and behold I will have him in a trap from which he cannot escape. There I will crush him, and what he has taken in his insolence shall be mine again for ever.” ”
> I’m sure Isildur would have loved to be able to do that.
But he hadn’t mastered it yet. UT:
“‘Atarinya,’ he said, ‘what of the power that would cow these foul creatures and command them to obey you? Is it then of no avail?’”
“‘Alas, it is not, senya. I cannot use it. I dread the pain of touching it. And I have not yet found the strength to bend it to my will. It needs one greater than I now know myself to be. My pride has fallen. It should go to the Keepers of the Three.’”
> No, Sauron followers are not mind controlled by him,
They’re not puppets, as the Cirith Ungol massacre shows, but they’re definitely under his influence, something like a “+3 Morale to all units” in wargame terms. Just Sauron focusing his attention on Frodo weakens his army:
“But the Nazgûl turned and fled, and vanished into Mordor’s shadows, hearing a sudden terrible call out of the Dark Tower; and even at that moment all the hosts of Mordor trembled, doubt clutched their hearts, their laughter failed, their hands shook and their limbs were loosed. The Power that drove them on and filled them with hate and fury was wavering, its will was removed from them; and now looking in the eyes of their enemies they saw a deadly light and were afraid.”
And Sauron’s death completely disorganizes them:
“The Captains bowed their heads; and when they looked up again, behold! their enemies were flying and the power of Mordor was scattering like dust in the wind. As when death smites the swollen brooding thing that inhabits their crawling hill and holds them all in sway, ants will wander witless and purposeless and then feebly die, so the creatures of Sauron, orc or troll or beast spell-enslaved, ran hither and thither mindless; and some slew themselves, or cast themselves in pits, or fled wailing back to hide in holes and dark lightless places far from hope.”
Saruman does a smaller version of the same thing:
“I am weary as I have seldom been before, weary as no Ranger should be with a clear trail to follow. There is some will that lends speed to our foes and sets an unseen barrier before us: a weariness that is in the heart more than in the limb.”
“‘Truly!’ said Legolas. ‘That I have known since first we came down from the Emyn Muil. For the will is not behind us but before us.’ He pointed away over the land of Rohan into the darkling West under the sickle moon.”
And somewhere in HoME is a passage about the orcs of Beleriand feeling the will of Morgoth on them, like an eye, so that they hated him but served him.
> So the Ring can’t make an outmatched army win.
Not when sufficiently outmatched, especially by an army that has good Will saves. Fighting Numenoreans is not the same as fighting orcs that were probably *made* to be dominated.
> all its owners have suffered only failures and defeats, Sauron included.
It has only ever had one owner who really used it, Sauron. Who dominated most of the Middle-earth and beat up the elves, but lost to Numenoreans. Who, again, are blessed magical telepathic humans.
The One certainly has power. Again, Sam benefited from it by accident:
“It was no more than six paces from him when, lifting its head, it saw him; and Sam could hear its gasping breath and see the glare in its bloodshot eyes. It stopped short aghast. For what it saw was not a small frightened hobbit trying to hold a steady sword: it saw a great silent shape, cloaked in a grey shadow, looming against the wavering light behind; in one hand it held a sword, the very light of which was a bitter pain, the other was clutched at its breast, but held concealed some nameless menace of power and doom.”
Imagine being able to control that power consciously.
beat up the elves, but lost to Numenoreans
But didn’t Tolkien, the Author also say that Sauron did not lose, but that it was by design he yielded allowed himself to be taken a prisoner to Numenor?
I’ll try to be short.
I’m not going to take face value everything that Tolkien wrote, because he wrote everything and its opposite, so we don’t get a fully coherent picture.
For example in letter 236 he said “Of the others only Gandalf might be expected to master him (the Ring)”, which would imply that Galadriel was deluding herself about using the Ring.
Which would support my point, but we could go on all the day citing contradictory letters and manuscripts.
For me the best way to proceed is to use the Lord of the Rings, and only that, and to try to make a coherent picture out of the facts described there.
Let’s start with the speech before the attack on the Black Gate. It is said “for he will think that in such rashness he sees the pride of the new Ringlord: and he will say: “So! he pushes out his neck too soon and too far. Let him come on, and behold I will have him in a trap from which he cannot escape. There I will crush him, and what he has taken in his insolence shall be mine again for ever.”
This doesn’t seem to imply any fear. Sauron would be sure of winning the battle and recovering the Ring. If he wasn’t he would not accept battle and the whole feint would not work.
About Isildur you quoted (not from LotR but let it pass for this time) “Alas, it is not, senya. I cannot use it. I dread the pain of touching it. And I have not yet found the strength to bend it to my will. It needs one greater than I now know myself to be.”
So Isildur couldn’t use the Ring. How could Aragorn master it in a matter of weeks, when Isildur failed after two years?
Another thing to consider is that the Ring seems to have a will of its own. Gandalf says in FotR “A Ring of Power looks after itself, Frodo. It may slip off treacherously, but its keeper never abandons it.”
So if the Ring betrayed Isildur, Sauron would probably think that the same is happening with Aragorn.
After all the last time he left the Ring in the hands of his enemies it was a disaster for them.
Lastly about the morale influence: yes, I do not doubt that Sauron influenced the morale of his troops, neither I doubt that Numenoreans could be immune to mind tricks.
What I doubt is that the Numenoreans had a sort of “morale debuff” that cause Sauron army to melt away.
I don’t think that first because they are just men, tall and strong but men. And second because that only happened against Ar-Pharazon, not against the Last Alliance. Not to say orcs had fought Noldor in other occasions, which should have even greater majesty than Numenoreans.
Then why they deserted Sauron only against Ar-Pharazon’s army? Evidently because that army was too powerful, not because of Numenorean magical powers that never got used in any other occasion.
> But didn’t Tolkien, the Author also say that Sauron did not lose, but that it was by design he yielded allowed himself to be taken a prisoner to Numenor?
Allowed himself to be taken prisoner rather than running away himself. What Tolkien chose to publish in LotR:
“He resolved to challenge Sauron the Great for the supremacy in Middle-earth, and at length he himself set sail with a great navy, and he landed at Umbar. So great was the might and splendour of the Númenóreans that Sauron’s own servants deserted him; and Sauron humbled himself, doing homage, and craving pardon. Then Ar-Pharazôn in the folly of his pride carried him back as a prisoner to Númenor. It was not long before he had bewitched the King and was master of his counsel; and soon he had turned the hearts of all the Númenóreans, except the remnant of the Faithful, back towards the darkness.”
And before that, in Letter 131:
“When he learned that Sauron had taken the title of King of Kings and Lord of the World, he resolved to put down the ‘pretender’. He goes in strength and majesty to Middle-earth, and so vast is his armament, and so terrible are the Númenóreans in the day of their glory that Sauron’s servants will not face them. Sauron humbles himself, does homage to Tar-Calion, and is carried off to Númenor as hostage and prisoner. But there he swiftly rises by his cunning and knowledge from servant to chief counsellor of the king, and seduces the king and most of the lords and people with his lies.”
The Akallabeth is a bit different:
“And Sauron came. Even from his mighty tower of Baraddûr he came, and made no offer of battle. For he perceived that the power and majesty of the Kings of the Sea surpassed all rumour of them, so that he could not trust even the greatest of his servants to withstand them; and he saw not his time yet to work his will with the Dúnedain. And he was crafty, well skilled to gain what he would by subtlety when force might not avail.”
There his servants don’t desert, because he doesn’t give them the chance, because he thinks they would.
“Of the Rings of Power” splits the difference:
“So great was the power and splendour of the Númenóreans in the noontide of their realm that the servants of Sauron would not withstand them, and hoping to accomplish by cunning what he could not achieve by force, he left Middle-earth for a while and went to Númenor as a hostage of Tar-Calion the King.”
In any version, there’s no actual battle, either because Sauron’s forces melt away, or he doesn’t give them a chance. He comes to Numenor as a feigned prisoner, but none of those versions suggest that he dismissed his armies as a feint. Even with his will and the One Ring behind them, they would not have stood up to the grandeur of Numenor. If the One is a +3 to Morale checks, facing Ar-Pharazon’s army is like -10.
That is, he may be a feigned prisoner. The earlier versions imply he started as a genuine prisoner. It probably matters how fast you can run away, or for a Maia, discorporate your body.
I say earlier but without getting into the weeds of HoME (History of Middle-earth) I don’t know how the Akallabeth text compares to the Appendix A text. The “Tar-Calion” ones are clearly earlier.
Thanks for your thorough scholarship! I believe it must have been the Akallabeth version I was thinking of.
“to use the Lord of the Rings, and only that”
Fine. That leaves us with both Aragorn and Gandalf saying Sauron is afraid. They could be wrong, but why would Tolkien want to make them wrong, how does that strengthen the story? The theme of people rejecting the Ring’s power for principled reasons is not improved by the power not actually being an option.
“too soon and too far”
*Too soon*. Implying the feigned Ringlord would be too reckless, and that some other approach would be more likely to work.
“when Isildur failed after two years?”
Hard to master the ring when you can barely touch it for pain. I’d venture the One extra-hated Isildur for taking it.
“all the last time he left the Ring”
Sauron never *left* the Ring.
‘I doubt is that the Numenoreans had a sort of “morale debuff”’
Good thing I never said that. I brought up mental powers just as a reason for them to resist influence, I never said they were telepathically contesting Sauron’s will over his troops. All the texts are quite clear that Ar-Pharazon’s army was just that intimidating, on a military basis.
“only happened against Ar-Pharazon, not against the Last Alliance.”
Ar-Pharazon had by far the greater force. The Last Alliance was the rump survivors of Numenor’s fall, plus various elves, not that numerous.
“even greater majesty than Numenoreans”
Individually, yes. But there were a lot more Numenoreans.
“because that army was too powerful” …that’s exactly what I’ve been saying all along.
“Numenorean magical powers” — there’s plenty of evidence of mental powers. But again, I’m only invoking them here as a possible factor in resistance, not in intimidation.
“Fine. That leaves us with both Aragorn and Gandalf saying Sauron is afraid. They could be wrong, but why would Tolkien want to make them wrong, how does that strengthen the story? The theme of people rejecting the Ring’s power for principled reasons is not improved by the power not actually being an option.”
I concur with the thematic reasoning, but theme must flow from the story, not being used to justify it.
Another issue with the idea that Sauron was afraid: the Mouth of Sauron was extremely cocky and sure of himself. The demands he offers to Aragorn are reasonable only if Sauron was sure of winning.
“Hard to master the ring when you can barely touch it for pain. I’d venture the One extra-hated Isildur for taking it.”
Exactly, Isildur couldn’t master the Ring. Now, why the Ring had made itself untouchable by Isildur, but not by Gollum, Bilbo or Frodo? Evidently because it had a will of its own and recognized enemies from allies and bystanders. From which we can deduce that, had Aragorn owned it for a prolonged period of time, he too would have been unable to touch it.
“Sauron never *left* the Riing.”
You know what I meant. The nightmare scenario for Sauron of the Ring being in the hands of his enemies had already happened.
“Good thing I never said that. I brought up mental powers just as a reason for them to resist influence, I never said they were telepathically contesting Sauron’s will over his troops. All the texts are quite clear that Ar-Pharazon’s army was just that intimidating, on a military basis.”
From that it follows that the Ring can’t change the outcome of a desperate military situation. It can give suggestions of courage to allies and of fear to enemies, but they always see the situation in front of them.
And the situation was that Aragorn was outnumbered 10 to 1.
From which we can deduce that, had Aragorn owned it for a prolonged period of time, he too would have been unable to touch it.
Bilbo owned it longer than Isildur and could still touch it.
From which we can deduce that the Ring would have left Aragorn touch it, or not, according to its own purposes.
The Ring’s motive appears to be that Isildur grew frightened and aware of the peril, but Sauron isn’t going to believe that Aragorn felt frightened at the prospect of moral peril.
I dunno, man. Tolkien said multiple times, in character and as an author, that Sauron was afraid of someone else getting the Ring, and you’re going through contortions to justify ignoring his plain statements.
‘sure of winning’. Have you heard of bluffs? Anyway, of course Sauron was confident of winning then, the whole point was for Aragorn to appear as an overconfident Ringlord bait. “too fast and too far”. “Oh look at me, I’m a dumbass newb, please empty Mordor of all your armies to crush me and take your Ring back, pay no attention to the hobbit behind the curtain.”
I figure a prudent Ringlord Aragorn would not run off into the wild like you claimed, but would stay in Minas Tirith, *a highly defensible city with an army*, re-fortify the Anduin crossing points, and work on mastering the Ring and building up his armies. Sauron would have to force a river crossing again, this time without the Witch-king and against the One Ring. Aragorn would have the Gondorian forces that had been kept south to deal with the now-nullified Corsair threat, plus whatever else he could scrape up — in the long run probably conquering Dunland and Umbar, adding them to his empire.
“which we can deduce that, had Aragorn owned it for a prolonged period of time, he too would have been unable to touch it”
That’s not a deduction that’s a guess. We can equally guess that the Ring resented Isildur in particular for chopping it off. Or that it didn’t recognize Isildur at all, but was simply hot from being cut off the Black Hand, and had settled down 3000 years later. Or that the problem wasn’t the Ring — Tolkien is inconsistent about the heat thing, which anyway was from having been worn on the Black Hand, not from it generating heat spontaneously — but Isildur for all his power lacking the domineering mindset to master the Ring.
“The nightmare scenario for Sauron of the Ring being in the hands of his enemies had already happened.”
Nonetheless Tolkien wrote over and over again that Sauron was afraid of his enemies getting the Ring. Gandalf senses his fear, “Hunt For the Ring” says it multiple times in different ways. Letter 246 has one line that could be read as Galadriel being deceived as to her potential, but *also* has a description of how a Maia like Gandalf could destroy Sauron utterly without even an army — giving a solid reason for fear. The ultimate nightmare scenario would be say Saruman getting the One: he’s already a mini-Sauron, a Maia used to domination, well able to use the One for its intended purpose, plus the possibility of him wrenching the Ring to himself and destroying Sauron. Isildur was nearly a best-case outcome for Sauron.
“the Ring can’t change the outcome of a desperate military situation”
That doesn’t follow at all. Handing out courage and fear on the battlefield *is* a way of changing the outcome of a desperate military situation. But of course it’s less effective if the other side is resistant to your fear effect.
“And the situation was that Aragorn was outnumbered 10 to 1.”
Again, the Black Gate was Aragorn deliberately looking stupid! It’s right there in the text! Too small a force, *and* too soon for mastery. Change either variable, and a military defeat of Sauron starts becoming more likely. The thought of lsildur’s Heir having the One canonically made Sauron attack earlier than he’d wanted, he didn’t want to risk giving Aragorn days or weeks of leisure. (Why do I say weeks? Sauron’s human allies were already gathering; he’d been collecting forces, and per any sensible logistics, he couldn’t keep them hanging around forever. So he was planning an attack soon… but he attacked instantly when Aragorn confronted him in the palantir.)
Anyway, I forget how this whole tangent started. But I never meant to imply that Aragorn with the Ring could beat Sauron overnight. Sauron’s fear would be a rival playing his own game: building up forces and power. Time means more mastery of the Ring, raising the chance of “these are my orcs now” shenanigans, and time+mastery means more troops with bigger morale buffs. Time also allows for trying to peel away Sauron’s human allies… It might well take many years, if ever, for Gondor to be able to *beat* Sauron, conquering Mordor a la the Last Alliance. But simply being able to save Gondor is already a big loss from Sauron’s POV. He wanted Gondor gone and Isildur’s line dead; Gondor strengthened by Isildur’s Heir with the One is a nightmare for him. At the very very least his Total World Conquest Plan just got a lot harder.
“either due to Wormtongue or a stolen map letting out the secret of his search for the One Ring in the Shire”
these two possibilities might not necessarily contradict each other: it’s possible that one source on its own would not have convinced Sauron, but that the two sources combined would have. (This happened with Stalin and assurance of Japanese non-aggression in the second world war)
Saruman is more than just arrogant and angry: he is blinded by fear and despair.
The Lord of the Rings has three major characters that fall into the dark, and all three fall due to despair. Boromir, his father, and the man who’s soldiers killed him all despair of any chance of victory, of defeating the Shadow, of holding out against the forces of Mordor. This despair drives them to try and use the Ring, which they believe is their only chance at success.
Saruman does not change his plans because he does not believe the West can win this war. Your chart showing the different outcomes is irrelevant: Saruman likely believes there are only two outcomes: an outcome in which he claims the Ring and defeats the Ring Lord, or an outcome where all the world is enslaved to the will of Sauron.
When a person thinks those are the only two possible outcomes, every risk, every evil deed becomes not only necessarily but morally acceptable. And this, more than anything else, is what leads to the corruption of Saruman.
(Written on phone, sorry for errors)
Could you (or someone else who reads this) remind me about “the man who’s soldiers killed him”? Which character was that? Where?
Saruman’s forces killed Boromir at the end of the first book/movie.
Sergei, that does not answer my question. You listed three people (at least, your English mechanics indicate a list of three):
2) his father
3) the man who’s soldiers killed him
So you actually only refer to Boromir?
I think he’s saying that Boromir, Denethor (his father), and Saruman (the man whose soldiers killed Boromir) all despair of any victory without the Ring.
Thank you! I should have been able to figure that out for myself, you’d’a thought!
Mindstalko is correct.
Thanks for confirmation! I probably should have been able to figure it all out. Must have been a bad day for what my team calls “forensic editing.”
To add to the confusion, the phrase “the man who’s (whose) soldiers killed him” seems to refer to someone whose own soldiers killed him.
Sorry about that! I always make a lot more grammar mistakes when writing on my phone, partly ’cause going back to correct small mistakes in a long message can be devilishly tricky. So when my phone autocorrects “whse” to “who’s” I just let it go if I notice it at all!
So recently I’ve been hearing from the military nerds on the forum I hang in that the new game Highfleet from Micropose is a fleet command game that actually does a good job of simulating/gamifying Operations.
(You have to use ELINT and Radio Intelligence to figure out enemy fleet movements and plot intercepts, while being very careful about your own emissions control.)
I’d be curious what your thoughts were…
Late correction, but: “you will not in some of my other writings” should be note right?
This is a long post, so I’ll add a short “abstract”. a tl;dr summary.
I Believe that dr. Devereaux scathing denunciation of Saruman’s strategy and operations, while supported by the text, is too harsh, I present a different take on events.
While Submit that Saruman’s strategy and operations were pretty good – Until he destroyed himself (and ruined Sauron’s plan) in one swift stroke, due to equal parts panic and overconfidence. and greed, let’s not forget that.
Saruman’s main objective was delaying the Rohirrim from reinforcing Gondor – something he very neatly succeeded at. Military conquest was never his goal, and his army’s mission was mainly defense, deterrence and raids. He mainly sought to prevent, or at least delay, the muster of the Rohirrim. When that failed, he attempted an audacious plan to disrupt the chain of command with a sudden strike, a high-risk-high reward operation, which failed – but due to Trees and Wizards failed enough to completely ruin his plan.
While it is possible that he would have done so anyway, it was the lure of the Ring that pushed him to this end, and so ruined him, and saved Gondor.
What happens when the same set of facts are explained by two theories?
The first test is simple. Are the known facts explained fully by both theories? Are there any contradictions? If only one theory survives close scrutiny, it is considered the true one. But what happens when both theories are supported by the known facts?
In science, the solution is to devise an experiment, where the different theories will predict different results, and see which one is proved right. In the Humanities, alas, no such experiment exists (barring the discovery of new information). When two theories are covered by the text, it is a matter of opinion which is right.
I respectfully disagree with Dr. Devereaux’s analysis of Saruman’s strategy and operations, but (unlike his analysis of the Uruk Hai) I agree it is supported by the text. I guess I’ll just let the readers read and decide.
I have three presuppositions to my theory, two supported by the text, and one only implied:
Saruman is convinced that Sauron is going to win, and nothing (Short of the Valar coming to town) is going to stop him.
This is evident in the text. “There is no hope left in elves and dying numenor” and all that,
Saruman may be a fool, but he’s not stupid. He can count. He can see impossible odds when the stare at him.
Sauron’s orders to Saruman were to prevent the Rohirim from reinforcing Gondor.
This isn’t in the text, but it certainly makes sense, and parallels the Haradrim’s fleet objective. Not to mention that failing to do just that turns out to be e critical failure,
1. What are Saruman’s strategic objectives?
1a – Survival. This isn’t a trivial objective. Saruman was, for centuries, the head of the white council, chief of Sauron’s enemies in middle earth. If Sauron triumphs, Saruman is dead meat. It isn’t enough for him to kow-tow and promise to be good. He needs to demonstrate his complete and total devotion, his utter loyalty, or else he has no chance. It isn’t enough for him to be useful, or powerful – it might even be worse.
1b – Be a lieutenant. This is a secondary objective. This requires him to be useful, and if possible even powerful, so it’s better for Sauron to let him join at a senior level – as long as he still survives!
2. What is Saruman’s mission?
This is one of my presuppositions, as written above. Prevent the Rohirim from reinforcing Gondor.
3. What are his challenges and advantages?
I. Military conquest is not in the cards.
Rohan is a local military Juggernaut. While it takes them time to get up to speed, when they are aroused, nobody local can stop them. Rohan has at least 10,000, probably 12,000 ELITE KNIGHTS, and who knows how many infantry. They have at least 2 heavily fortified cities and a very strong fortress. They also have the loyalty of their subjects, while Saruman had to ally himself with the dunlandings (Rohan’s ancestral enemies) and orcs (every one’s ancestral enemies). Until Sauron comes to town, Saruman is not going to conquer anything,
Saruman is not stupid. He knows this.
II. Isengard is practically unassailable.
As Théoden puts it AFTER the battle of helm’s deep: “There are not enough men in the mark, not if they were all gathered together and healed of wounds and weariness, to assault the stronghold of Saruman”.
While behind his walls, Saruman is safe.
III. The Orthanc is impervious to anything, except perhaps Sauron.
Even if the worst came to pass, Saruman will remain safe.
4. What are Saruman’s goals:
I. Prevent the Muster of the Rohirrim.
If he can prevent, or even delay enough, the muster, Saruman wins.
II. If the muster takes place, prevent the Rohirrim from reinforcing Gondor.
A much more risky proposition, and one where he might lose even if he does everything right.
5. And finally, the wildcard. what happens if Saruman finds the Ring of Power?
I. Saruman claims the ring, defeats Sauron, and reigns in an age of order and reason.
The jackpot! Saruman Rulez! White FTW!!!
II. Saruman finds the ring, and decides he can’t overthrow Sauron. He hands the ring to Sauron.
Mission accomplished, This is the ultimate act of loyalty. Saruman’s life is safe, and a pretty sizable chunk of real-estate to rule is pretty much guarantied.
III. Saruman can’t find the ring, but discovers information critical to its retrieval.
Major brownie points. His life is pretty safe, and he really needs to foul up to get on Sauron’s bad side.
IV. Saruman finds the ring, tries to take down Sauron, and fails.
Well, at least he went down swinging…
So, taking all this into account, we can appreciate Saruman’s campaign up to 1 march, when everything went wrong:
I. The Muster hasn’t happened yet – and it’s so close! A couple for weeks and it’s mission accomplished!
II. The leadership of the Rohirrim is all but disabled – the king is incapacitated, Eomer is arrested and stripped of rank and power, and Theodred is dead.
III. By a miracle of organization and logistics, Saruman managed to raise almost overnight a substantial army. Not enough to take down the mark, but enough to threaten it, and perhaps draw off their power.
Iv: The ring was within reach! He sends a sortie, but they are destroyed before getting back.
Saruman doesn’t know it, but they captured hobbits, pissed off the mordor orc, who managed to get word back to base, before being destroyed, This is bad. Salvageable, but bad.
But, apart from that. so far so good. But then, the 2nd of march arrives. On that fell day, out of the blue, everything falls apart. Theoden is healed, and rides for battle.
This is bad. In a few days, Rohan will muster it’s forcers, and enjoy a vast military advantage, but more importantly – mission failure became a distinct possibility.
At this point, these are the options open to Saruman, and they are mostly bad options:
I. The conservative option. Take his army to the field, fight a defensive battle, slowly retreat to Isengard, and withstand a siege. There are two main outcomes:
a. Rohan commits to the siege, and fails to reinforce Gondor. Mission accomplished!
b. Rohan leaves a blocking force, and sends most of it’s cavalry to Gondor, Mission failed.
II. limited conquest: Try to take over westfold. Bad idea. While he cam smash the westfold forces, the king’s force will still be able to raid and harry him, but more importantly, the Muster will be called. Once the Muster is over, the Rohirrim are much too strong, and his army will lose swiftly.
III. attempt a siege against the king’s force: Impossible. Again, in a few days the full might of Rohan will gather, and any siege will be broken almost immediately.
But then, an enticing option appears: The king leaves Edoras and rides to the westfold, within striking distance of Saruman’s forces, with only 1000 knights! Before calling the Muster! This is an amazing opportunity. If he can just destroy that army, Rohan’s ruling line will be destroyed, and the confusion that will ensue may be enough to prevent the Muster! Even if he fails, the outrage may be enough to draw Rohans’ full force against him!
It’s true, his army wasn’t trained or equipped for sieges and castle assaults, but he has a new trick up his sleeve (his blasting fire), and hopefully numbers will take the place of training.
It has to be quick, though. in a few days, the full might of Rohan will come crashing down on him. He can’t take the time to make any prolonged preparations. This is his brief window – While Erkbrand’s army is routed and dispersed in the field, and Rohan’s forces haven’t started to muster. He must strike now!
Anyway, his army is too big to completely fail. Even if the assault fails, and the army retreats, we’ll just regroup. There aren’t enough riders to truly take down such a large army, not even in retreat. Not yet, anyway. And he has the blocking force he sent east, to prevent reinforcements, and act as a base in case of failure.
But the icing on the cake, is the promise of the Ring. As Gandalf says about Saruman: “His thought is ever on the ring. Was it present in the battle? was it found? What if Theoden, Lord of the Mark, should come by it and learn of its power? That is the danger he sees.” There’s a chance that if he can catch the king, he gets The Ring. That is a chance that’s worth taking.
(And this is the real problem. Saruman must seem, above all, loyal. Since his sortie to try and catch the ring, he neglected to check in, and Sauron’s already suspicious. Now he’s risking everything on this chance, and he still hopes for the Ring, so he still doesn’t ask permission. They say it’s better to ask forgiveness then to ask permission, but only when you try to show initiative. If you want to appear loyal, always ask permission! It’s true, if he gets the ring or information on it, he’s golden. But he doesn’t, and that’s a problem.)
And so, the doomed raid is called. Saruman’s army makes a forced march, forms and storms the fords, routing Erkbrands forces. His Wargry rides hell-for-leather to try and catch the king’s forces, but are not enough to stop them. His infantry make ANOTHER forced march, and reaches Helm’s Gate that very night, and without pausing for rest, immediately starts assaulting this incredibly strong fortress, again and again, gnawing at the defenses until they fail, one by one.
What a strong, disciplined, spirited force. What cohesion!
But after TWO forced marches, and TWO bloody, intense battles, the army first wavers (at the horn-call), and then breaks (at the cavalry charge). It’s OK. There’s a lot of reserves back there. The line will hold,
But then. Trees and Wizards,
First impossible thing – The forest. What? What’s there? It wasn’t there yesterday! Even the farthest ranks begin to waver.
Second impossible thing: Erkbrand’s army, the one they just routed last night, somehow appears as if by magic, and charges them! This is too much. The army routs, and either surrenders, or flees into the forest, and is completely destroyed.
And what about the army sent east, the blocking force? Destroyed by Hourons.
And what about that unassailable fortress, Isengard? Destroyed by Ents.
Sauron’s not gonna be pleased.
Up to the 2nd of march, Saruman was pretty solid. He trashed and routed the Ents nearest to him. He managed to build a sizable army. but most importantly, his PSYOPS were on the brink of accomplishing their mission. He tried a long shot to get the ring, and he knows it failed. He doesn’t know how much it made him seem bad to Sauron, but overall everything seems OK.
He didn’t plan for the Ents rousing themselves, but he wasn’t really scared. This kind of thing hadn’t happened in millennia, and anyway he probably had the means to take them out anyway. Overconfident.
Then, something went wrong, and Saruman panicked, and sent his army on a doomed raid. It was a long shot, with a decent chance of success, but it risked losing it all if it failed. And it did. Completely. Because of Trees and Wizards. If he had to just contend with humans, it might have worked, and anyway probably wouldn’t have failed so much. But as Dr. Devereaux said, he’s a wizard. He should have known better.
Saruman was a vein, overconfident, greedy fool. But he wasn’t stupid. He took a long shot, and it nearly worked. When you try for the long-shot and score, you seem awesome. But when you try for the long shot and miss, you just look stupid.
But when you fail Sauron, you’re also dead. So it was a stupid risk. But the lure of the Ring proved too much for him.
I appreciate you put a lot into the theory but I do not think the books support your articulation of his mission as to delay Rohan from supporting Gondor–there is too much explicit discussion that it was about him trying to get power for himself. Perhaps though if we only looked at the films you could support this theory though–it’s hard to remember exactly what was in the films.
I think the #1 problem with this analysis is that he has [i] already begun the war with Rohan by the time he makes his stunning gamble [/i]. His army is already marching on Rohan before the lightning column of riders even begin to move to reinforce the Westfold – Saruman’s forces hit Erkenbrand at the Ford on the *same day* Theoden sets out his force that are riding like hell, so they didn’t depart Isengard after he found out about the column (Unless they’re secretly a motorised brigade), and he didnt have remote field control – he wound up his clockwork army and fired it at rohan days prior
Really late comment, I know, but: I think one thing left out of this analysis is that Saruman wasn’t a free agent. He was a treacherous agent, but we know he was at least nominally working for Mordor. Pippen’s interview in the Seeing-Stone started with Sauron demanding to know why Saruman was so late in reporting–establishing that 1) the two had spoken, fairly regularly, and 2) Sauron considered Saruman to be acting as an agent, and that Saruman was at least going through the motions of it. We also know that Sauron can inflict tremendous mental anguish through the link of the Seeing-Stones. We also know (via the Nazgul that arrives that night, and via some text in the Unfinished Tales) that Saruman had been in contact with Sauron via the Nazgul. Grima was acting as a triple agent as well.
What this means is that we can’t look at Saruman’s actions as isolated from Mordor’s actions. Saruman must at least pretend to act as a lieutenant for Mordor. If he fails to do so, Sauron crushes him.
This paints the war against Rohan in a different light. Saruman’s psy-ops were fine as long as everything was going according to Sauron’s original timetables. Once the Ring went South, that time table advanced significantly, for a few reasons. First, Sauron likely wants to put pressure on whoever has the Ring (assuming it works as advertised). This would push that person to attack too quickly. Sauron’s not 100% ready, but the West isn’t 50% ready, so this is in Sauron’s favor. Pressing the attack against Rohan is part of that strategy. Second, psy-ops don’t pin down troops as effectively as an army. Sauron doesn’t want Rohan helping Gondor, so he used Saruman to attempt to pin down Rohan. Sauron comes out ahead either way–if Saruman wins Gondor falls (it almost fell after Saruman failed), and if Saruman fails Sauron doesn’t have to deal with Saruman later. There’s zero cost to Sauron (Isengard bears all the costs to these operations), and every outcome puts him ahead.
I think the fact that Saruman had made and was wearing a Ring of Power is also significant here. It’s a very small detail, a one-off comment, but remember how these rings work. Sauron controls the Nazgul through the Nine. He attempted to control the Dwarves through the Seven. When Sauron fell the work of the Elves–built through the Three–died with him. The ultimate source of power for the Rings of Power was Sauron. Saruman made a Ring and openly communicated with Sauron, basically inviting Sauron to take over his mind. We know from Sauron’s dealings with Denathor that Sauron can manipulate how people think, in various ways, and we know that Saruman’s pride is his weakness.
This opens up some possibilities for Sauron.
Again, Saruman’s forces are basically free for Sauron–in fact, destroying them is a good thing ultimately. Sauron knows that the Ring is on the move. So why not use Saruman’s forces to find it? There’s a risk that Saruman will master the Ring, but not a huge one given that the Nazgul are in play. Saruman would THINK he’s being smart–commit to war against Rohan as a feint, while really looking for the Ring. Sauron, on the other hand, has contingency plans for any outcome, and the forces available to take action, as well as detailed intelligence on Saruman’s plans.
Interesting viewpoint, and you marshal your facts convincingly. One point where I either disagree or at least would add adjust these obserations:
While we know from the text how Sauron has used the palantir to influence Denethor (through deception and manipulation) and how an unsuspecting and untrained Hobbit reacted, we do *not* know precisely how this mode of communication would work between two of the Maiar. Sauron had more “time in grade” being evil in the lands of mortals, but essentially, Sauron and Saruman were the same type of being, which suggests to me that Saruman might have had a greater degree of resistance than you give him credit for.
“Wizard Needs New Strategy, Badly” Found the Gauntlet player! I love it.
Late and long and JRRT nerd but…
” I tend to share CGP Grey’s understanding of how the ring works: the promises that it can be used to overthrow or replace Sauron are just lies”
OK so watched the video and I think its kinda weak tea. I feel its a bit reductionist and ignores the clear text of just the LOTR and Hobbit (w/o even needing to look to the UT or Silmarillion) on more than a few factual points.
Yes its true for Sauron the key thing about the ring was that it was supposed to have provided a tool that would allow him to dominate 16 Eldar (plus the also those using the un-numbered lesser rings presumably built with the same fault). For story purposes however you can’t ignore that to do that Sauron is not just crafting a wifi device to access his back door – a cool piece of tech that is – but a ‘heart in the box’ build out of his now severed and discrete portion of himself and his power.
And discrete it is. We know that portion is discrete from him. Having take full form again Sauron cannot locate his lost ring. He cannot tell when it is worn by another. Even somebody who benefits from its passive effects on mortals (to do evil no less) and who also claims in ignorance ownership of ‘his’ precious that does not alert Sauron, not at all. Nor does passive use by Sam (who knows what he has) alert Sauron even in his own land of Mordor. Even passive use on a criminally left unguarded and unused Numenorean relic of power only vaguely sort of clues S into general directions. In other words Frodo as to be wearing the ring and actively using another power as well to really attract attention. Its only when Frodo who knows exactly what the ring is and claims it by his own name as his own is Sauron finally made aware. Only a direct challenge to ownership of the Maiar-Sauron trapped in the ring seems to provide GPS grade location.
Thus it seems difficult to contradict the direct statements of Gandalf (I though we were not suppose to to do that) at the Last Debate. That is that there were individuals in the room who could master the latent Maiar-Sauron power in the ring. But also that was not a thing one did in a day. Galadriel says the same. As does Gandalf in the Shadow of The Past (on the first point). Sauron strikes in confidence not because the ring has a just delude person mode but because they would not have had time to master it and we know he can be sure nobody has even tried yet (or maybe he can’t I mean it one off and maybe he lost the manual).
Also Sauron is beatable (with the ring) – he is not Morgoth. He was beat by Gil-galad, Elendil and a supporting cast of Isildur, Elrond and Cirdan. The West still has more than enough people to fit that bill vs a Sauron w/o the ring (we are clearly introduced to them all in the LOTR). Its actually not so much the west is weak and Sauron stronger but that west has become apathetic and detached.
I think the ring power as only an illusion minimizes the real risk that the west takes by picking Gandalf’ s ridiculous hail marry leap of faith (I mean if it was more than that he would hasd some entrance plan one assumes he would have shared with Aragorn for getting into Mordor). If the Ring really could raise someone to cast down Sauron directly and they deluded themselves into not thinking they would be corrupted eventually. Or when you consider had the ring question been punted by tossing in the sea – the west had come together and was likely in a position to at minimum pen Sauron up in Mordor and knock off at least a couple more Nazgul, retake Umbar and who knows with the Balrog dead reopen Mithril production and start sending missionaries East and South and that w/o the ring Sauron can’t hand out the rings he holds. I mean really Gandalf was asking for the most low probability high risk option vs the ones that really looked better.
I mean really Gandalf was asking for the most low probability high risk option vs the ones that really looked better.
I don’t think is really a supportable conclusion. Gandalf isn’t a fool, nor are the other people at the Council of Elrond, who also agree to his proposal. If all the wisest people in Middle Earth agree that destroying the Ring is the best course of action, I think we can assume that they’re correct.
Also Sauron is beatable (with the ring) – he is not Morgoth. He was beat by Gil-galad, Elendil and a supporting cast of Isildur, Elrond and Cirdan. The West still has more than enough people to fit that bill vs a Sauron w/o the ring (we are clearly introduced to them all in the LOTR). Its actually not so much the west is weak and Sauron stronger but that west has become apathetic and detached.
It’s not that the West has become apathetic and detached, as if they simply need to stir themselves up and start doing things again. It’s that the men and elves simply aren’t as strong as they once were. The elves are less numerous than they were back in the Second Age, and even the best men are weaker than their ancestors 3,000 years ago. Sauron was beaten before, but it doesn’t necessarily follow that he can be beaten again, with his enemies having undergone several millennia’s worth of decline.
As for “mastering the Ring”, Gandalf makes it pretty clear that anyone trying to use the Ring will eventually be corrupted by it. Heck, Boromir’s (partially) corrupted just by spending time in close proximity to it, without ever so much as putting it on. Using the Ring to destroy Sauron might be possible, but if the winner just sets himself up as Sauron Mk. II, there’s not really much point.
I mean, we know using the Ring is a fool’s errand; it’s certainly possible to defeat Sauron with it, but that’s still a lose condition for the Free Peoples, because whoever wins that way just sets themselves up as the next Dark Lord. Meanwhile bottling Sauron up with military force runs into the problem that he’s an immortal shapeshifting sorcerer, so he’s going to escape eventually and then cause trouble again. Or he could decide to come out and personally throw down with your military force. There’s not really anyone left the equal of Gil-galad or Elendil in combat.
“while Tolkien wavered initially on which ‘two towers’ are The Two Towers, he settled not on Orthanc and Barad-dur, but on Orthanc and Minas Morgul”
Tolkien really confirmed that? I’d be curious to know the source of this. I always assumed (until the release of that movie of that title, and even then I kept my own counsel), that the towers in question were Minas Morgul and Minas Tirith, but maybe both Peter Jackson and I were wrong…
Heck, assume that the One Ring giving you power enough to challenge Sauron isn’t a lie but that it takes years of effort to unlock. Is Saruman going to have those years of effort before the armies of Mordor ride in and take his head. Well, clearly, no.
“but that it takes years of effort to unlock”
We don’t really have data on this. Isildur hadn’t mastered it in two years, but it also literally hurt him to even try. Sauron was alarmed enough by believing Isildur’s Heir had the One to change his plans and attack Gondor ASAP. Galadriel told Frodo that it would at best take him a lot of work to use the One effectively, being unused to mental power or the domination of others’ wills.
OTOH, Saruman is an Incarnate Maia, versed in Ring-lore, and already adept at dominating others — not just his Voice, but a mental effect he cast across the length of Rohan, as evidenced early in The Two Towers. If anyone could just pick up the One and start using it, it would be him.
And, per Letter 246, as a fellow Maia, Saruman might be able to bypass the need for a military victory, wrenching the One entirely to himself and in effect destroying Sauron forever.